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91  FOREWORD
This research report is part of an EU-funded project Gender-sensitive 
return assistance for vulnerable groups of returnees. The one and 
a half year long project kicked off in July 2009, and the research 
was carried out in Tampere Peace Research Institute (Tapri) at the 
University of Tampere. The project’s main source of funding is the 
European Union’s Return Fund (RF), which is part of the EU’s General 
Program of Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows (SOLID), 
nationally coordinated by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior. 
The aims of the research were two-fold. The first research report, 
Gender, Vulnerability and the Obligation to Return: An Overview of 
Return Assistance to ‘rejected’ asylum seekers in the Nordic Countries, 
published in January 2010 reviewed the policies in Finland, Sweden, 
Norway, and Denmark for the return of ‘rejected’ asylum seekers. The 
study conducted by Tiina Kanninen aimed at providing guidelines 
for the development and coordination of the Finnish return politics 
highlighting that other Nordic countries are more systematic and 
determined than Finland in both their thinking and practices of return 
assistance. The study also served as a necessary background for the 
second part of the project that focused on the experiences of gendered 
vulnerability, persecution, violence and trauma of Afghans and Iraqis 
in the countries of origin and on the way to the West. While the first 
part of the project opened perspectives to the administrative and 
official aspects of return this second part at hand is strongly empirical 
in nature. We thus urge the reader to approach the two reports as 
complementary perspectives on a single question.
***
I consider myself fortunate having had a chance to carry out several 
years of ethnographic research among asylum seekers and refugees 
in Finland prior to starting the empirical work for this report in 
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October 2009. In many respects the problems encountered while 
conducting fieldwork among asylum claimants who are processing 
traumatic experiences of the past and facing an uncertain future 
were familiar to me. In one central respect I was, however, entering 
a completely new territory. While I consider myself well informed 
in the Iraqi refugees’ experiences I must confess that I was only 
superficially aware of the complexity of the crisis in Afghanistan 
and the multifaceted experiences of millions of Afghan refugees 
worldwide. Moreover, being an anthropologist specialized on the 
Arab world I felt both socially and linguistically very much at home 
with the Iraqis, whereas my access to the Afghan interlocutors’ 
personal narratives was completely dependent on interpreters. 
Surprisingly, during the course of the fieldwork my earlier contacts 
with the Iraqis in Finland extending back to early 2000s proved to 
be pivotal for carrying out both field works. One name stands out in 
this respect. I had cooperated closely for over three years with Riadh 
Muthana, an Iraqi journalist and human rights activist and former 
political prisoner of the Saddam Hussein era who settled in Finland 
in 1998. Riadh not only arranged dozens of meetings with recently 
arrived Iraqi asylum seekers but utilized his extensive networks in 
order to find suitable interpreters fluent in Kurdish, Dari and Farsi. All 
our interviews with Iraqi Arabs were carried out in Arabic, whereas 
the views of the Kurdish interviewees were translated by interpreters 
from Sorani Kurdish to Arabic. With respect to interviews with 
Afghans we turned to another Iraqi friend of Riadh, Hassan Ugla 
– refugee in Finland since 1995 and fluent in Farsi and Dari. In this 
sense the field work was a truly collective effort. Undoubtedly the 
entire research process benefitted greatly from the fact that both 
men have a refugee background and thus the entire research team 
was able to bypass many of the obstacles that frequently emerge 
in interviews with asylum claimants, conducted in challenging 
contexts such as asylum reception centers and housing compounds 
for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum. With the generous help 
provided by the Employment and Economic Development Center 
(EEDC) in Turku the project was able to hire Riadh’s wife Majda 
Ajlan to conduct interviews with Afghan women within EEDC’s 
practical work training program. While being tremendously grateful 
for the invaluable help provided by the participants of the research 
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team, I wish to emphasize that I take full responsibility of the analysis 
of the data and the composition of the research report, with all its 
possible shortcomings. 
The field work period conducted for this project was largely 
about listening to people who had personally experienced the 
consequences of the global war on terror initiated by the George 
W. Bush administration following the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
strikes in the U.S.. In the case of Iraq the people involved in this study 
directly experienced the Western military invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
the dramatic collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the rapid 
descent of the Iraqi society into chaos. They witnessed the extremely 
bloody circle of sectarian and ethnically motivated violence that 
left behind more than 108,000 civilian casualties and produced 
the largest refugee crisis in the Middle East since the Palestinian 
exodus of 1948. The Afghans for their part had histories of exile 
and temporary refuge in the neighboring countries extending back 
to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The western 
invasion of the year 2001 and the collapse of the brutal Taliban 
rule in the country allowed millions of Afghans to return home but 
the deterioration of the security situation in most of Afghanistan 
initiated a new phase in the global mobility of the Afghans.
Over the course of five months (October, November, December 
2009, January and June 2010 we interviewed thirty five Iraqis who 
had arrived in Finland from 2005 onwards and resided in asylum 
centers and private homes. While the majority of our interlocutors 
were ‘rejected’ asylum claimants, we also heard a number of 
displaced Iraqis who had entered Finland as quota refugees from 
Syria. I myself interviewed two Iraqis and one Turkish Kurdish man 
in a detention center in Helsinki and organized series of discussions 
with social workers of asylum centers and lawyers working with 
asylum claimants.
In order to gain a deeper perspective in the current developments 
in Iraq, Riadh Muthana made three visits in different parts of Iraq 
in 2009 and 2010, interviewing not only public authorities and 
activists in non-governmental organizations but also ordinary Iraqis 
concerning their experiences in the political turmoil following the 
occupation. In the last stage of the research Riadh traced a number 
of Iraqis who were under threat of forced return to Iraq from Sweden 
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and interviewed two men in Gothenburg in September 2011 and one 
woman via Skype calls. 
Between July and October 2010 we managed to find fifteen 
Afghan asylum claimants who were willing to share their experiences 
with us. The Interviews took place in multicultural centers, reception 
centers of asylum claimants and housing compounds for minor 
asylum claimants in south western Finland. Unfortunately, given 
the scarcity of time and lack of prior experience of fieldwork with 
Afghan asylum seekers we were not able to reach a similar richness 
of data as in the case of Iraqis. Thus, as the reader will notice, the 
description of the Afghan experience is heavily supplemented by 
extensive reading of research rapports, media items and newspaper 
articles.
Marko Juntunen
Helsinki
January 11. 2011.
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2  INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of an increasingly abrupt public migration debate 
in EU Member States, even countries with a tradition of considerably 
liberal migration policies – such as Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the 
U.K., and the Netherlands – have adopted stricter policies towards 
asylum claimants. Largely as a result of these developments, the 
number of asylum claims peaked in Finland in 2008 and the following 
year the Government of Finland begun to react to the new situation. 
Return, deportation, and criteria for granting and rejecting asylum 
claims entered the public consciousness in Finland, like in many 
Western European contexts. Finland introduced several initiatives 
aiming at reducing the number of unfounded asylum applications 
by delimiting family reunification, rejecting the applicants’ rights 
to work, and speeding up the processing times of asylum claims. 
In addition, policies of detention and removal of refused asylum 
claimants were to be revised.
Iraq and Afghanistan remain in 2010 among the most dangerous 
places on the earth nevertheless many asylum claimants in Finland 
have recently received negative asylum decisions – often counter to 
the advice given by UNHCR – and thus their futures remain open.1 
1 Suomi palauttaa irakilaisia turvapaikanhakijoita. [Finland will return Iraqi asy-
lum claimants] Yle Uutiset, May 5, 2009. Available online at: http://yle.fi/uutiset/ 
kotimaa/2009/05/suomi_palauttaa_irakilaisia_turvapaikanhakijoita_728142.html  
 Thors: Suomen tarkistettava linjaansa Irakin turvapaikanhakijoiden suhteen. 
[Finland needs to revise its policy concerning Iraqi asylum claimants] Yle Uuti-
set, April 27, 2009. Available online at: http://www.yle.fi/uutiset/kotimaa/2009/04/
thors_linjaus_irakilaispakolaisten_suhteen_tarkistettava_708459.htm
 Suomi voi ryhtyä palauttamaan pohjoisirakilaisia ja afganistanilaisia turvapai-
kanhakijoita. [Finland can begin returning asylum claimants from the north of Iraq 
and Afghanistan] Yle Uutiset, January 3, 2007. Available online at: 
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Finnish authorities have displayed considerably more reluctance to 
return Iraqis and Afghans to the countries of origin than Sweden 
and Denmark. However, willingness to start large scale returns, 
particularly those of Iraqis, has been voiced by Finnish immigration 
authorities several times in 2009 and 2010. 
While a more restrictive asylum policy is under construction in 
Finland, there is very little official debate on what the actual content 
of Finnish return policy should look like.2 Neither the rationality of 
forced or assisted returns to Iraq and Afghanistan, nor the future 
options of returned migrants have entered official political debate 
in Finland. This means that while a large proportion of the asylum 
decision for Iraqis and Afghans are negative, the asylum seekers 
receive very little information concerning the different options they 
have until they are obliged to leave Finland. While Sweden has 
engaged in hundreds of highly problematic returns, the considerable 
advantage of the Swedish system is that the asylum applicants are 
from the outset provided information as to what follows from both 
positive and negative decisions on asylum claims.
 The experiences of violence and persecution of Iraqis and Afghans 
interviewed for this study are extremely heterogeneous and highly 
complex. This poses new challenges for policy makers and immigration 
authorities. While international asylum migration has for decades been 
predominantly a masculine trait of adult men, over the last decade an 
increasing number of single mothers, unmarried women, and young 
people unaccompanied by elders are claiming for asylum in Finland, 
like in other EU Member States. The subjective experiences of Iraqis 
and Afghans become understandable only against the background of 
the social and political history of the regions in question and thus they 
will be discussed in length in the following pages.
http://www.yle.fi/uutiset/kotimaa/2007/01/suomi_voi_ryhtya_palauttamaan_poh-
joisirakilaisia_ja_afganistanilaisia_turvapaikanhakijoita_225047.html;jsessionid=B
C8903B66889970315B25BEBA37611BC?name=useFontSize&path=per cent2F&v
alue=normal&redirectUrl=per cent2Fuutisetper cent2Fkotimaaper cent2F2007per-
cent2F01percent2Fsuomi_voi_ryhtya_palauttamaan_pohjoisirakilaisia_ja_afganista-
nilaisia_turvapaikanhakijoita_225047.html&refresh=null 
2 Kanninen T. (2010). Gender, Vulnerability and the Obligation to Return: An 
Overview of Return Assistance to ’Rejected’ Asylum Seekers in the Nordic Countries. 
Occasional Paper No. 98. Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere.
15
Large-scale violence and the collapse of the state structures 
always produce complex forms of vulnerability with effects not only 
on kin and household but also on normative order, in particular 
notions concerning propriety and sexuality. Murder and harassment 
of homosexuals, forced marriages and abductions, and rape of 
women and children are integral parts of the ‘logic’ of violence in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan. Security vacuums leave room for criminal 
gangs and networks of organized crime to engage in kidnappings for 
ransom and trafficking of women and children for prostitution. 
Migration debates in the West should not ignore the fact that 
many forms of gendered vulnerability are in fact results of the legal 
impasse encountered by the asylum seekers in search of shelter. 
For thousands of Iraqis and Afghans the dangers and trauma they 
experience on the way to the West, or while circulating from country 
to country as refused asylum seekers without legal residence, may 
be even more threatening than the violence at home. Thousands of 
people have lost their lives on the way to the West; in the mountains 
of eastern Turkey, on Evros river separating Turkey from Greece 
and on Greek – Turkish shoreline. Others encounter dangers while 
cramped in cargo containers, overcrowded fishing boats, and lorries. 
Those left in the legal limbo in the European transit countries such 
as Greece, Italy and France have no other option than to look for 
shelter in make-shift camps, where women and minors are easily 
subjected to sexual violence. 
 Based on an in-depth empirical research conducted between 
2009 and 2010, this report seeks to convey critically important first-
hand information which should be taken into serious consideration 
when formulating the future directions of Finnish asylum and return 
policies. It should be highlighted that the movement of asylum 
seekers should be observed through a gender lens. Refugee mobility 
follows particular pathways and travel trajectories which are 
cleared by earlier generations of mobile men, women and children. 
Mobility is informed by shared memories and narratives, as well as 
commonly upheld attitudes and assumptions. The nature of present 
day asylum migration can be assessed only by recognizing that the 
asylum seekers have significant information concerning political 
and gendered mechanisms that emerge hand in hand with violent 
conflicts and displacement. 
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Much of contemporary knowledge concerning the refugee 
experience is produced within state institutions that project forms 
of state power on asylum seekers, such as border guard, police, and 
immigration offices. This research, on the other hand, sought to 
provide its subjects an alternative and neutral ground to communicate 
their personal experiences without the fear that their narrations 
could endanger their futures. We believe that such a perspective is 
essential for understanding the preconditions for sustainable returns 
to Iraq and Afghanistan. 
table 1. The table indicates a considerable increase in the numbers of 
asylum claims in Finland since the year 2007. It is worth noting that in 
February 18, 2008 Sweden signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” 
regarding the repatriation of Iraqi refugees from Sweden to Iraq. Similar 
agreements were also ratified by Denmark and Norway, which may at least 
partly explain Finland’s growing attraction as a country of destination for 
Iraqis.
Afghans all decisions positive negative/returns within  
EU countries/abated applications
2010  
1.1. – 31.7
285 118 150/68/17
2009 242 95 144/112/3
2008 93 72 19/14/2
2007 159 122 36/10/1
Iraqis all decisions positive negative/returns within  
EU countries /abated applications
2010  
1.1. – 31.7.
820 408 309/147/103
2009 1023 495 438/380/90
2008 496 268 186/184/42
2007 321 221 91/90/9
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3  REFUGE AS A GENDERED  
 EXPERIENCE
Violence is a form of contextual human behavior, and it is always 
influenced by collective actions, attitudes and shared cultural 
understandings.3 The idea that war, political violence and post-
conflict situations are particularly deeply structured by gendered 
understandings has been recognized by scholars within political and 
humanistic sciences.4
The Afghan and Iraqi societies with more than three decades of 
nearly continuous violence indicate that gender is both transformed 
by conflict but also that conflict itself reflects changing understandings 
on gender. 
It is often the young men who partake in actual violent actions, 
as they are expected to fulfill their masculine responsibilities as 
defenders of women, children, and elders of their communities. 
Political violence thus enforces men to be rough and underlines a 
kind of masculinity where the roles of men and women are defined 
in terms of the protectors and the protected.5 Decades before the 
present day conflicts, both the Iraqi and Afghan societies were 
already deeply militarized, and nearly all adult males knew how to 
use guns. Nearly forty per cent of Iraq’s adult males took part in the 
war against Iran (1980–1988), and the image of the fighter as the 
prime example of masculinity and patriotic defender of the nation 
3 cf. Connell, R.W. (1987). Gender and Power. Stanford University Press, Palo Alto.
4 Kimhi, S. et. al. (2009). Getting a Life: Gender Differences in Postwar Recovery.
Kimhi, S., Eshel, Y. Zysberg, L., Hantman, S., Sex Roles, 7/8 (61). Borer, T. (2009). 
Gendered War and Gendered Peace: Commissions and Post-conflict Gender 
Violence: Lessons From South Africa. Violence Against Women. 15 (10).
5 cf. Moallem, M. (2005). Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister: Islamic 
Fundamentalism and the Politics of Patriarchy in Iran. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005.
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was widely rallied by the media, popular culture, and the regime’s 
public discourses.6
Women, on the other hand, tend to take the responsibility for 
keeping their households together (as mothers and elder sisters 
of households), and they often partake in supportive activities 
offering their services as nurses and caretakers of the victims and 
the wounded.7 
Conflicts thus tend to polarize gender roles and delimit the 
normative discourses surrounding gender and sexuality. This process 
very often leads to two central consequences. First, men cannot 
be ‘soft’ in both practical and symbolic ways. Therefore conflict 
situations very often entail a strong hetero-normative undercurrent 
and especially homosexual males become targets of aggression. 
Leading figures of armed militias, populist leaders, and conservative 
religious leaders may configure homosexuality as un-masculine and 
morally corrupt behavior that threatens the moral purity of the 
community.8
Second, women’s role as markers of morality and community 
become enhanced. In the Muslim world, this process is often 
supported by ideas referring to sectarian and ethnic identities. Both 
sect and ethnicity can be seen as socially constructed markers of 
differences, for they are supported by publicly shared understandings 
of what makes people different from each other. Differentiation 
operates, although often in highly contradictory ways, especially 
through family and kin systems, and socialization. The female body 
becomes the signifier of family, kin and moral community, and its 
6 Rohde, A. (2006). Opportunities for Masculinity and Love: Cultural Production 
in Ba’thist Iraq During the 1980s. In Ouzgane, L. (Ed.) Islamic Masculinities. Zed 
Books, London. 
7 See: Silber N. (2009). Gender and the Sectional Conflict: How Important Were 
Women to the War? University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. 
Freedman, J. (2008). Women Seeking Asylum: The Politics of Gender in the Asylum 
Determination Process in France. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 10 (2). 
8 They Want Us Exterminated: Murder, Torture, Sexual Orientation and Gender 
in Iraq. Human Rights Watch 2009. Available online at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/iraq0809webwcover.pdf
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importance as an object of both protection and aggression becomes 
underlined.9 
Like sect and ethnicity, the role of patriarchy should also not 
be overlooked. Extended violent crises paralyzed the very state 
mechanisms that had begun to liberate both Afghan and Iraqi women 
from the constraints of a patriarchal society. The deterioration of the 
infrastructure and the collapse of public services, together with severe 
economic crisis, reinforced traditional forms of authority embedded 
in relations of family and kin.10 These factors largely explain the 
emergence of a more conservative ethos concerning gender roles. 
In his classic study written in 1972, the sociologist Stanley Cohen 
suggested that at times of uncertainty and rapid change societies may 
undergo periods of heightened moral alertness, even moral panic. 
A characteristic feature of such a phase is that particular social 
groupings or individuals become defined as threats to the society’s 
key defining values, and are constructed as markers of the troubling 
question of who belongs to a community and who is excluded from 
it.11 In the case of present day Iraq and Afghanistan, systematic 
gendered violence against women, children, and sexual minorities 
reflects the kind of situations defined by Cohen. Rape, sexualized 
torture, and sporadic killings of women of the ‘wrong’ side, together 
with several hundred killings of homosexual men, were integral parts 
of the experience of both countries at the end of the first decade of 
the new Millennium. 
3.1.  Gender and asylum 
Interest towards the role of gender in the asylum experience and 
asylum decision process has increased significantly in the past 
two decades. The gendered profile of asylum claimants in Finland 
9 cf. Joseph, S. (2008). Sectarianism as Imagined Sociological Concept and as 
Imagined Social Formation. International Journal of Middle East Studies 40 (4).
10 They Want Us Exterminated: Murder, Torture, Sexual Orientation and Gender 
in Iraq. Human Rights Watch 2009. Available online at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/iraq0809webwcover.pdf 
11 Cohen, S. (1972, 70–71). Folk Devils and Moral Panics. Routledge, London.
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resembles that of other Western European countries. Nearly two 
thirds of the new entrees are men, and very often they arrive in 
target countries without accompanying family members. Women 
are much more likely to escape violence within the national 
boundaries of conflict zones due to socioeconomic constraints.12 In 
Iraq, for example, at present nearly eighty per cent of the internally 
displaced people are women with their offspring.13 The women who 
manage to enter Western Europe and apply for asylum are much 
more likely than men to be accompanied by children and spouses. 
Nearly all of those Iraqi and Afghan children who arrive in Finland 
unaccompanied by their parents are boys.14
What can be said about the role of gender within the asylum 
process in the EU in general? Are men and women treated unequally? 
Recent studies suggest highly contradictory answers. At first hand it 
seems that both women and men are at the same time both victims 
and winners because of their gendered position. The studies that 
highlight women’s vulnerability in the asylum process revolve around 
two central arguments. The first one is that women’s gendered 
position as caretakers – mothers, grandmothers, and elder sisters – 
explains why they are less likely than men to become international 
refugees.15 The second argument, in brief, is that women’s cases are 
often denied when they enter Western Europe and claim for asylum 
because their experiences of persecution are not in line with the 
official definition of a refugee.16 
The official definition of a refugee – stated in the most important 
international refugee conventions, namely the 1951 Convention 
12 Mascini, P & van Bochove, M. (2009). Gender Stereotyping in the Dutch Asylum 
Procedure: Independent Men versus Dependent Women. International Migration 
Review, 43 (1).
13 The Internally Displaced People in Iraq. Update 35, June 30, 2008. Available 
online at: http://www.iraqredcrescent.org/IDP_35_update_EN.pdf
14 Interview conducted in reception center of un-accompanied minors in Finland, 
August 2010. 
15 Freedman, J. (2008). Women Seeking Asylum: The Politics of Gender in the 
Asylum Determination Process in France. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 
10 (2). 
16 Zeigler, S & Sterwart, K.(2009). Positioning Women’s Rights within Asylum 
Policy A Feminist Analysis of Political Persecution. Frontiers 30 (2).
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relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol – reflects 
the political atmosphere of the Cold War era. Asylum claimants 
were predominantly politically convicted male dissidents from 
Eastern Europe who escaped persecution or its threat practiced by 
Communist regimes. Women were and are still less often than men 
political activists in opposition movements, trade unions and other 
civil associations. Women’s political roles tend to be more indirect 
than men’s. For example during Saddam Hussein’s rule many 
Iraqi women who opposed the Ba’ath party regime acted as secret 
couriers and took care of safe houses for male activists of banned 
underground movements. Thousands of Iraqi women experienced 
torture and extended imprisonment because of their male relatives’ 
political activities. Systematic abuse and sexual violence against 
women were explicit tools of political oppression and often violence 
was practiced as means to make arrested male family members 
confess to their interrogators. It is still today common that decision 
makers do not recognize sexual violence perpetrated by state actors 
as an essential part the logic of warfare.17
Another general disadvantage for women is that there is some 
degree of blindness towards cases of domestic violence in the asylum 
process. This applies to all EU countries. As noted above, extended 
conflicts often underline women’s role as markers of communal 
norms and social boundaries. Women’s liberties become constrained 
by the ‘protective’ practices of males. In such settings disputes over 
women’s domestic roles and behavior and dress in public spaces are 
strikingly common. In many regions of the Muslim world, these 
developments lead to an increase in ‘honor’ crimes, forced marriages, 
and assaults against women. In asylum process cases involving 
gendered forms of violence rarely lead to positive decisions for the 
applicants, as the proof of applicant’s vulnerability is often extremely 
difficult to verify.18 Women are advised to resort to the protection of 
17 Macklin, A. (1995, 226). Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories, 
Human Rights Quarterly, 17 (2).
18 Coleman, A. (2008b). It’s Tortured to Call that Gender Politics: (Re)producing 
the Public/Private Divide in Immigration Court. Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the The Law and Society Association, Hilton Bonaventure, Montreal, 
Quebec, Canada, May 27, 2008
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their respective governments and police even when the futility of 
such an attempt is widely known by Western decision makers.19
In general, women’s public and private experiences of 
persecution and violence were to a large deal unnoticed in the 
international refugee conventions of the Cold War era. Additions 
and improvements were suggested in the latter half of the 20th 
century in order to dissect and handle female-specific problems in 
asylum policy. In 1991 the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) introduced Guidelines on the Protection of 
Refugee Women, and pressed for the European Union and a number 
of European countries to implemented similar policies.20 Regardless 
of these initiatives, the gendered aspects of asylum policies and the 
effects of policy to women claimants still lack serious scrutiny. One 
indication of gender blindness is that Western European countries 
do not provide accurate gender disaggregated statistics on asylum 
seekers. The complexity of women’s experience of violence and 
persecution is often ignored by the discretionary power.21 In France, 
seventy-five per cent of the positive cases result from the decisions 
made by the court of appeal (Commission des Recours des Réfugiés 
– from 2008 onwards – Cour nationale du droit d’asile).22
Like in other EU countries, in Finland there is no explicit legal 
guidance for legal actors working with asylum cases involving 
honor violence, rape, or domestic violence. This leaves wide spaces 
19 Interview with Finnish Refugee Council, February 2010.
20 Mascini, P & van Bochove, M. (2009). Gender Stereotyping in the Dutch Asylum 
Procedure: Independent Men versus Dependent Women. International Migration 
Review, 43 (1).
21 cf. Keenan, S. (2008). The Applicant Claims to be a Lesbian: Legal Discomfort 
and Disruption in Sexuality-Based Refugee Claims Made by Women. Conference 
Papers, Law & Society; 2008 Annual Meeting. Available online at: http://www.
allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/3/5/6/4/p235649_index.
html 
22 Freedman, J. (2008). Women Seeking Asylum: The Politics of Gender in the 
Asylum Determination Process in France. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 
10 (2). 
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for alternative and contradictory readings for judges and trial 
attorneys.23 
It often seems advantageous for women to mute their individual 
agency and reduce their personal histories to easily comprehensible 
stereotyped gendered roles. Presenting oneself as a good mother, or 
a helpless victimized woman in need of protection has proved to be 
much more useful for asylum seekers than demonstrating individuality, 
self-reliance, and active rebellion against patriarchal power.24 
Due to their more explicit political roles in many conflict zones, 
men thus may seem to fit better in the official definitions of refugee. 
However, contrary to what one may expect, statistical data from 
the U.S., Canada, and the Netherlands suggests that, in fact, male 
claimants have a considerably smaller success rate than women in 
the asylum process. The reasons are three-fold. First, unlike women, 
men often are not accompanied by a spouse or children. Second, 
men tend not to follow their spouse to the destination, and they are 
more likely than women to come from countries considered safe 
in the Western Europe. Finally, in the case of women the asylum 
procedure often perceives especially single mothers with children as 
victims of gendered systems of power, while the single claimant men 
fit within the category of bogus refugees.25 
It is essential to bear in mind that political violence, as noted 
above, has always gendered repercussions that pertain to both 
men and women. Thus both male and female asylum seekers can 
23 cf. Coleman, A. (2008b). It’s Tortured to Call that Gender Politics: (Re)producing 
the Public/Private Divide in Immigration Court. Conference Papers, Law & Society; 
2008 Annual Meeting. Available online at: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_
mla_apa_research_citation/2/3/6/0/7/p236074_index.html 
24 Kneebone, S. (2005). Woman within the Refugee Construct: ‘Exclusionary Inclusion’ 
in Policy and Practice: The Australian Experience. International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 17(1)
Spijkeboer T. (1999). Stereotyping and Acceleration: Gender, Procedural 
Acceleration and Marginalized: Judicial Review in the Dutch Asylum System. In 
Noll, G. (Ed.) Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in Asylum Procedures. 
Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden.
25 Mascini, P & van Bochove, M. (2009). Gender Stereotyping in the Dutch Asylum 
Procedure: Independent Men versus Dependent Women. International Migration 
Review, 43 (1). 
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be vulnerable because of their gendered position. Deviation from 
patriarchal norms, conceptions of honor, sexual appropriateness, 
and heterosexual gender roles can cause serious threat of violence 
for both genders, yet this form of gendered vulnerability goes almost 
unnoticed in Finnish asylum process.26
It has been suggested elsewhere that blindness towards men’s 
gendered vulnerability can be interpreted as an expression of deeply 
entrenched male dominance in the Western culture. Often policy 
makers are simply unable to comprehend that men can become 
victims because of their masculinity.27
3.2.  On the way to Europe
The Iraqis and Afghans interviewed for this study have highly 
versatile personal histories of international mobility. While the 
vast majority arrived in Finland by resorting to services provided 
by migrant smugglers directly from the country of origin – after 
journeys ranging from five days to three weeks – we also interviewed 
several people who had stayed repeatedly extended periods in 
neighboring countries before embarking on a journey to West. Some 
had spent years on the road in countries generally understood as 
transit locations – such as Iran, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Italy, and 
France – while in search of shelter from the Northern Europe. 
While in transit, the future is very much dependent on a person’s 
ability to gather information and contacts facilitating further 
travel. It is increasingly common that both Iraqis and Afghans end 
up leaving their applications – and often under several different 
identities – for asylum in several EU countries. In the case of Finland 
one third of asylum claimants arriving in 2009 had also sought 
asylum in some other EU Member State.28 When the options for 
26 Interview at Finnish Refugee Council, February 16, 2010. 
27 Mascini, P & van Bochove, M. (2009). Gender Stereotyping in the Dutch Asylum 
Procedure: Independent Men versus Dependent Women. International Migration 
Review, 43 (1).
28 Finland Uses Dublin Agreement to Speed Refugee Deportation. Yle News, 
February 10, 2009. Available online at: http://yle.fi/uutiset/news/2009/10/finland_
uses_dublin_agreement_to_speed_refugee_deportation_1052376.html 
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protection seem bleak, many are left with no other alternative than 
to drift – by decision of authorities or voluntarily – from country 
to country, living in the streets and unofficial migrant encampments 
with occasional stays in asylum and detention centers. 
We encountered several difficulties when interviewing the asylum 
seekers whose claims – or petitions at the appeals and supreme courts 
– were still being processed at the time of the interviews. It was obvious 
from the beginning that smuggled migrants do not necessarily provide 
accurate information concerning their experiences and motivations in 
a pre-organized research setting. The interviewees were particularly un 
willing to share information on the last stages of the journey prior to 
their arrival in Finland. The reason for this may result from a variety 
of factors, such as pressure practiced by the migrant smugglers, stress 
and exhaustion, not to mention the obstacles created by the interview 
situation itself – especially in institutional settings such as detention 
and reception centers. Furthermore, the narrations, especially those of 
children and teenagers, were obviously often influenced by smugglers, 
other migrants and parents. It is also not uncommon that the legal 
advisors in the country of arrival provide asylum seekers advice, which 
may shape the ways in which they describe their experiences. It was 
equally difficult to gain direct answers as to why Finland was chosen 
as the country of destination. The majority of those who had paid for 
all inclusive journeys to secure a place in Europe claimed that they 
had no particular destination in mind. However, in several interviews 
our interlocutors mentioned that they had family or friendship 
connections in Finland. Those whose journeys included several stops 
in transit locations were undoubtedly informed by fellow asylum 
seekers on the asylum policy and future options in Finland. 
Because of these limitations we found it useful to construct 
an image of present day Iraqi and Afghan travel trajectories by 
interviewing, not only newly arrived asylum seekers, but also those 
who had entered Finland as quota refugees and through marriage 
and family reunion. In addition to the recent newcomers, we also 
interviewed members of earlier generations of Iraqi and Afghan 
migrants (most of whom entered Finland between 1998 and 2002) 
concerning their perspectives on the present day Iraqi and Afghan 
diasporas.
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3.3. Travel trajectories
The rapidly increasing number of Afghan and Iraqi asylum seekers 
entering the EU territory has become an issue of concern in many 
European countries. The global movement of both Afghans and 
Iraqis is, first and foremost, a response to an extended violent 
conflict and the subsequent social, political and economic difficulties, 
which have made life unbearable for millions of people. While the 
majority of both Iraqi and Afghan refugees reside in the neighboring 
countries, or travel back and forth between a neighboring country 
and the country of origin, their increasing arrival to Western Europe 
indicates that people display growing readiness to widen their scope 
of movement. There are three major reasons behind this. First, the 
introduction of restrictive immigration and asylum policies by the 
EU Member States coincides with growth of organized migration 
industry. Second, the growth of diasporic communities in the West 
creates a clear pulling factor as their members provide essential 
information and often also financial and instrumental help directing 
the movement of those on the road. Third, modern communication 
technologies facilitate extremely rapid move of remittances around 
the world without recourse to formal banking system, thus enabling 
the funding of irregular movement. 
The travel routes of asylum seekers can be viewed as cultural 
artifacts that are informed by collective memory and popular 
discourses.29 By far the most common travel trajectory for the 
Afghans on their way to West runs from Afghanistan via Iran to 
Turkey. In the case of the Iraqis, Turkey plays an equally pivotal role 
in the first stages of the journey. Istanbul serves as a central transit 
point for both Afghans and Iraqis and a vast majority continue their 
journey towards the Netherlands, Germany, and Scandinavia in small 
groupings via Greece, Bulgaria, Italy and France – all considered 
transit countries due to their restrictive migration policies and social 
conditions generally understood as extremely difficult for asylum 
29 Clifford, J. (1997). Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
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seekers.30 Our interviews indicated that a less frequently used route 
extends from eastern Turkey to Russia and the Baltic States, and 
further to Finland and other Nordic destinations. 
Financial constraints force a vast majority of Iraqis and Afghans 
make several stops on the way in order to rest, receive money transfers 
from family members, and to gather information concerning migrant 
smugglers, entry restrictions, and asylum policies in different target 
countries. Thousands of asylum seekers have no other possibility to 
make their living than by engaging in networks transporting both 
people and goods, which blurs the boundary between the smuggler 
and the smuggled.31 Some Iraqi interviewees explained that those 
unable to pay the migrant smugglers may as well finance their trip 
by entering in agreements with drug dealers and transporting drugs 
across key borders.
3.4.  The smuggled
Asylum seekers’ travel practices materialize within a larger 
socioeconomic context of illicit global trade and – more particularly 
– as a part of one of its fastest growing currents, migrant smuggling. 
Today, illicit trade connects Western Europe to the Middle East, 
Central Asia and South Asia. It includes a vast range of economic 
activities from the trade of counterfeit consumer goods to human 
organs, migrants, drugs, and weapons. Illicit trade is a constantly 
expanding and transforming, web-like sphere of economic activity 
that is largely organized around trust, and social networking. It 
often penetrates state institutions, and, at worst, undermines and 
destroys whole organized economic zones. All initiatives aiming at 
30 cf. Yaghmaian, B. (2005). Embracing the Infidel: Stories of Muslim Migrants on 
the Journey West. Delacorte Press, New York. 
Mougne, C. (2010). Trees Only Move in the Wind: A study of unaccompanied 
Afghan children in Europe. UNHCR – PDES. Available online at: http://www.unhcr.
org/4c1229669.html
31 Yaghmaian, B. (2005, 219–254). 
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delimiting the scope of illicit trade increases the economic turnover.32 
Although migrant smuggling differs in its nature, structure, and goals 
according to location, everywhere the smugglers are united by their 
common interest in maximizing profit and thus their dependence 
on customers. Therefore, changes in political spaces quickly affect 
business options and forge transformations in the strategies used by 
the smugglers.33
Making contact with the smugglers was generally described as 
easy by the interviewees. Some Afghans reported having paid well 
over 10,000 € for an all-inclusive trip to Finland, while the price was 
some ten to twenty per cent cheaper for the Iraqis. Those Afghans 
with more limited means initially sought less expensive transit 
destinations such as Turkey or Greece, the travel to which required 
some 4,500 to 5,000 €. The travel costs of Iraqis crossing to Turkey 
was reported being around 1,000 € and to Greece between 2,000 
and 3,000 €. Travel was financed by selling property, land, and 
livestock, or resorting to savings of relatives. Many of the Iraqis we 
interviewed informed us having sold everything they owned in order 
to embark on a journey with their entire family. Narratives of Iraqi 
and Afghan interviewees on encounters with migrant smugglers 
reveal a central paradox. The risks involved in the business are vast 
but people have no other option but to cooperate with the smugglers, 
who are known to be untrustworthy. The migrants can never be 
sure of their fate when dealing with smugglers but do their best to 
minimize this risk. In practice it means that they turn to a local agent 
recommended by friends and members of family. For example, an 
Iraqi interviewee described the beginning of his journey as follows: 
In Sulaymaniyah (in Iraqi Kurdistan) some of my Kurdish friends 
suggested that I turn to one local Kurdish man whom they knew. 
Because I am an Arab, a Kurdish smuggler could easily have deserted 
32 cf. Naím, M. (2005). Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are 
Hijacking the Global Economy. Doubleday, New York. 
Nordstrom, C. (2004, 209–238) Shadows of War: Violence, Power and International 
Profiteering in the Twenty-first Century. University of California Press, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles. 
33 cf. Juntunen, M. (2002). Between Morocco and Spain: Men, migrant smuggling 
and a dispersed Moroccan community. University of Helsinki, Helsinki.
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me in the mountains. My friends served as a source of trust between 
myself and him (Hussein, born in Baghdad, 1976)
The clients rarely maintain direct contacts with the smugglers 
themselves. All the arrangements are made with their agents, 
transporters, and people who run the safe houses for accommodation. 
The clients are usually under tight control of the drivers and 
transported in private cars, minibuses, pick-up trucks, and lorries. 
The drivers make several stops on the way and at times order the 
clients to bypass the police, and security checkpoints on foot. In 
case of the Iraqi-Iranian-Turkish frontier, the border can be reached 
on foot after three to four days of rough and fast paced hike, with 
the help of a mountain guide. The clients are organized in small 
groupings usually of no more than a few dozens of people.34 Before 
reaching the border, the drivers and guides pass their clients to 
other members of their networks. Some interviews indicated that, 
along the Iraqi-Iranian-Turkish frontier, a large part of the rural 
population is deeply engaged in the informal economy that revolves 
around smuggling of both people and drugs, and forging official 
documents. Moreover, several villagers along the main travel routes 
make their living by working as mountain guides, selling food, and 
providing safe houses for people on the way to the west. As an Iraqi 
interviewee told us:
We entered the last village before the Turkish border and were 
housed in a deserted dwelling. We were told that we would proceed 
early in the morning to a dry river bed nearby. It appeared to be a 
meeting point for everyone (using the eastern route). There must 
have been at least 500 people, Iranians, Afghans and Pakistanis – all 
on the way to the West. I saw whole families with crying children 
(Hussein, born in Baghdad, 1976)
Naturally, money makes the journey a great deal less arduous. 
Another Iraqi respondent paid 14,000 € for a smuggler in 
Sulaymaniyah. Within 48 hours a private car took him with his wife 
and three children to Istanbul, and then through an unspecified route 
via Western Europe and Sweden to Finland. Another elderly man 
from Baghdad reported having paid the smugglers 8,000 € for a trip 
34 Smith, B. (2008). Kurdish Refugee Reception Centers in Greece Home Displaced. 
Visual Anthropology, 24 (1).
30
through Turkey, Georgia, and Russia to Finland. As he explained,
The smugglers operated in travel agencies in Sulaymaniyah. I 
wanted to find someone who could take me across the border to 
Zakho (in Turkey). I spent the night in a pension and then I was 
directed to a man willing to take me to Europe, because I had 
informed that I don’t want to stay in Turkey. They (smugglers) said 
it would be expensive, and it wouldn’t be the easiest of journeys. I 
said I was ready. Then we headed to Russia through Georgia. There 
was just myself the smuggler and a third person. We were on the 
road about three weeks. (Abu Mahmud, born in Qayim, Iraq, 1947)
Nusratullo, a teenager from the Helmand province in eastern 
Afghanistan told us he paid nearly 7,000 € for a journey to Finland 
via Iran, Turkey, Greece, and Western Europe:
If I told you all the details, we would stay here until tomorrow. We 
used all means of transportation – trucks and cars and sometimes we 
proceeded on foot. We were on the road for nearly fifty days. I cannot 
remember the places, but we were housed in rural areas, often in the 
middle of nowhere. Sometimes we were given just one meal a day, and 
the smugglers refused to answer our enquiries concerning the next 
destination. (Nusratullo, born in Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan 1994)
Afghan children constitute one of the largest groups of minors 
who enter Western Europe via migrant smugglers. Between January 
1 and March 31, 2009 nearly half of the four hundred minors 
who claimed asylum in the United Kingdom were Afghans.35 In 
the Greek island of Lesvos children represented forty per cent of 
the total Afghan arrivals in 2009. In Italy, the same year, the total 
number of unaccompanied Afghan children residing in the country 
was 758. Norway, which is a particularly attractive destination for 
unaccompanied minors due to its generous social welfare policy, has 
received several hundreds of Afghan child claimants – in 2009 the 
number reached 588.36 
35 UK to deport child asylum seekers to Afghanistan. Guardian, June 7, 2010. 
Available online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jun/07/child-asylum-
seekers-uk-Afghanistan 
36 Mougne, C. (2010). Trees Only Move in the Wind: A study of unaccompanied 
Afghan children in Europe. UNHCR – PDES. Available online at: http://www.
unhcr.org/4c1229669.html 
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Thousands of children face tremendous risks when their fate is 
in the hands of smuggler networks, but also during periods of rest-
over in transit countries. Afghan and Iraqi children, a vast majority 
of whom are boys in their early teens, are alone with their traumatic 
travel experiences and pain of separation from their parents and 
peers. During the journey, the smugglers strive to maintain their 
authority by breaking bonds of solidarity between the clients. In 
practice, this often means that the children are kept away from friends 
and trustworthy adult acquaintances, who could offer at least some 
security. In safe houses and migrant encampments children sleep 
with adult men and are largely unprotected from sexual violence.37 
3.5. In transit
As Turkey has no functioning asylum system, refugee status 
determination is carried out by United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR). The Turkish authorities generally discourage 
the refugees from staying within the Turkish territory and support 
the idea that all those recognized as refugees by the UNHCR will be 
resettled in third countries. However, while the recognition rates by 
the UNHCR have been high for Afghans in particular – some eighty 
per cent in recent years –resettlement appears to be increasingly 
difficult for most refugees. Therefore, only a small minority of the 
Iraqi and Afghan newcomers make an effort to gain an officially 
recognized refugee status by turning to UNHCR. The willingness to 
use this option seems to be continuously reducing; as indicated by 
the UNHCR records, the Turkey office registered only 4,276 Iraqis 
in the country in 2007.38
Officially, refugees and asylum seekers face no legal obstacles 
when looking for employment in Turkey. Nevertheless a large 
majority of the some 60,000 to 90,000 Iraqis in the country are 
37 Ibid.
38 The Silent Treatment: Fleeing Iraq, Surviving in Jordan. Human Rights Watch, 
November 27, 2006. Available online at: http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11107/
section/1 
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working illegally due to cumbersome bureaucratic procedures which 
prevent them from legal employment.39
Nearly all of our interviewees informed that after arrival in 
Turkey the first objective was to reach Istanbul. As an Afghan 
respondent explained,
We were within a large group of approximately eighty to ninety 
people in one lorry. There were people from different nationalities – 
Afghans, Iraqis, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. We stayed almost two 
weeks on the Turkish border and during this period we were given 
(false) passports. Then some forty people were told to get in another 
lorry. They gave us bottles which we used for urination. They also 
gave us sacks of bread and some canned food. Our journey took 
about three days and we proceeded mostly at night. Everyone was 
squatting very uncomfortably. The children were a problem for all, 
as the smuggler warned us that we have to keep them quiet. It was 
a closed space, but it had small openings for ventilation. For three 
days we never got out. When we got to Istanbul the truck entered 
a building. All I know is, that as I got out of the truck, I saw a 
large space that resembled an underground car park. We were then 
accommodated in the building above (for seventeen days). (Hamid, 
born in Ghazni, Afghanistan, 1979)
In case the arrangements for further travel were not made prior 
to arrival in Istanbul, all interviewees began to search for contacts 
that would open possibilities for moving forward. 
An Iraqi man who reached Finland in September 2009 with 
his wife and three children related having spent only one night in 
Istanbul, as the journey across the sea – to a location unknown to 
him – was arranged in Sulaymaniyah in Iraq by 14,000 €. 
Those obliged to settle temporarily in Istanbul begin to look for 
shelter in the poor districts of the town where shared flats are widely 
39 cf. Yaghmaian, B. (2005, 13–107). Embracing the Infidel: Stories of Muslim 
Migrants on the Journey West. Delacorte Press. New York.
Number of Iraqi, Afghan refugees in Turkey halved last year. Today’s Zaman, March 
30, 2010. Available online at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.
do?load=detay&link=205790 
The Silent Treatment: Fleeing Iraq, Surviving in Jordan. Human Rights Watch, 
November 27, 2006. Available online at: http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11107/
section/1
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available for destitute and exhausted new arrivals. As everyone wants 
to move on as soon as possible, migrant dwellings are commonly 
plagued with conflict and tension.
In the early 1990s, certain areas in Istanbul turned into 
temporary stopovers for migrants and witnessed a rapid emergence 
of an informal service and information sector for the new arrivals. 
Istanbul’s migrant quarters, such as Aksaray, are notorious for 
their drug dealers, petty criminals, prostitutes, suitcase traders, 
and migrant smugglers. At present Aksaray hosts Iraqis, Iranians, 
Afghans, Bangladeshis, and Sub-Saharan Africans. Women, men and 
entire families, as well as minors without parents, are among its new 
inhabitants. The area is also known of its many hotels and hostels, 
restaurants, discotheques, cabarets and brothels, some of which are 
used as deal-making places for migrant smugglers. Migrants find 
their income in street commerce, small factories, and sweat shops. 
The most destitute have to resort to pick-pocketing, survival-sex, 
and petty drug dealing. Asylum seekers on their journey to the West 
are frequently arrested by Turkish police, but usually released after 
giving bribes. Although people are not in most cases taken in custody, 
many are subjected to sporadic violence and beatings perpetrated by 
the Turkish police.40 
Greece has been under severe international criticism since the 
turn of the Millennium for its policies and practical treatment 
concerning asylum seekers, refugees, and irregular migrants. The 
Greek authorities have been accused of practicing refoulement of 
asylum seekers on both sea and land, issuing illegal deportation 
orders, carrying out arbitrary age tests for unaccompanied child 
asylum seekers, and providing highly insufficient and overcrowded 
facilities of reception and detention.41 While a small numbers of 
Iraqis and Afghans have sought a more permanent stay in Greece, 
40 Stuck in a Revolving Door: Iraqis and Other Asylum Seekers and Migrants at the 
Greece/Turkey Entrance to the European Union. Human Rights Watch. November 
2008. Available online at: www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/11/26/stuck-revolving-
door-0-Similar 
41 Mougne, C. (2010). Trees Only Move in the Wind: A study of unaccompanied 
Afghan children in Europe. UNHCR – PDES. Available online at: http://www.
unhcr.org/4c1229669.html
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the majority aspire to travel further when no other options are 
available. Several Afghan young men, whom we interviewed between 
August and October 2010, told us that the Greek authorities had 
evaluated their ages based on visual criteria. Many claimed being up 
to three years younger than officially stated in Greek records. Many 
Iraqis and Afghans encounter the most severe difficulties during 
their entire journey in Greece. It is not uncommon that asylum 
claimants may prefer to be returned back to Iraq or Afghanistan 
rather than Greece or Italy, should their case fall under the Dublin 
accord, obliging the first EU member state of destination to process 
the asylum application.42 
 According to some estimates nearly fifty per cent of Iraqi 
diasporans in Western Europe have made a stopover in Greece while 
on the way to other locations.43 Most of them arrive in Greece from 
Turkey by land route and carry no documentation. In practice this 
means crossing the Evros river by rafts or by swimming. Another 
option is to cross the Aegean Sea to Greek Island destinations located 
near Turkish coastline. As an Afghan youth said in the interview,
In Istanbul, the smugglers told us that if we wanted to go to 
Greece we should pay 2,300 € each. They provide migrants with 
rubber boats and each boat carries twenty people. 
They told us to select among us a driver who would navigate 
the boat to Greece. We left Istanbul and drove about two hours. 
Then we walked for three hours until we reached a swampy area. 
The boats were fully equipped and the smuggler asked me to drive 
one of the boats and told me that I would be exempted from paying 
the 2,300 €. He told that the driver of the boat bears the penalty 
according to both Greek and Turkish law. The punishment can 
lead up to ten years in prison. I accepted the task in order to save 
the money for my trip to Europe. They also gave us knives, and 
said that if we see the coast guard we ought to tear apart the boats 
immediately. In that case the coast guard would rescue us and take 
42 Interview conducted with Finnish Refugee Aid, February 22, 2010. 
Interview conducted with a social worker at asylum center in Finland, February 
28, 2010.
43 Wance, S. (2004). An Assessment of the Iraqi Community in Greece. UNHCR 
Representation in Greece. Available online at: www.aina.org/reports/aoticig.pdf
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us to Greece. Otherwise they would return us with the same boat 
to Turkey. It took almost four hours to reach Greece. We began the 
journey at three am. at night and arrived at seven am. (Hussein, born 
in Ghazni, Afghanistan, 1992)
People have no other choice but to keep trying; they must pay 
the same amount of money for the smugglers for each attempt and 
there are no guarantees of success. Several hundreds of people have 
lost their lives on the Greek-Turkish border in recent years.44 If the 
financial situation permits, sea journeys can be arranged to Italian, 
and even French locations. Consider for example the following 
explanation by an Iraqi respondent:
We continued from Izmir (Turkey) by a small sailing boat with 
approximately thirty-five people for four days. We did not land in 
Greece, because the journey doesn’t take that long there. It must 
have been Italy or France. I took some pictures secretly on the way 
by my camera phone. I remember that we landed about three o’clock 
in the morning. (Khalid, born in Shangal, Iraq, 1967)
Several of our interviewees had been pressured by the smugglers 
to remain silent about the details of their travel arrangements. They 
reported that, on occasions, the smugglers had simply refused to give 
them detailed information about the travel routes. Journeys took 
place in night time and many claimed having been tightly controlled 
by the smugglers. As an Iraqi youth recounts, 
I don’t know where we disembarked. We had crossed the sea, 
leaving from Istanbul on a normal passenger boat with other travelers. 
I do not know where we were heading. The smuggler refused to 
answer our enquiries and did not let us to talk to others. We were 
not even allowed to see our (false) passports (that the smuggler had 
arranged for them) (Ali, born in Baghdad, 1988).
The new arrivals always enter the EU territory exhausted both 
physically and economically. In Greece asylum seekers face very 
similar obstacles concerning the asylum process and labor market 
position as in Turkey. Many leave as the financial situation allows 
them to be smuggled further. The asylum process in Greece takes 
44 Migrant deaths on Turkish – Greek border spark UNHCR concern. Sofia Echo, 
July 2, 2010. Available online at http://sofiaecho.com/2010/07/02/926788_migrant-
deaths-on-turkish-greek-border-spark-unhcr-concern
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approximately three months, but the possibilities for third country 
settlement are extremely low. During the first half of the year 2003 
Greece rejected 2,171 asylum applicants from Iraq and Afghanistan 
and only twenty-two were recognized during the same period. The 
year 2008 Greece did not grant a single refuge for an Iraqi applicant.45 
The asylum seekers are allowed to stay in the extremely poorly 
equipped refugee centers for no longer than six months. Those 
with negative decision are generally expected to leave the country 
within one to three months, although in practice actual deportations 
are rarely executed by the authorities. Young man from Ghazni, 
Afghanistan related us:
We were handed over to the refugee reception center in the island 
of Samos. This camp was under the supervision of the Government 
of Greece. It was very bad there, like in a prison. After ten days they 
gave us a document stating that we had a month to leave Greece and 
they brought us by boat to Athens.
In Athens, a large number of Afghans have turned to church 
charities for food. This happened to me also. During this period, I 
together with my friends, started to look for a smuggler who would 
to take us out of Greece. I stayed twenty-two days in Athens in a very 
difficult situation. There were special places for smugglers, mostly 
Afghans and Iranians. We gave them money and photographs for 
passports. (Hussein, born in Ghazni, Afghanistan, 1992)
In early 2000s, the government of Greece did not provide any 
benefits for most registered asylum seekers. Thousands found shelter in 
parks and abandoned buildings and survived usually by hawking and 
street commerce. Several unofficial refugee camps are still located at the 
outskirts of Athens providing shelter for Afghans, Iraqis, and Iranians.46 
Some are fortunate enough to find occasional part time jobs 
from construction sites and agriculture. They are not offered a work 
permit, thus the jobs remain undocumented. When the people are 
45 Europe urged not to turn away Iraqi refugees. The Independent, June 17, 2008. 
Available online at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/europe-
urged-not-to-turn-away-iraqi-refugees-848507.html 
46 cf. Yaghmaian, B. (2005, 260). Embracing the Infidel: Stories of Muslim Migrants 
on the Journey West. Delacorte Press. New York. Smith, B. (2008) Kurdish Refugee 
Reception Centers in Greece Home Displaced. Visual Anthropology 24 (1).
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finally ready to leave the makeshift camps, the departure only marks 
a new beginning in their struggle.
Many interviewees with sufficient financial resources informed 
us having crossed Greece very rapidly. Finland was usually reached 
after five to fifteen days on the road. A Man from Iraqi Kurdistan, 
travelling with his wife and three children reported: 
After reaching the shore we first entered a small town and the 
Afghans, Iraqi Yazidis, and Christians among us were divided by the 
smugglers according to their desired destinations. We entered a lorry 
and remained there for three days. The smuggler said that we were 
in Europe, but what was the name of the town I am not aware of. 
After a day’s rest we continued our journey on a normal passenger 
bus. I don’t know which route we took but the last destination 
before Finland was Sweden. When reaching Turku we contacted 
immediately the police. (Khalid, born in Shangal, Iraq, 1967)
Fear and uncertainty are constantly present in the narratives of 
Iraqis and Afghans. A seventeen-year-old Iraqi boy who had lived 
most of his life in Qandil, on the Iranian side of the Iraqi-Iranian 
border, informed us having lost his entire family after embarking a 
lorry somewhere in Southern Europe:
We saw a lorry approaching us and the smuggler told us to enter. 
We were altogether ten passengers – our family and another Iraqi 
family. The smuggler told the others to go to the back of the lorry 
and ordered me to sit next to him in the front. After a long while 
on the road he received a phone call. He told me to go back and 
hide inside a container box the size of which was approximately one 
cubic meter. Then he drove on, but after a while he stopped. I heard 
voices and then we continued. Later he came to me and told that we 
should eat. I told that we need to give food also to my family. He 
said that my family members were still in the place where he told 
me to get in the container box. He said that he was ordered to bring 
me to the destination and that he was sure that my family would be 
there waiting for me. This happened seven months ago. I still have 
not been able to contact my family. I managed to get the news to 
my paternal uncle who lives in Qut in Iraq. Neither has he heard of 
them. (Rezgar, born in Qandil, Iran, 1993)
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4  THE IRAQI DRAMA 
Experience of refuge is surrounded by systems of gendered and 
sexualized power, embedded in different domains of social relations. 
Thus ethnic and race relations, sectarian and religious relations, and 
kin and household relations deserve detailed attention in this study.
Iraq under the Ba’ath party regime is often referred to as the 
‘republic of fear’.47 The party governed Iraq from July 1968 until 
the invasion of the country by international coalition forces in 
April 2003. It transformed gradually into political machinery, one 
of the main tasks of which was the literal and symbolic silencing 
of Iraqi citizens. Silence, distrust, and violence penetrated every 
sector of the society from kindergartens to schools, universities, and 
administrative institutions. The regime under Saddam Hussein’s reign 
(1979–2003) included 500,000 informers and used all conceivable 
forms of violence from assassinations, abductions, and deportations 
to torture and murder. The primary role of interrogations carried 
out by some half a dozen internal security institutions was not 
to collect information but to evidence and establish the suspect’s 
guilt. Torture and fear aimed at breaking the individuals for later 
recruitment into the machinery of fear. The Iraqi regime’s message 
was that party membership was the only guarantee of individual 
social progress. In similar vein ascending in the party hierarchy 
required the individual’s integration into the practical dynamics 
of violence.48 One interviewee, Abdelkarim, who spent most of his 
young adulthood as political prisoner explained us:
47 Makkiya, K. (1998) [1989]. Republic of Fear: Politics of Modern Iraq. University 
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Finally a very high proportion of Iraqis were members of the 
party. But in the end the vast majority joined the party because of 
fear. The system aspired to recruit everyone. The regime even had 
a slogan: “The whole folk is of Ba’ath”. (Abdelkarim, born in 
Baghdad, 1961)
The Ba’athist political culture had a devastating effect on 
the everyday life. Fear of actual or potential violence framed the 
entire society and managed to blur boundaries between action and 
inaction, participation and spectatorship.49 Particularly traumatizing 
for ordinary Iraqis was that many were forced to become spectators 
of public executions, or to partake in the acts of violence against 
fellow citizens – sometimes even the members of one’s own family. It 
was not exceptional that in situations of interrogation suspects were 
obliged to torture other suspects.50 
Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis became first suspects and then 
guilty merely because of their social backgrounds. Many individuals 
paid a heavy price for having a family name that was associated with 
banned religious, left-leaning, or ethnic political activism. Often 
entire families were arrested and tortured in order to put pressure on 
the politically most active family members. An Iraqi woman whose 
parents and three brothers left the country between 1991 and 2007 
recalled: 
I never felt completely at ease during Saddam’s reign. From 
the day I opened my eyes my world has been in the state of war. 
Especially people like us, who had always defended human rights, 
were constantly threatened by them (the regime). They never stopped 
putting pressure on our family. (Sajida, born in Baghdad, 1969)
Saddam’s years with two deadly wars (The Iraqi-Iranian War 
1980–1988 and the Second Gulf War 1990–1991) left the Iraqis 
choking on the historical memory of pain, loss, and death. Every Iraqi 
household we visited for this study is full of traumatic memories. 
49 In comparison with the case of political terror in Northern Ireland, see: Feldman, 
A. (2003). Political Terror and the Technologies of Memory: Excuse, sacrifice, 
commodification and actual moralities. Radical History Review, 85.
50 Juntunen M. & Muthana, R. (2008) Abu Ghraib – Varissuo: Irakilaismiehen 
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Many of our interlocutors described their personal past being 
nightmarish and beyond comprehension. At the same time, the ones 
suffering from the most severe past traumas expressed deep agony 
resulting from a pressing need to organize personal and collective 
memories but being unable to do so. 
The collapse of the Ba’ath party regime in April 2003 was 
followed by several symbolic acts of role reversals. The former 
victims took over the streets in order to regain their stolen dignity.51 
During the first days after the U.S. invasion, acts of revenge and 
humiliation were targeted at Ba’athist functionaries and members 
of the feared security institutions. Often the perpetrators were 
supporters of Shi’ite popular movements banned by the former 
regime.52 A man experiencing the deteriorating security situation in 
Baghdad following the collapse of the regime recounted: 
Particularly the Iranians supported the emerging Shi’ite militias, 
which were then sent to the streets. They had whole lists of names 
of people who were functionaries in Saddam’s regime. Even teachers 
and academics became targets of horrible acts of revenge. At the same 
time they (militias) were using people’s financial crisis and general 
poverty for their own good. First nobody said that the violence had 
anything to do with sectarianism. You were only targeted because of 
being Saddam’s supporter. Then later it became clear that it was also 
a question of sectarian politics. (Abu Mahmud, – Sunni Muslim man 
-born in Qayim, 1947)
4.1. The Shi’ite resurgence
Iraq is of specific symbolic and ritual importance for Shi’ites. Not 
only are eight of the twelve holy Imams of Shi’ites buried in Iraq but 
also some of the eldest religious centers of learning madrasas and 
the most renowned mosques and burial grounds are located within 
51 Cockburn, B. (2009, 145–148). Muqtada al-Sadr and the Shia Insurgency in 
Iraq. Faber and Faber, London. 
52 Iraq’s Shiites Under Occupation. International Crisis Group, Middle East 
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its borders. The town of Najaf has since the 11th century been 
regarded as the focal point for Shi’ite learning worldwide. Najaf 
hosts the hawza, a loosely organized network of men of religious 
learning with their followers and students. However, it would be 
erroneous to perceive the Shi’ites of Iraq as a social grouping with 
a sense of common identity defined entirely in religious terms and 
untouched by other social markers, such as local identity, tribal 
affiliation, worldview, and political ideology. In the late 1950s 
and early 1960s many educated Shi’ites were left-leaning in their 
political attitudes, but the period also witnessed the establishment of 
the first popular Shi’ite political movements. During the early years 
of Ba’athist rule in the 1970s, the Iraqi regime made great efforts to 
co-opt increasing numbers of Shi’ites and by 1982 nearly thirty per 
cent of the members of the most influential Ba’athist institution, the 
Revolutionary Command Council, were Shi’ite. 
The war years between Iraq and Iran considerably changed the 
political future of Iraqi Shi’ites. Iran had experienced a revolution 
that was largely rallied by Shi’ite religious clergy. For obvious 
reasons the secular-nationalist, yet Sunni dominated Ba’ath party 
regime feared a similar fate. 
Unlike in Iran, Iraq’s collective of Shi´ite senior clerics, the hawza, 
had stayed outside of politics for the most part of the modern history 
of Iraq in order to preserve its spiritual independence. However, 
towards the end of the Ba’athist reign, the hawza was rapidly drawn 
to the political process.  
The first modern Shi’ite Islamist movement in Iraq, Da’wa, 
was formed in 1957. It was soon forced to move its leadership to 
Iran, and a number of its influential members sought refuge in Paris 
and London. In 1982, a group of leading figures of the movement, 
together with a new generation of exiled Shi’ite Islamists founded 
(with considerable Iranian backing) the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Like Da’wa, SCIRI soon penetrated 
deeply in the Iraqi diaspora in Western Europe. The Shi’ite Islamists 
paid a heavy price for their open opposition to the Ba’athist Iraqi 
regime, as dozens of forefront leaders of both Da’wa and SCIRI 
were assassinated, executed, and tortured to death. Three decades 
later, the Government of Iraq was largely in the hands of the 
relatives and descendants of the persecuted founding fathers Iraq’s 
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Shi’ite Islamism, a development that seemed extremely unlikely in 
the 1980s. A large majority of the Iraqi victims of the Iran–Iraq 
War pertained to Shi’ite families, a factor which further enhanced 
sectarian divides within Iraq. The damage caused by the devastating 
war on country’s infrastructure was furthered by the Second Gulf War 
(1990–1991). The Ba’athist government displayed great indifference 
to the deteriorating living conditions of the disenfranchised Shi’ite. 
Numerous charity organizations connected to Shi’ite Islamist parties 
began to engage in large scale charity work, often with considerable 
Iranian support. This strengthened sectarian solidarity, particularly 
in the southern parts of the country and among impoverished 
members of urban population.53
In the aftermath of the Second Gulf War in 1991, the Shi’ites acted 
out decades of frustration, persecution, and political marginalization 
in a popular uprising that spread from the southern city of Basra to 
Shi’ite concentrations elsewhere in Iraq. The regime responded by 
taking up arms against both rebels and civilians in a manner that 
resembled ethnic cleansing in many locations. All men over fifteen 
years of age were arrested in the Shi’ite stronghold of Kerbala in 
central Iraq. Millions were terrorized and up to 150,000 citizens 
were killed merely because they were Shi’ites. Among ordinary 
Iraqis, the uprising was largely fuelled by the erroneous assumption 
that popular initiatives to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime would be 
backed by U.S. military force. The bitter end of the uprising largely 
explains the mistrust felt by the Shi’ite population towards the U.S. 
presence in Iraq following the invasion of 2003.54 As man pertaining 
to Iraq’s Mandaean religious minority recalled, 
I remember very clearly standing on a rooftop seeing that horrible 
sight (in Baghdad in 1991). Dozens of trucks were packed with men 
women and children but also older people. They were on the way to 
53 Cockburn, B. (2009, 145–148). Muqtada al-Sadr and the Shia Insurgency in 
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be executed, and buried in mass graves that were found much later. 
They had closed the borders with Jordan but people were still trying 
to escape Baghdad towards west. From the north thousands escaped 
to Turkey and in the south the Shi’ite population went to Iran and 
many were also hosted in refugee camps in the Saudi Arabian desert. 
Some of them are still there. (Abu Basim, born in Baghdad, 1962).
In the aftermath of the Second Gulf War, no-fly security zones 
were established by United Nations in the southern Iraqi regions 
with marked Shi’ite majority and in the northern Kurdish regions. 
Especially in the north, this resulted in an increasing sense of 
independence from Baghdad government, which finally lead to the 
establishment of Kurdistan Regional Government in 1992.55
In the new geopolitical climate following the military occupation 
of Iraq in 2003, numerous leading figures of the hawza developed new 
political visions for the Iraqi Shi’ites, constructing them as a social 
and political community demanding political representation that 
would reflect the country’s demographic profile. Being a majority in 
Iraq, many Shi’ites felt they had the right to define the future course 
of their country. At the same time, prayer rooms, mosques, and 
religious symbols became increasingly present in the public spaces. 
Several Iraqis we interviewed for this report perceived – as Abu 
Nawris in the following excerpt – that the change of atmosphere 
was, however, a gradual process. 
Due to a more than a decade of constant recession, people curled 
up in their own areas, they did not intermingle with others (those 
of other ethnic and sectarian backgrounds) and their awareness of 
the world came increasingly from one source. For many this meant 
mosques or prayer rooms. This resulted in growing unawareness of 
the world in every respect. Many had to leave school and the society 
turned upside down. Without this 1980s and 1990s recession we 
would not have encountered the problems that emerged after the 
invasion (of 2003). (Abu Nawris, born in Baghdad, 1971) 
55 Tripp, C. (2002, 271–275). History of Iraq. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath. International Crisis Group. Middle east 
Report 6. October 1, 2002. Available online at: repository.forcedmigration.org/
show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:3369 
44
The Ba’athist regime had to counter the emerging, religious, 
social, and political activism by presenting itself as the guardian of 
people’s religious sentiments. Saddam transformed into a believing 
president who saves the citizens from the corruptive effects of Western 
imperialism. Simultaneously the regime, being largely composed 
of Sunni tribes, allowed more assertive Sunni religious and social 
activism. Social control exercised in the name of religion became 
more visible, and numerous religious practices and symbols that 
were previously unheard of emerged in Iraq. Consider the following 
insight by an interviewee who is a former political prisoner because 
of his leftist sympathies:
The political and religious atmosphere changed after the Iraq – 
Iran war. The regime feared revolution and therefore suppressed all 
forms of oppositional activism. But it resorted also to conservative 
Wahhabi (Sunni) Islam to play out other religious forces. The regime 
nominated Wahhabi imams in mosques, supported youngsters to go 
and fight among the Muslim volunteers in Afghanistan and they 
allowed Muslim charities’ activities in Iraq. All these developments 
guaranteed that the atmosphere changed gradually. Take alcohol 
for instance – in early 1990s all bars were closed in Baghdad. 
(Abdelkarim, born in Baghdad, 1961)
Public schools became largely gender-segregated, the veiling 
of women increased, selling of alcohol was restricted, and night-
life facilities in major cities were closed. These developments also 
resulted in more explicitly drawn ethnic and sectarian boundaries. 
However, nearly all our interviewees’ shared a highly unanimous 
perception concerning the role of ethnicity and sect in Iraq during 
the Ba’athist reign. The wars and economic hardships were making 
life increasingly unbearable, yet religion and ethnicity were not 
explicitly structuring the everyday interaction of people. This idea 
was especially clear in the testimonies of educated urban middle 
classes:
Nobody talked about backgrounds (ethnic and sectarian). We 
were all in the same situation. (Abu Mahmud, born in Qayim, 1947)
In our city district there were Sunnis, Shi’ites, Kurds, Christians 
and Mandaeans. We never encountered any problems. Nobody 
would say that this or that family is Sunni or Shi’ite. (Raghad, born 
in Baghdad, 1994)
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My neighbors had been there for twenty years, I didn’t know 
whether they were Sunni or Shi’ite. But then after the Second Gulf 
war the situation begun to change, and we cannot dismiss the role 
of Iran and Saudi Arabia, they played a central role in promoting 
sectarianism(…) and automatically also the Kurds began to forge 
their ideas about own state. (Abdelkarim, born in Baghdad, 1961)
It should be underlined, however, that ethnic and sectarian 
tensions were already mounting in many areas with heterogeneous 
population, such as the town of Kirkuk. One interviewee from the 
region related us:
The Turkmens, the Arabs and the Kurds were in their own 
sections of the town and this situation soon reflected itself on the 
political life and the political culture. People had no trust in public 
authorities but preferred to solve their own problems amongst 
themselves. From 1970s onwards politics was a kind of ethnicity 
chess. The present day politics is an extension of this. (Nawzad, born 
in Kirkuk, 1957). 
As it will be indicated below, the traditional fabric of ethnically 
and religiously heterogeneous Iraqi society, and its handshake culture 
between different societal groupings was rapidly transformed in the 
aftermath of the U.S. military invasion of April 2003.
4.2. Gender and household 
From late 1950s onwards, Iraqi governments invested great efforts 
in modernizing the country’s education system and in revising its 
health and employment policies. This had a vast impact on the 
gender order in Iraqi society.56 A rapid change in the public role of 
women was backed by the 1958 civil law reform, which guaranteed 
women social and political rights that were relatively broad in 
comparison with many other parts of the Muslim world. Women’s 
illiteracy declined rapidly and the presence of women at all stages of 
education increased. Indeed, the issue of women’s role was a central 
ideological tool for the ruling Ba’ath party. Paradoxically, under the 
56 Fattah H. & Caso F. (2009, 213–214) A Brief History of Iraq. Chekmark, New York. 
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Ba’ath regime women’s social visibility in the public sector increased 
considerably while repressive dictatorship was under construction. 
These initiatives became particularly clear during the first years of 
Saddam Hussein’s reign.57 
The war years of the 1980s and 1990s and the embargo that 
followed the Second Gulf War had a tremendous effect on the Iraqi 
households, and family and kinship systems. The traditionally tight 
cohesion of families deteriorated as thousands of homes lost their 
breadwinners in battle fronts. Saddam’s crackdown on all real and 
potential opposition activism launched vast migratory movements 
from Iraq to its neighboring countries and to the West. Given the 
mass unemployment and huge inflation rate, the economic difficulties 
in the domestic sector deepened during the embargo years with 
disastrous effects.58 An interviewee pertaining to Baghdad’s educated 
middle class recounted:
The situation before the invasion was already quite bad. We 
suffered from constant lack of water and the sewage system would 
flood in the winter time. We had only a few hours of electricity a day, 
but we knew the timetables. We did not let the children drink the 
tap water, and tried our best not to resort to bottled mineral water 
because lot of it was just cheating (i.e. bottled tap water). (Abu Faris, 
born in Baghdad, 1957)
Nearly two million civilians died during the embargo because of 
malnutrition and disease, including 700,000 children.59 The collapse 
of public services forced people to resort to their immediate kin-
based networks, which partly explains why the Iraqis often speak 
of the embargo years as a period of revival of tribalism.60 Another 
explanation is the regime’s political strategy to ensure its grip on 
power by offering benefits to strategically important, predominantly 
57 Al-Ali, N & Pratt, N. (2009, 21–55). What Kind of Liberation? Women and 
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Sunni Muslim tribes. Moreover, the regime allocated judiciary 
powers (that had previously belonged to civil courts) to tribal elders. 
The years of embargo also generated serious street crime problem in 
major cities narrowing women’s participation in the public sphere.61 
On several occasions our interlocutors pertaining to educated middle 
class underlined the fact that the Iraqi society was in deep social 
crisis even before the occupation of 2003. As two of our interviewees 
explained,
The present situation can only be understood in the light of the 
wars of 1980s and 1990s, and the recession brought by the embargo. 
Everyone was mentally exhausted and what marks the experience 
of the generation of the embargo years is growing ignorance mixed 
with religious resurgence. (Abu Nawris, born in Baghdad, 1971) 
What explains the growing illiteracy rate is the fact that the 
children had to work because of economic crisis. Also cars were 
increasingly stolen and houses were burgled. Then there was a slight 
improvement in 2002 and 2003, everyone had food cards, and 
hunger was no longer a great problem. (Ali, born in Baghdad, 1974)
4.3. Post invasion years 
Shortly after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC 
on September 11, 2001, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz 
labeled Iraq a terrorist state because of its alleged possession 
of weapons of mass destruction and support for international 
terrorism. The more aggressive U.S. policy towards Iraq materialized 
in the spring months of 2003 as the U.S. led international military 
invasion brought an end to Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Ba’athist 
machinery of terror had left hundreds of thousands of victims, over 
three million political refugees, and a deepening internal chaos. 
Simultaneously with international military invasion, there was also 
an important undercurrent developing in Iraq which was largely 
unnoticed by western media. Namely, Shi’ite symbols quickly 
entered the public space in Iraq. For example, many streets and 
61 Al-Jawaheri, Y. (2008, 121). Women In Iraq: The Gender Impact of International 
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urban areas were re-named with references to Shi’ite history and 
in many places images of the martyrs of Shi’ite political movements 
replaced those of Saddam Hussein. All of a sudden, religious graffiti 
were dotted here and there in urban areas. The expression of new 
Shi’ite political and spiritual revival found its strongest expression 
as three million Shi’ites marched in April 2003 to the city of Karbala 
in commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein in the year 
680.62
Approximately two months after the military invasion, the 
Ba’ath party was declared illegal. Its military and security apparatus 
was dissolved and hundreds of thousands of Baath members lost 
their jobs in public institutions. As nearly sixty per cent of the Iraqis 
had been employed by the state, millions of Iraqis were now without 
means of income.63 Things were made worse by the deteriorating 
security situation (which was hardly under control of the foreign 
occupiers) and the poor basic infrastructure. The Iraqi infrastructure 
was already in ruins after decades of war and embargo, and it was 
given the final destructive blow with the invasion. 
People, paralyzed because of air raids, areal bombings, looting, 
roadside bombs, and general chaos had to cope for months in 
temperatures reaching fifty degrees without running water, sanitation, 
or electricity. Abu Faris described the conditions in Baghdad:
There were ponds of sewage water on the streets. Only the 
households with generators could pump water from the tap, and 
there were people in the streets selling electricity from their portable 
generators. People would buy one to two hours of electricity. On top 
of everything, the water was contaminated but people had to use it 
for washing. (Abu Faris, born in 1957, Baghdad) 
The battle over political representation, security vacuum, and 
widely spread street crime only furthered the deeply shared popular 
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frustration. The supporters of the former regime and the Sunni 
tribes, aiming to secure their grip of the future administration of 
Iraq, began to translate their resentment as the Shi’ite had done – in 
terms of sectarian political rhetoric. Simultaneously, both factions 
were investing heavily on recruiting members both nationally and 
internationally in order to build up their military strength.
Prior to the first full parliamentary elections in the new Iraq, in 
December 2005, the social atmosphere reflected deepening internal 
divisions in the country. The security situation was extremely tense 
and the elections drove ordinary Iraqis into a situation in which 
voters were forced to select a representative, and thus also their 
own “camp” on the basis of religion or ethnic grouping. As two 
informants residing in Baghdad at the time recalled in interviews,
The armed militias were investing on areas where the Americans 
were not present. They only concentrated on empty (disputed) areas 
in order to gain control on them. It was a process of reordering. 
Soon the Shi’ite families were covered by their group. The Kurds also 
had their military entity the Peshmerga, but God forbid if there was 
a family who belonged to the former supporters of the regime. (Abu 
Mahmud, born in Qayim, 1947).
Particularly difficult it was for people like us whose quarters 
housed all kinds of people. We received families from both Shi’ite 
and Sunni dominated areas. Our area was a contested ground, the 
atmosphere was not tense, but we all knew that it was not considered 
an area protected by a particular militia. We were between Shi’ite 
dominated Sadr-district and Sunni dominated Fadl and Adhamiya. 
This meant that the both camps would attack our area when they 
saw it necessary. This happened especially when they were too afraid 
of perpetrating acts of violence in the heart of the enemy’s territory. 
(Abu Faris, born Baghdad, 1957)
Shi’ite Islamist parties Da’wa and SIIC were both effectively 
organized in the diaspora and thus favorably positioned to take over 
the Iraqi power vacuum. The same holds true for the major Kurdish 
political parties – the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the 
People’s Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These two parties comprise the 
organizing forces of Kurdistan’s autonomous regional government, 
established in 1992. Unlike dozens of emergent political parties 
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inside Iraq, these Shi’ite and Kurdish parties had their ready-made 
agendas and infrastructures.
All of our interlocutors who witnessed the sectarian violence 
explained that the security climate deteriorated very rapidly in the 
spring months of 2006. This was due to a massive bomb attack 
which destroyed the Golden Mosque in the city of Samarra – one of 
the holiest places of Shi’ite Islam – and which was allegedly carried 
out by a group of Sunni extremists.
From the beginning, the violence following the occupation found 
highly diverse local manifestations. Blood was shed in confrontations 
between occupying forces and Sunni insurgent groups. The latter 
could be roughly divided in three categories – the extremists, 
Ba’athists, and Sunni nationalists. Extremists were largely responsible 
of detonating car bombs, carrying out suicide attacks in the streets 
and marketplaces, and abducting businessmen and members of 
educated elites and western contractors and journalists, but also 
members of the newly established Iraqi security institutions. Iraq 
had become part of a global warfront for Islamic militants fighting 
against western geopolitical and cultural dominance. Many fighters 
from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, Algeria, and Morocco 
arrived and sided with the Iraqi insurgents.64 
Ba’athists, especially former members of Iraq’s security structures, 
took up arms and staged attacks against both the multinational 
coalition and Iraqi Government forces. Some groups of Sunni Arabs 
were not driven by militant Islamism or Ba’athist loyalties but rather 
strove for the establishment of a new Iraq guided by loosely defined 
“moderate” Islamic principles.
The involvement of Shi’ite resistance increased considerably 
from the year 2004 onwards. Influential figures in the Hawza took 
different positions with regard the occupation. The leading clergy, 
including the supreme Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, opposed the foreign 
military invasion. The fiercest critique was voiced by Moqtada 
al-Sadr, member of the influential Shi’ite family that had suffered 
tremendously under the Ba’athist regime. The Sadrist movement 
with its military wing, the Mahdi Army, soon controlled an entire 
64 A Face and a Name: Civilian Victims of Insurgent Groups in Iraq: Human Right 
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section of Bagdad, which was soon renamed as Madinat al-Sadr 
(Sadr City). The Mahdi Army, with up to 60,000 armed soldiers, 
was present in the Shi’ite majority cities of Iraq. By 2005 it seemed 
as if all political parties and interest groups had established armed 
militias to protect their interests. The Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI (later; Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, 
SIIC), controlled thousands of men of the so-called Badr Brigade, 
a militia comprised largely of former officers and soldiers who had 
defected from the Iraqi army. It also included hundreds of refugees, 
many of whom had joined SCIRI when its leadership was exiled in 
Iran.65
Ethnically and religiously heterogeneous urban areas were soon 
divided along sectarian and ethnic boundary lines. By 2010 over 
fifty areas within the city were divided by concrete walls.66 Without 
a protector, people belonging to regional minorities such as a young 
man from Baghdad whom we interviewed for this study had no 
other option than to leave. 
We lived in a Sunni dominated area and soon the expulsion of 
the Shi’ites begun. Everyone knew of the death lists. We received 
a message stating that my father’s and brother’s names were listed 
in al-Qaeda’s death list and that we had to move to another area. 
We took all our possessions with us. By that time my brother had 
already moved (to Qatar). Later they forced many other people out 
of the area, then the first wave of explosions and murder started 
and the Iraqi al-Qaeda settled in the area. (Samir, born in Baghdad, 
1986) 
The sectarian violence took its toll from the families of several of 
our interlocutors. As a man from Kirkuk related,
My cousin died in a terrorist act in Kirkuk. He was standing in 
front of a butchers shop in Kirkuk when a truck full of explosives 
65 Fattah, H. & Caso, F. (2009, 254–256). A Brief History of Iraq. Chekmark, New 
York. 
Badr Corps. Global Security. Available online at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/para/badr.htm 
66 1,400 checkpoints inside Iraqi capital Baghdad. Azzaman, March 27, 2010. Available 
online at: http://www.azzaman.com/english/index.asp?fname=news\2010-03-27\
kurd.htm
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was detonated. Dozens of people lost their lives in the incident. It 
was increasingly common to see young (recruited) men from Saudi 
Arabia and North Africa in the streets of the city. There are still 
today (February 2010) several people in Kirkuk’s prisons charged 
of terrorism – from abroad but there are also Iraqis among them. 
People are being brainwashed to carry out suicide attacks by religious 
leaders. They may say: ‘today you will have lunch with Prophet 
Muhammad.’ (Nawzad, born in Kirkuk, 1957).
Boundaries were guarded by militias controlling the movement in 
and out of strategically important zones. Thousands of civilians lost 
their lives on the some 1,400 check points within the capital city.67 
As indicated by one interviewee sectarian and ethnic boundaries 
soon marked the entire public space:
At present (October 2009) you have to show you identity card 
upon request. The card states religion, I mean, whether you are 
Christian, Mandaean, or Muslim, but it doesn’t state whether you are 
Shi’ite or Sunni Muslim. The card also states your ethnicity – whether 
you are Arab, Kurd or Turkmen. Recently Assyrian Christians have 
claimed that they should be officially recognized as an ethnic group 
in their identity cards. It’s extremely difficult to move in Bagdad’s 
Thawra and Adhamiya districts, to give an example, without two 
identity cards. People resort to forged cards and use most commonly 
recognized ‘sectarian’ names to prove themselves as either Sunni 
or Shi’ite. The militias guarding the checkpoints have begun to use 
different kinds of tests to check whether a person is who he claims to 
be. They for example ask how do you perform your prayer or your 
wudu’ [the Islamic ablution ritual] as there are sectarian differences 
in these. (Abdelkarim, born in Baghdad, 1961)
4.4.  Experiences of persecution
While international attention was focused on the battlefront 
between international coalition forces and different insurgency 
groups, other forms of violence remained largely unnoticed by the 
western media. Between the years 2005 and 2008, on average 14,2 
67 Ibid.
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people were killed every day by suicide attacks and car bombs, and 
137 by gunfire and executions. The years 2006 and 2007 alone 
witnessed more than 53,000 civilian deaths.68 Many thousands 
lost their lives in air raids and house searches of the coalition 
forces, not to mention kidnappings and other forms of violence 
perpetrated by criminal gangs. Increasing numbers of Iraqis were 
subjected to fear and violence under ‘preventive’ security measures 
carried out by coalition soldiers and western security contractors 
and sub-contractors.69 More than 180,000 Iraqis were detained or 
imprisoned and thousands were subjected to torture and humiliation 
by the U.S. trained Iraqi military and security institutions. In more 
than 1,300 cases, the Americans were aware of torture practiced by 
Iraqi security but effectively ignored the information.70 By the year 
2008 forty per cent of families based in Baghdad had lost at least 
one family member due to violence. There were between four and 
five million orphans and 1.5 million widows, over two million new 
international refugees and 2.8 million internal refugees.71
Militias loyal to leading Shi’ite and Sunni parties and military 
factions were the major perpetrator of violence, murdering more 
than 32,500 Iraqis.72 Especially the Shi’ite militias were notorious 
68 Iraq Body Count. Database. Available online at: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/
database/
69 According to international network opposing Iraq’s occupation ‘Brussels Tribunal’ 
the total number of functionaries in these contractors may have exceeded 160,000 
individuals in 2006. see: http://www.brusselstribunal.org/SecurityCompanies.
htm#ISG
70 British BBC Channel 4 gained access to nearly 400,000 secret military significant 
activities reports (SIGACTS) logged by the U.S. military in Iraq between 2004 
and 2009. The channel released a documentary “Secret War Files” in 2010 which 
indicated that Americans were aware of the levels of violence against civilians and 
casualty figures. President Bush continuously claimed that Americans did not record 
casualties and were doing their utmost to avoid civilian deaths. BBC Channel 4, 
Dispatches: Secret war files: http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/
episode-guide/series-74/episode-1
71 Al-Mashad al-Iraqi (2008) Political discussion program, al Jazeera (Arabic) TV 
channel 16.11. 2008.
72 Dispatches: Secret war files. BBC Channel 4. Available online at: http://www.
channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/episode-guide/series-74/episode-1
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for running their secret prisons and interrogation centers.73 It was 
by no means exceptional that fierce rivalries took place between 
competing groupings from the same sect. Among the targeted 
were also entire families accused of loyalty to former regime; those 
who held public positions in the Ba’athist Iraq; individuals who 
were perceived too liberal or ‘corrupt’ in their public demeanor; 
women working outside of private homes; sexual minorities; artists; 
musicians; alcohol, music and perfume retail dealers; prostitutes, 
and ordinary Iraqis working for occupiers, or to foreign relief and 
development organizations.
In the chaotic situation, people were often unaware who was 
targeting them and why. Terms such as sectarian violence and civil 
war hardly captured the nature of the situation as perceived by our 
interviewees. What they experienced as particularly painful was that 
violence against civilians was often perpetrated by ordinary people 
against other ordinary people. Every person we interviewed could 
name at least one close relative who had died in the post-invasion 
turmoil. 
4.4.1. Religious minorities
The mass flight of Iraq’s religious minorities increased rapidly in the 
years following the invasion. In 2005, the UN estimated that thirty 
per cent of those who left Iraq were non-Muslims, and particularly 
Assyrian Christians. According to the Assyrian organization AINA 
nearly half of Iraq’s 1.2 million Assyrians (estimate of 2003) had fled 
by mid-2009.74 
73 Manfred Novak United Nation’s Special Rapporteur on Torture, published a 
report in September 2006 where he alleged that torture was a grave problem in 
several prisons run by ministries of interior and defense. Many prisoners had burns 
and tissue damages caused by use of acids. It had become increasingly common that 
the bodies left in public places were found with missing or damaged body parts, 
which indicated that many had been tortured before execution. cf. Iraq torture 
worse after Saddam. BBC News, September 21, 2009. Available online at: http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5368360.stm 
74 Available online at : http://www.aina.org/releases/20090618154221.htm 
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Four of our interviewees belong to Iraq’s Mandaean religious 
minority.75 According to them, the public space went through a 
rapid transformation due to strengthening religious conservatism:
We shopkeepers, for example, were no longer allowed to play 
taped music in our premises, and those who had TVs in their shops 
had to monitor carefully which channel was on. My (jewelry) shop 
was in the district of Thawra (in Baghdad) and I was well aware of 
the atmosphere on the streets. At times I had to keep my shop closed 
for weeks because of the violence and general unrest. Soon the nature 
of dealing with female clients changed. Every woman was dressed in 
black abaya cloack and one had to keep the intercommunication to 
the minimum. Some jewelry shops were blown up in that section of 
the town. (Abu Nawris, born in Baghdad, 1971)
In the market place in Sadr City the shopkeepers were no longer 
allowed to place tomatoes and cucumbers next to each other (because 
of sexual connotations). (Sajida, born in Baghdad, 1969)
Prior to deserting their home quarters, our interviewees reported 
having often spent several weeks practically locked inside their 
homes. Umm Thamina who left Baghdad in 2007 recalled:
The atmosphere was tense and oppressive. I stayed at home all 
the time making only short visits to food markets, aware of the threat 
of road side bombs. Those committing the terrorist acts were both 
from inside the Thawra district but also outsiders. They were both 
contract killers but also criminals hired by militias. (Umm Thamina, 
born in Baghdad, 1978) 
The Mandaean women that we interviewed told us that 
harassment, threats, and direct physical violence towards women 
of religious minorities became frequent after 2006. All informed 
that Mandaean and Christian women had no other option than to 
adapt to ‘Islamic’ dress codes when moving in public spaces. Umm 
Thamina narrated us:
75 A large majority of the 60,000–70,000 members of global community of 
Mandaeans resided in Iraq until 2003. At present there are large refugee communities 
in Iran, Sweden and other western European countries, Australia and the U.S.A. 
See: Iraqi minority group needs U.S. attention, Yale Daily News, March 9, 2007. 
Available online at: http://www.yaledailynews.com/staff/kai-thaler/ 
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You simply had no other choice than to cover your head with 
a scarf and dress in black abaya. We were all afraid of what might 
happen to us. They (the members of Shi’ite militia) said to my 
husband’s brother’s wife and their two daughters, aged twelve and 
fourteen that they would be killed if they did not cover up. By 2007 
all my female relatives had adopted head scarf, including my aunt 
who was in Syria, studying to become a secretary. Makeup was not 
so much an issue for the militias but later they begun to force women 
to wear only black or white scarves. Colorful scarves were no longer 
considered appropriate. (Umm Thamina, born in Baghdad, 1978)
4.4.2. Members of secular and educated middle classes
A large proportion of our interviewees, fourteen individuals, could 
be categorized as belonging to Baghdad’s educated and largely 
secular middle classes. All had resided in areas that until 2005 
housed an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous population. 
Harassment and acts of violence were directed, not only against 
people from ‘wrong’ sectarian or religious groups, but also against 
women (and on occasions also men) who were seen as too ‘liberal’ or 
‘westernized’ in their behavior or public demeanor. Several women 
reported us having seen or heard of women who had been stabbed 
by knife in thighs for wearing trousers. Kidnappings, murder, and 
rape of women and girls were endemic in many areas of Baghdad as 
indicated by two interviewees.
A short while ago a half a kilometer from our house in Yarmuk, 
in Baghdad, a woman and her two children were murdered right 
there on the street. (Ali, born in Baghdad, 1974)
I have one cousin who is exceptionally blonde. Her parents keep 
saying to her not to go to the university because foreign looking 
people are in particular danger. They are constantly kidnapped, either 
by al-Qaeda or by radical Shi’ites. (Abu Nabil, born in Baghdad, 
1962)
Three male and one female interviewee ended up as targets of 
violence perpetrated by both Shi’ite and Sunni militias because of 
their professional profile. Journalists, sports teachers, and perfume, 
music and western fashion retail sellers were subjected to violence 
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and threats. Sunni insurgents also targeted state employees and other 
functionaries of the ‘illegitimate’ government. A civil servant whom 
we interviewed in Baghdad informed us: 
We are all afraid, at streets, workplaces and buses. You can hear 
people saying in buses: “God save us from elections”. People have 
lost their hopes. I am sure that our ministry is in danger. There have 
been many acts of terrorism against public institutions, even in those 
situated near U.S. troops. (Kamil, civil servant in the Ministry of 
Migration Karrada, Baghdad76)
The interviewees reported that the militias maintained regional 
death lists and many, as Abu Faris, had personal experience of direct 
encounters with armed combatants: 
We were returning from the marketplace with my brother and 
we saw them standing some ten meters from our front door. We 
were forced to shop on that day because in the Sadr- district there 
had been several terrorist strikes. It meant that soon there would 
be unrest in our quarter. We had bought some eggs, oil, milk and 
bread to manage for a week or ten days. These men had obviously 
come to revenge the strike in Sadr. […] There were perhaps fifty 
people among them; everyone was armed with Kalashnikovs and 
PKC (machine guns) and majority seemed very young, only fifteen 
to seventeen years of age. They were all dressed in black. Some, 
obviously outsiders, had left their faces uncovered but others had 
covered everything except eyes in order not to be recognized. One of 
them shot with his Kalashnikov over my head so close that I didn’t 
hear well for two days. I was sure they would kill me. That boy left 
me alone, but then another one with PKC approached me. I saw 
also my neighbor saying that we had nothing to do with violence 
and that we hardly got out of our houses. I was not so much worried 
of myself but I feared what they might do to my wife and children 
[…] In about thirty minutes a man, approximately twenty-five years 
of age, came and said: “We are not after these ones”. It appeared 
that they had come in search of another family, but did not want to 
return empty handed. That’s why they had come to our house. (Abu 
Faris, born in Baghdad, 1957) 
76 Interview conducted in Baghdad, July 17, 2010. 
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One interviewee of Kurdish origin had received death threats 
because of working as a driver for a foreign charity organization:
Numerous international relief organizations had entered Kurdish 
region after the invasion. Among them was a Greek organization 
specializing on health care with offices in Erbil and Dohok. They for 
example took care of those who couldn’t receive treatment for their 
illnesses in Kurdistan. I started working for them as a driver, and 
the car had Greek license plates so everyone knew that I work for a 
foreigner. The terrorists saw no difference whether you worked for 
humanitarian organization or the occupying military forces. They 
interpreted you being opponent of Islam and that kind of people 
were killed. First I received phone calls reminding me that I am an 
Iraqi and that he Americans are occupying our country. They said 
that I have to leave my job because the Greeks spy for the Americans. 
Finally the organization left Kurdistan because of the deteriorating 
security, and I received a death threat in phone. (Abu Asad, born in 
Shangal, Mosul, Iraqi Kurdistan, 1967)
4.4.3.  Violence against women 
As noted earlier, the deterioration of women’s position in the Iraqi 
society was largely a by-product of the decade of international 
sanctions which preceded the toppling of Saddam’s regime. The 2003 
foreign military invasion and subsequent sectarian violence only 
intensified the problems encountered by Iraqi women -- something 
that was completely contrary to the intentions of the international 
coalition occupying Iraq. In the years immediately after the invasion, 
there were concrete attempts to improve women’s official social, 
legal, and political position. This objective was clearly expressed by 
President George W. Bush in the run up to the invasion. Women were 
expected to give a new face for the post-Saddam Iraq. Numerous 
international programs were established to educate women for their 
new roles as moderating participants in the political process. The 
U.S. invested great efforts in promoting women’s empowerment, 
according to the visions of neo-conservative political forces in the 
George W. Bush administration. Many U.S. experts entered Iraq 
specifically for this purpose. Strikingly often, they were in their first 
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international mission and with hardly any experience of post-conflict 
settings. Appointments were often done according to political rather 
than professional criteria.77
 The new Iraq was to open all positions within the government 
and public state institutions for women. The new system was based 
on a specific quota for women. The initial plan was to guarantee 
twenty-five per cent representation for women across all levels of 
government, yet in practice it was implemented only in the parliament. 
Elevated ideas were countered by bleak realities. In January 2005, 
following the first parliamentary elections, critical voices were raised 
both domestically and internationally claiming that many female 
voters were largely unaware of what they were voting for. Political 
programs were hardly accessible to ordinary citizens in the tense 
security atmosphere. Many of our interviewees expressed the view 
that the first elections did not launch a democratic process, but 
instead represented the rapid institutionalization of sectarian politics. 
Women were elected as members of the new parliament but they 
were by and large family members of male conservative politicians 
with hardly any political background. In the following years it was 
increasingly difficult to find women running for elections because of 
the security risks involved in public campaigning.78
In the dominant official political discourses, women were 
increasingly constructed as symbols of post-Ba’athist Iraq and 
its Islamic nature. Yet the question of women’s role also became 
a part of the political rhetoric of both Sunni and Shi’ite resistance 
movements, which often vocalized their hatred towards western 
imperialism and cultural influence by referring to the role of women 
in future Iraq. Despite having remained in the center of political 
discourses, there has been no improvement in women’s overall social 
and political situation since the invasion.79
It soon became apparent that the most influential political parties 
in the new Iraq relied heavily on conservative religious norms. 
77 Kids Who Run Iraq. BBC World Series. March 2008. Available online at: http://
www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/specials/1658_assignment_2008/page51.shtml
78 Al Ali, N. (2009). What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq,
Lecture at UCLA Center for Near Eastern Studies. Available online at: http://www.
international.ucla.edu/cnes/podcasts/article.asp?parentid=104926
79 Ibid.
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The country’s new constitution reflected the efforts to harness 
civil law more tightly to the Islamic legal doctrine.80 Conservative 
interpretation of Sharia civil law is currently applied practice 
in Shi’ite-dominated areas in southern Iraq and in some Sunni 
dominated areas of central Iraq. 
More often than ever in the history of modern Iraq, violence in 
the post-occupation Iraq was a vehicle to reorder public spaces, not 
only along sectarian and ethnic boundaries, but in terms of gender 
as well. Particularly in areas falling under the control of sectarian 
militias, women were forced to fit into strictly defined gendered 
norms of propriety. Thousands of women were harassed, kidnapped, 
raped, and killed merely because of appearing to be too liberal.81
Nur, a 24 year old university student who was kidnapped and gang 
raped by Shi’ite militia was interviewed for this study in Baghdad in 
July 2010. She described us the atmosphere at the university: 
The militias, both Sunni and Shi’ite, begun to control everything. 
They even interfered in the relations between the students. They 
entered the lecture halls and did not respect even our lecturers. Most 
pivotal thing for them was that women covered their heads. They 
were ready to punish everyone who did not obey. It was impossible 
to talk freely. We tried to tell them that they had to respect lecturers. 
Soon we were backed by others. Then the militias threatened to kill 
us. Then I was kidnapped. (Nur, born in Baghdad, 1986)
Public assassinations of women created a vicious circle; every 
murder pushed women to think twice about their public activities. 
Ultimately, women disappeared almost entirely from many urban 
areas and sectors of labor, making the remaining women even more 
vulnerable than before. 
Our interviewees included a thirty-six-year-old woman who 
worked as a gymnastics coach. She was accused of corrupting 
80 Women Lose Ground in the New Iraq. Once They Were Encouraged to Study 
and Work; Now Life Is ‘Just Like Being in Jail. The Washington Post, December 
16, 2006. Available online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/12/15/AR2006 121501744.html
81 Trapped by Violence: Women in Iraq. Amnesty International 2009, Available 
online at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/005/2009/en/e6cda898-
fa16-4944-af74-f3efc0cf6a4d/mde140052009en.pdf
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children, particularly girls, and experienced increasing pressure to 
leave her profession. After returning from an international sports 
event in Syria, the woman had been interviewed by an Iraqi TV 
station without wearing a headscarf. This led to more severe threats. 
She received two letters; one at home and another in her training 
premises, telling her to leave her profession. She explained us her 
reason for leaving Iraq: 
One of our neighbors, leader of another sports team Talaba-
club was kidnapped and later killed. They said that the same would 
happen to me. (Sajida, born in Baghdad, 1969)
4.4.4.  Sexual minorities
In early 2007 the UN reported rapid increase in severe cases of 
persecution and torture of sexual minorities in Iraq.82 Already in late 
2005 Iraq’s supreme Shi’ite authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, 
had published a religious decree, fatwa, which legitimized the killing 
of homosexual men and women in order to protect the Iraqi society 
from corrupting influences. The fatwa was lifted by al-Sistani twelve 
months later but from the point of view of Iraq’s sexual minorities 
the message was clear.83 In early 2009 several sources reported of 
series of killings with hundreds of victims in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Najaf 
and Basra, as militias begun to monitor people, especially men, 
whom they suspected of homosexual conduct.84
The main responsibility for these arbitrary killings lay in the 
hands of the Mahdi Army of the Sadr-movement. The leader of the 
82 Gays Living in Shadows of New Iraq. The New York Times, December 18, 2007 
Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/world/middleeast/18baghdad.
html
83 They Want Us Exterminated: Murder, Torture, Sexual Orientation and Gender 
in Iraq. Human Rights Watch 2009. Available online at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/iraq0809webwcover.pdf
84 Iraq’s Newly Open Gays Face Scorn and Murder. The New York Times, 
April, 7 2009. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/world/
middleeast/08gay.html
Gays killed in Baghdad as clerics urge clampdown. Reuters April 4, 2009. Available 
online at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE53312Q20090404
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movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, himself proclaimed homosexuality as 
a disaster and threat to the morals of the nation.85 
The Ja’fari school of Shi’ite jurisprudence, but also the four 
legal schools of Sunni law, criminalize homosexuality between men. 
However, punishment – which may according to circumstances 
range from warning to execution – must meet strictly defined criteria 
before any sentence can be imposed. In the Iraqi Criminal code, 
which was drafted in 1969 and which is still in force, homosexual 
conduct is only mentioned under title ‘Rape, Homosexual Acts, and 
Assault on Women’s Honor’. Although in principle this reference to 
homosexuality seeks to define a gender-neutral rape law, it has been 
criticized for leaving police and prosecutors wide scope to persecute 
people whose conduct they dislike. 86
Several members of sexual minorities had little option but 
to leave the country. In most cases people sought shelter in the 
neighboring countries, and registered with the office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with the hope 
of being resettled in third countries. We were not able to trace any 
homosexual interviewees who had claimed for asylum in the EU 
countries because of fear of being persecuted. However, in Baghdad 
we interviewed two homosexual men who had lost dozens of 
homosexual friends since the invasion. According to them, the fears 
increased in Baghdad in the spring of 2009, with rumors of the killing 
campaigns. The rumors were confirmed as six gay men were executed 
within a period of two weeks in Baghdad’s Shi’ite stronghold Sadr 
- city. A large majority of the killings were perpetrated by sectarian 
militias but on occasion also by members of the victims’ own tribes. 
Muhannad, a 25-year-old economics student, told us that he had 
turned to the Iraqi Police after receiving a death threat from the 
Mahdi Army. He ended up being raped by the police – an incident 
which he said is not uncommon. In Bagdad’s vernacular Arabic the 
85 Iraq’s Sadr Wants ‘Depraved’ Homosexuality Eradicated,” AFP, May 29, 
2009. Available online at: www.google.com/.../afp/.../ALeqM5gyEDJh2jz2X-
0cesB76vl6eIJL6Q 
86 Gays Living in Shadows of New Iraq. The New York Times, December 18, 2007 
Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/world/middleeast/18baghdad.
html
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strongly derogatory term Jrawi (little bitch-dog) is often used in 
reference to gays, Muhannad told us.
4.4.5.  Persecuted academics, professionals, and former  
 members of the Ba’ath 
Several acts of violence against civilians indicated a deep 
embitterment and hatred towards former Ba’ath party loyalists and 
public functionaries of the ‘system’, including teachers, academics 
and physicians. 
At the beginning of the crisis, one of the first groups to leave 
Iraq was the educated upper strata of population. Threats against 
professional elites working in public institutions (government 
offices, hospitals, and universities) became increasingly common 
as the crisis deepened. The Iraqi Medical Association reported that 
nearly half of Iraq’s medical doctors had fled by 2008. Numbers 
indicated by Oxfam/NCCI (NGO Coordination Committee in 
Iraq) were even more alarming with regard to country’s rebuilding 
prospects; roughly forty per cent of Iraq’s entire professional staff 
had left the country since 2003. Over 230 university professors had 
been assassinated between 2003 and 2008, and in 2007 deans of 
three major universities in Baghdad announced a nearly eighty per 
cent fall in the number of their teacher staff.87 Universities in major 
cities had turned into headquarters for militias and death squads. 
In one single incident, armed men wearing Iraqi Police uniforms 
had abducted up to 150 professionals from the Ministry of higher 
education in Baghdad.88 
Abu Mahmud, whom we interviewed in a reception center in 
Turku, had worked as a secretary of the party’s regional office in 
Dora, Baghdad. One of his sons who had belonged to Saddam’s 
elite army, the Republican Guards, disappeared in the fall of 2009. 
87 cf. Lischer, S. (2008). Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the 
Forced Migration Crisis. International Security, 33 (2).
88 Iraq’s Education Under Siege. Asia Times Online. November 21, 2006. Available 
online at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HK21Ak05.html 
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According to Abu Mahmud, he was most likely kidnapped and 
executed by the Mahdi Army. Three days after his disappearance 
Abu Mahmud’s house was destroyed by a bomb blast where his wife 
also lost her life.
Another man whom we interviewed perceived that in the 
current political climate, anyone with connections to former public 
institutions – especially those of security – had no room to participate 
in the reconstruction of Iraq. He related about the developments 
leading to his departure from Iraq:
In the nineties I worked at the Ministry of Social Affairs and then 
I was transferred to the administration of the Abu Ghraib prison. 
In 1994 I started my academic studies in order to avoid military 
service. I married and worked with my father at his clothing business 
until 2003. Then in 2005 the authorities ordered everyone who had 
previously worked for the state to take their professional documents 
and report at the Ministry of Labor. I went there and turned to some 
people with whom I had worked earlier. They told me to get out fast 
and run because (as a former worked in prison administration) I 
would be arrested. (Ali, born in Baghdad, 1974)
4.4.6. Kidnappings 
Since the spring moths of 2003, thousands of Iraqi men, women, and 
children have been kidnapped by both militias and criminal gangs 
in search of ransom money. Indeed, kidnapping became the major 
form of criminal activity in Iraq, overtaking burglaries, robberies, 
car theft, and other crimes. According to Iraqi Police Forces, some 
incidents were perpetrated by criminal gangs, but the main culprits 
were insurgent groups who financed their activities by kidnappings. 
Many cases remain unreported as people are concerned about 
antagonizing the kidnappers. 
In October 2009 the kidnappings in Baghdad began to target 
especially children. The children of wealthier city districts, such as 
Shari´Filastin and Zayouna in eastern Baghdad and Mansoor in the 
western part of the city, are particularly vulnerable. In these areas, 
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posters of missing children have become common.89 Umm Basma, 
who visited Baghdad in July 2009, told us the following in an 
interview conducted in Finland in November 2009:
We did not let our children out because while we were in Baghdad 
one child got kidnapped in the neighborhood. My sister works in the 
day care center in Shari´ Filastin and she said that one day she got 
frightened because of hearing a woman scream in front of the center. 
She enquired what had happened. The woman said that she is from 
the same street, and feared that her child had been kidnapped. The 
girl was five years old, of locals. After a few hours the family was 
informed that they had to pay 15,000 € ransom. The woman said 
that she was sure her daughter would be killed even if they paid the 
ransom. It was a poor family. After this incident we didn’t let our 
children play outside. (Umm Basma, born in Baghdad, 1964)
4.4.7. Children  
The social and political turmoil that has prevailed in Iraq for more 
than three decades has left deep mental and physical wounds on the 
generations born since 1970s. With the 2003 invasion the overall 
situation of children deteriorated rapidly. By 2007 violence had 
orphaned tens of thousands of children.90 
Currently there are no precise statistics about the mental state of 
the Iraqi children. However, the Association of Iraqi Psychologists 
announced in 2007 that violence raises serious concerns for the 
future generations91 and, according to figures presented by Iraqi 
ministry of health, thirty per cent of children show symptoms of 
89 Kidnappers target youth of Baghdad. Guardian, February 29, 2004. Available 
online at. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/feb/29/iraq 
Kids at risk in Iraq kidnap business. The Australian. October 8, 2009. Available online at: 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/kids-at-risk-in-iraq-kidnap-business/
story-e6frg6so-1225784065612
90 Iraqi Youth Face Lasting Scars of War. Washington Post. June 26, 2007Available 
online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/25/
AR2007062501952.html
91 Children of war: the generation traumatized by violence in Iraq. The Guardian. 
February 6, 2007. Available online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/
feb/06/iraq.topstories3
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trauma, such as sleep disorders and inability to concentrate. In 2008 
merely seventy psychiatrists remained in Iraq, none of whom had 
specialized on treatment of traumatized children and adolescents. In 
Baghdad only, it was estimated that a half a million children were in 
need of psychological help.92 Children who have witnessed murder, 
gunfire, assassinations, kidnappings, and violent house searches tend 
to build mistrustful perceptions of the adult world, which may lead 
to social withdrawal and hopelessness – symptoms that are often 
extremely difficult to treat.93 Ali, whom we interviewed in Baghdad 
in October 2009 related:
When we left our home (in Dora, Baghdad) I was fifteen and in 
the secondary school. The schools had remained closed for months 
because no one allowed their children to attend the classes. People had 
been killed right in the streets. The worst part lasted about eighteen 
months (…) teachers and headmasters were murdered, all according 
to death lists (distributed by the militias). (Ali, born in Baghdad, 1991)
Thousands of children experienced situations where they 
witnessed their parents being humiliated and made incapable to 
protect their offspring. 
Violence has also affected the lives of children economically, 
for the economic status of families that have lost their fathers has 
dropped dramatically. An increasing number of children have begun 
to work in street commerce, and many were forced to become 
directly involved in the violence. For example, some children were 
hired as bomb makers, which is a major reason for why in 2008 
some 1,500 children and adolescents were held in Iraqi prisons.94
The indirect effects of occupation on the Iraqi children should 
not be overlooked, either. In 2006 one quarter of the victims of 
unexploded military devices were children. It is estimated that 
the western powers have dropped nearly seventeen million cluster 
92 Fakhri, K. (2008). Trauma, Affect, and Changing Family Structures in Iraq. 
Presentation in international symposium Cultural Voices of a Fragmented Nation: 
War, Trauma, and Remembrance in Contemporary Iraq” December 11–13, 2008, 
Marburg University.
93 Ibid.
94 Poverty Drives Children to Work. Global Policy Forum. May 10, 2007. Available 
online at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/167/35653.html 
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bombs in Iraq since the Second Gulf War. South central Iraq in 
particular is badly contaminated by cluster ammunition remnants 
and unexploded air and ground ordnance. This will undoubtedly 
have devastating effects on future generations of Iraqis.95
4.5.  Iraq since 2009
The U.S. administration’s critically flawed military strategy in Iraq 
largely explains the onslaught of violence in 2006 and 2007. A 
central part of the strategy was to keep the number American troops 
as small as possible while simultaneously pushing the Iraqi Security 
Forces into the lead. The U.S. anticipated that gradual political 
progress would result in increased security. The failure of this 
strategy could be explained by two factors; first, the Iraqi Security 
proved to be highly insufficient and unprepared to take the lead, 
and second, political progress could not be reached after the vicious 
circle of sectarian violence had begun. 
In early 2007, as president George W. Bush appointed general 
David Petraeus and the new ambassador in Baghdad, Ryan Crocker, 
to take charge on the change of strategy. The number of U.S. forces in 
Iraq was increased by nearly forty per cent with the aim of stabilizing 
key areas of the country. Increasing security, it was believed, could 
nurture political progress and provide possibilities to strengthen the 
Iraqi Security Forces. A large part of the troops was allocated in 
Baghdad in order to disrupt al-Qaeda and other insurgent networks 
extending to Sunni majority areas that served as bases to carry out 
terrorist operations within the city.96
While fighting armed organizations, the U.S. increased its support 
for coalitions of tribal Sunni Sheikhs, the so called ‘awakening 
95 Iraq. 2008 Key Data. Land Mine Monitor. Available online at: http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2009&pqs_
type=lm&pqs_report=iraq
How many civilians were killed by cluster bombs. Iraq Body Count. Available online 
at: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/killed-by-cluster-bombs/
96 Understanding General Petraeus’s Strategy. The Weekly Standard. June 27, 
2007. Available online at: http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/Content/Public/
Articles/000/000/013/803vtvls.asp?page=2
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councils’. The cooperation managed to improve security particularly 
in Anbar and Salah al-Din provinces.97 Moreover, in August 2008, 
the radical Shi’ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr suspended the activities of 
his Mahdi Army. This was a result of major U.S. and Iraqi military 
campaign carried out on the movement’s strongholds in the Iraqi 
Capital and southern parts of the country in spring 2008.98
The number of civilian deaths dropped rapidly in Baghdad after 
the circle of violence between Sunnis and Shi’ites had been broken. 
However, this was not merely because of the new American strategy. 
In fact the ceasefire imposed by militias indicated that they had 
managed to carry out thorough population transfers and established 
fiefdoms for members of the same sect. A recent report by Refugees 
International maintains that Iraq resembles a large military base 
within which each neighbourhood is separated by walls, which 
prevent ordinary Iraqis from moving freely.99 
Spectacular attacks involving large numbers of victims remain 
frequent in Iraq. Although in some provinces (Anbar and Baghdad) 
violence has been dramatically cut down, other areas with highly 
heterogeneous population and deeply grounded presence of insurgent 
groups remain extremely dangerous (Kirkuk, Mosul).100
At the time of writing this report, Iraq’s future – even in short 
term perspective – allows multiple interpretations. Very positive 
indications can be read from rapid decrease in the number of 
civilian deaths – from 9,222 in the year 2008 to 4,673 the year 
2009. However, large-scale acts of terrorism still occur and their 
magnitude seems to be increasing. In 2008 a total of 534 people died 
97 In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict. The New York Times. December 
23, 2007. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/world/
middleeast/23awakening.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all 
98 Al-Sadr Back in Iraq Stronghold. Al Jazeera News, January 5, 2011. Available online 
at: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/01/2011151418794320.html 
99 The Return and Resettlement of Displaced Iraqis. Refugees International. March 
31, 2009. Available online at: http://www.refintl.org/policy/testimony/return-and-
resettlement-displaced-iraqis
100 Civilian Deaths from Violence in 2009. Iraq Body Count. Available online at: 
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in the nine most devastating attacks, and in 2009 750 people lost 
their lives in the eight largest attacks.101 
Perhaps the most concerning news come from the political 
arena. In August 2010 President Barak Obama announced that 
the U.S. was to consistently follow the agreement it had made with 
Iraqi Government that all American forces will be out of Iraq by 
the end of the year 2011. In the same month the Iraqi Chief of Staff 
had warned that the withdrawal of the U.S. military would create a 
severe security vacuum in the country and foreign military presence 
would be needed until the year 2020.102 
Not only Iraq’s security climate but also the developments in 
the political sphere seemed to raise international concern. The 
parliamentary elections held in March 2010 resulted in a grave 
political impasse as none of the main four electoral blocks won 
majority. For nearly nine months, Iraq was without a functioning 
government.
The deadlock was resolved in December 21, 2010 as the 
parliament approved a new government headed by Prime Minister 
Nouri al-Maliki, who had been in power since 2006. The twenty-
nine ministers of the new government include members of all 
major sectarian factions. However, the process of forming the 
new government reflects Prime Minister al-Maliki’s attempts to 
consolidate his power and dominance over the entire security file, 
as he is acting minister of defence, interior and national security 
“until appropriate candidates are found”. The power sharing within 
the government further solidifies sectarianism in political life and 
gives supremacy to sect and ethnic identity over national unity.103 
It should be noted that the new government includes six ministers 
from Muqtda al-Sadr’s radical Shi’ite block and the movement has 
no less than thirty nine seats in the Iraqi parliament. Sadr himself 
101 Ibid.
102 US troops withdraw from Iraq despite fears over violence. The Telegraph, 
August 19, 2010. Available online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
middleeast/iraq/7954677/US-troops-withdraw-from-Iraq-despite-fears-over-
violence.html 
103 Iraq gets a new government. Al Jazeera Net December 12, 2010. Available online at: 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/12/201012211373655244.html 
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made a visible comeback to Iraq in early 2011. He had spent several 
years in exile in Iran following an arrest warrant imposed on him.104 
The political process reflects a fierce regional and international 
power play on influence and control over Iraq’s natural resources. 
The style of politics in Iraq very much resembles the situation in 
Lebanon, where an ethno-sectarian division of power generates 
repeated periods of civil violence and even war. The Iraqi constitution 
grants the post of Presidency to the Kurds, while the Prime Minister 
is of the Shi’ites, and the Sunnis hold the position of the speaker of 
parliament. At worst, Iraq might become hostage to its sectarian 
system, where each political party fights over its share and is largely 
driven by the fear of marginalization.105
The sectarian political system is a direct result of post-invasion 
developments. In this situation, the largest gains have fallen into 
the hands of Iran who has for long backed al-Maliki. In November 
30, 2010, a leading Arabic International TV channel, al Jazeera, 
carried out a spectator poll asking: “Who is the winner in the 
recent parliamentary elections in Iraq? Iran or democracy?” An 
overwhelming majority, eighty-eight per cent of the answerers, 
perceived that the winner was Iran.106
Nevertheless, the role of Iraq’s Sunni Arab neighbours should 
not be overlooked in the consolidation of the country’s sectarian 
boundaries. Arab countries have for several years rallied for greater 
political influence on the Iraqi Sunnis in order to outplay Iran. Should 
the ethno-sectarian political culture prevail, Iraq will experience 
increased external interference, whether by the U.S., Iran, or other 
regional powers. In Arabic news rooms and Internet pages, there 
are rumours of hundreds of millions of dollars being allocated to 
104 Al Sadr calls Iraqis to resist. Al Jazeera News, January 8, 2011. Available online at: 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/01/20111872647305497.html 
105 The ‘Lebanonisation’ of Iraq . Al Jazeera Net. November 29, 2010. Available 
online at: http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/2010/11/20101126143626991797.
html 
106 see: Man al muntasir fi tashkil al-hukuma al-Iraqiaya al-jadida. [Who is the winner 
in the formation of new government in Iraq]. Al Ittijah al Mu´akis [The Opposing 
Direction] –program. Aljazeera (Arabic), November 30, 2011 Available online at: 
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sectarian politicians. Numerous online discussion sites also suggest 
that there is close intelligence coordination between sectarian blocks 
and neighbouring countries with regard to the situation in Iraq.107 
In this climate the battle against terrorism and organised crime 
has proved to be increasingly difficult. Both international al-Qaeda 
and remnants of Ba’athist militias aim to destabilize the situation, 
and re-ignite sectarian conflict. Another critical question is the fate of 
the millions of Iraqi refugees in the neighbouring countries. Should 
they face forced return to their home areas, the risks for mounting 
sectarian tensions are likely to increase. Taking all these factors into 
account, Iraq’s social and political future will remain extremely 
difficult to predict. The indications that conservative political ethos 
will keep its grip on the Iraqi administrative culture are too numerous 
to list here. The recent onslaught on basic democratic and cultural 
rights by a number of provincial councils illustrates the direction of 
the change. For example, in November 2010 the Baghdad provincial 
council ordered all Baghdad’s nightclubs to be closed, based on the 
justification that the city had to be cleared from bars without proper 
licenses. Acting on orders from the provincial council, three days 
later the Iraqi security forces also closed the Iraqi Writers’ Union 
social club in central Baghdad. In Babil, the provincial council 
decided to ban songs and plays in the Babil Cultural Festival. Similar 
developments have occurred in various areas of the country in the 
fall of 2010.108
4.6. Population transfers 
Despite its chaotic nature, there was a clear underlying logic in the 
sectarian violence of 2006–2007. Militant groups attempted to 
homogenize their territories in order to secure their positions, first 
by expelling unwanted individuals. The cleansings were followed by 
107 See: Iraqi CP, Interview about the Political Impasse 6 months after the Elections. 
SolidNet.org. Available online at: http://www.solidnet.org/index.php/iraq-iraqi-
communist-party/558-iraqi-cp-interview-about-the-political-impasse-6-months-
after-the-elections
108 Iraqi Writers Union outraged by social club closure. AK News, November 29, 
2010. Available online at: http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/1/198624/
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the introduction of new members of the “desirable” group in the 
area. Third, the militants aspired to promote their personal political 
position by presenting the displaced population as vulnerable and in 
need of protection. In effect, leaders from all militant groups tended 
to exaggerate the nature of the violence. 
By 2008 Iraq had witnessed the largest mass population 
movement in the Arab world since the 1948 Palestinian exodus, as 
nearly eighteen per cent of the Iraqi people were forced to leave 
their homes. Cleansing of entire neighborhoods from people of the 
“wrong” groups became a part of the social and political reality 
of occupied Iraq.109 One of our interviewees witnessed the changes 
upon a visit in Iraq in the summer of 2009:
Very many left and were replaced by others, for example as I 
visited my paternal aunt’s house, (In Shari’ Filastin, Baghdad) I 
was told that several of the neighbors had gone. It used to be a 
heterogeneous area, but now majority of the newcomers were of 
Shi’ite families (Umm Basma, born in Baghdad, 1966). 
The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) estimated in 
2007 that fifteen million Iraqis were extremely vulnerable due to 
impoverishment and alienation, and that a vast majority had been 
exposed to terrifying and traumatizing experiences of violence.110
Up to 2.4 million Iraqis left the country, predominantly to Jordan 
and Syria, and some 2.7 million – eighty per cent of them women 
and children under the age of twelve – sought refuge within Iraqi 
borders.111 Only a small minority – estimated around 100,000 – had 
the strength and resources to make their way to Europe.112
This vast humanitarian cost of the occupation remained largely 
unnoticed in the Western media because the problem was largely 
109 Lischer, S. (2008). Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the Forced
Migration Crisis. International Security, 33 (2).
110 Harper, A (2007). Iraq: Growing needs amid continuing displacement. Forced 
Migration Review 29. Available online at: http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/
FMR29/51–53.pdf 
111 The Internally Displaced People in Iraq Update 35, 30 June 2008. Available 
online at: http://www.iraqredcrescent.org/IDP_35_update_EN.pdf 
112 Five Years on Europe is Still Ignoring Its Responsibilities Towards Iraqi Refugees, 
UNHCR, March 3, 2008, Available online at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/47e1315c2.html
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invisible. Nearly ninety-nine per cent of the refugees did not reside in 
camps and simply utilized their social networks, or used their savings 
to find housing in more secure areas in Iraq or in the neighboring 
countries.113 Another reason for the lack of media coverage is that 
Iraq was a danger zone for those international relief workers, news 
houses, and journalists who were not ‘embedded’ in the international 
coalition military forces. Without news stories with faces and names, 
the new Iraqi refugee crisis thus failed to enter the western media 
consumers’ consciousness. 
4.6.1.  Routes within Iraq 
The movement of displaced Iraqis took various routes and found 
several destinations. A large part of the population transfers took 
place within the capital Baghdad, as people left highly insecure areas 
to districts with less dangerous neighborhoods and better services. 
Samir from central Baghdad recounted: 
In our area (Dora, Baghdad) the Sunnis formed the majority 
and the transfer of Shi’ites started. People talked about death lists 
and killings. We also received a note saying that my father’s and 
brother’s names were included in al-Qaeda’s death list and that we 
should move away. We took everything with us and left the house 
empty. By that time my brother had already moved outside of Iraq. 
Many others were forced to leave and then the wave of explosions 
and murder started as al-Qaeda took control of the entire area […] 
Many of them were from abroad and they settled in deserted houses. 
Increasingly often the newcomers were people of whom we knew 
nothing about. Little by little Dora became a Sunni area. We moved 
to Talibiya in Baghdad because we had relatives there who helped 
us to rent a house. So many people left Dora; for Yamin, Sha´ab and 
other Shi’ite dominated areas. (Samir, born in Baghdad, 1986) 
113 Lischer, S. (2008). Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the Forced
Migration Crisis. International Security, 33 (2).
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By 2007 more than 350,000 people in Baghdad had resorted to 
networks of kin and tribal links inside the city in search of shelter. 
At the same time, several hundreds of thousands moved outside of 
the capital.114 Between 2005 and 2008, the city underwent a massive 
transfer of Sunni families from the west of the city to the Sunni 
dominated areas in the north and northwest of Baghdad. They were 
replaced by Shi’ites from eastern Baghdad.115 A major trend within 
the Shi’ite population was to leave the Sunni strongholds in major 
cities and rural areas of central and north-central Iraq, and to head 
towards the southern regions of the country with a Shi’ite majority. 
In reality, the patterns of population transfers were much more 
complex, as many Iraqi marriages were formed across sectarian and 
ethnic boundaries. A considerable number of people, regardless of 
their ethnic and religious backgrounds, sought shelter from the more 
settled regions under the Kurdistan Regional Government in the 
north-western Iraq. The situation worsened as most of Iraq’s eighteen 
governorates began to impose both formal and informal restrictions 
on the entry and residence of internally displaced persons. 116 This 
made life unbearable especially for those who did not have social 
connections to the more secure areas. For many the only option was 
to leave the country altogether.
4.6.2. Internally displaced people (IDP) 
The Iraqi Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Displacement and 
Migration should in theory take the responsibility for displacement 
issues in Iraq. The harsh reality for a vast majority of the displaced 
Iraqis is that they do not receive any form of government assistance. 
For ordinary Iraqis, not to mention the IDPs, the government has 
continuously proved incapable of providing even basic services such 
114 The Real Challenge of Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Future. Available online 
at: http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2007/1206_iraq_ferris.aspx?more=rc 
115 Harper, A. (2007). Iraq: Growing needs amid continuing displacement Forced 
Migration Review 29. Available online at: http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/
FMR29/51–53.pdf 
116 Ibid.
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as electricity and clean water.117 Many IDPs see Iraqi government as 
useless representative of impenetrable bureaucratic morass.
Some eighty per cent of the IDPs in the country were from 
Baghdad according to 2007 estimates.118 Those who sought refuge 
from more secure areas seldom managed to receive IDP stipends 
or transfer their Public Distribution System (PDS) card to claim 
food allotments. Thousands of Iraqis still face equal difficulties 
when trying to obtain documents to reclaim stolen, confiscated 
or destructed property. Similar situation is encountered by those 
thousands who had to sell their properties, often with extremely 
unfavorable terms. As Abu Basim expressed,
We for example sold our house in Baghdad and the same happened 
to my wife’s family home. It was a normal market price deal, but it 
is obvious that many buyers were of the new government elite, who 
benefitted from the situation. Mandaeans like us had always lived 
surrounded by other groups. Our house was just one surrounded by 
families from other groups. (Abu Basim, born in Baghdad, 1962).
From 2009 onwards, as the security situation begun to improve 
nearly 250,000 persons – mainly – IDPs have returned to their 
homes. The large majority of returnees are from Baghdad, however 
sustainable returns proved to be difficult.119 Many found resettlement 
impossible due to lack of government protection, chronic 
unemployment, economic constraints and tensions encountered in 
the demographically reordered areas. Many returnees have been 
displaced again.120 
Resettlement has been particularly difficult for those returning 
from neighboring countries. UNHCR survey found in 2008 that 
117 Al-Mashad al-Iraq. Al Jazeera (Arabic) 27.6. 2010, Available online at: http://
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seventy per cent of the refugees returning from Syria had been 
displaced within Iraq shortly after their return.121 A large majority 
of the displaced do not consider return simply because their homes 
were destroyed or confiscated and they think that security in their 
home areas is not duly enforced.122
According to another UNHCR survey released in 2010 nearly 
two thirds of Iraqi returnees from neighboring countries regretted 
taking the decision of returning back to Iraq. General insecurity and 
fear of persecution made return to original homes impossible for 
seventy-seven per cent of residents in Baghdad’s Karkh and Resafa 
quarters. The survey also indicated that more than third of the 
returnees were uncertain whether they will stay permanently in Iraq 
if the conditions do not improve.123
The IDP situation has remained a vast challenge regardless of the 
fact that the Iraqi Government announced its initiatives to close the 
IDP file by the end of 2009. Many fear that even the inadequate food 
and economic assistance can be dramatically reduced.124
Iraqi government has furthermore proved to be incapable of 
developing an effective plan to receive the influx of returnees and 
minimize the risks of new round of sectarian violence that could 
be initiated by a massive return. Moreover, the government lacks a 
clear mechanism to solve disputes surrounding property rights of 
returnees who find their homes destroyed or occupied. 125
Internal displacement both reflects and forges sectarian 
divisions within the Iraqi society. In Iraq, as elsewhere extended 
political violence and paralysis of public sector, together with 
121 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Iraq Situation Update, March 
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mass unemployment and economic crisis of households, leaves 
plenty of room for political manipulation of the displaced people. 
One of the major hindrances for the development of civil society 
movement lies in this very fact. The government perceives emerging 
nongovernmental organizations as a threat rather than a partner.126 
By far the most visible charitable organizations that channel aid to 
citizens are under direct leadership of sectarian political groupings. 
The most visible of such actors are Shahid al-Mihrab – foundation127 
and charities under control of the Sadr movement with particularly 
strong following among the two to three million residents of the 
Sadr City district in Baghdad. 
The Shahid al-Mihrab – foundation is headed by Ammar al-
Hakim the leader of the most influential Shi’ite political party SIIC. 
With its personnel of 7,500 workers, it oversaw the building of 
hundreds of mosques, gender separated schools (that impose veiling 
for girls over ten years of age) day care centers and health clinics. 
It has provided various forms of material and social support for 
displaced Shi’ites in different locations. In addition Sadrist charities 
provide economic assistance for burial services, money gifts for 
families of dead and injured and food assistance. Furthermore they 
help resettling displaced families free of charge.128 Numerous young 
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men have joined armed Shi’ite militias but also Sunni insurgency 
groups simply because they need money.129
4.6.3.  Internationally displaced people
We fled for Syria in the middle of December in 2006 with my wife 
and three children. The journey from Baghdad to Syrian border 
was very difficult. We were extremely lucky since there were five 
buses ahead of us which were all stopped and the passengers were 
robbed. Many lost money and jewels. An American military convoy 
happened to appear just at the right moment and because of this 
nobody stopped our buss. When we reached the border we heard 
from other Iraqis that we were in the only bus that was not robbed 
that day. Among us there were many widowers and entire families 
who had lost their father. In some cases, I remember, the father had 
disappeared with no trace. Women were only thinking about their 
children’s best, especially if there were teen-aged daughters in the 
family. They were the ones in the gravest danger, because of frequent 
kidnappings and rapes. Everyone knew that the situation was only 
deteriorating. People just had to get their daughters to a safe place. 
(Abu Basim, born in Bagdad, 1957)
A vast majority of Iraqis seeking shelter outside of Iraq turned 
to neighboring Syria and Jordan as Iraq’s southern neighbors Saudi-
Arabia and Kuwait had categorically rejected the entry of displaced 
Iraqis. The years 2003-2005 Jordan proved to be largely tolerant 
of the large influx of Iraqis. The official attitude changed rapidly in 
the end of the year 2005 as three Iraqis carried out a terrorist attack 
killing sixty in the capital Amman. Authorities begun to prevent 
entry of single men between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five and 
Jordanian border guards inspected Iraqis concerning their sectarian 
identity and refused entry of those considered Shi’ite.130 In order to 
129 The Real Challenge of Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Future. 
Brookings, December 6, 2007. Available online at: http://www.brookings.edu/
speeches/2007/1206_iraq_ferris.aspx 
130 Frelick, B. (2007). Iraqis denied right to asylum. Iraq Special Issue. Forced 
Migration Review, June 2007. Available online at: http://www.fmreview.org/
FMRpdfs/Iraq/contents.pdf
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avoid deportation, most Iraqis attempted to register as refugees at 
the UNHCR office in Amman. By 2007 some 50,000 had managed 
to claim refugee status, but only a tiny minority was selected for third 
country settlement programs. The overall number of Iraqis in Jordan 
was estimated to be around 750,000.131 Since the first years of Iraqi 
influx the average size of cases handled by UNHCR had sharply 
risen, as more often entire families left Iraq. As Jordan grew more 
determined to close its borders, Syria remained the only welcoming 
country for Iraqis. There are no accurate estimates of the number of 
the Iraqis in Syria, yet it was believed to exceed 1.5 million by 2008-
2009.132 By the year 2009 UNHCR in Damascus had registered over 
200,000 Iraqis and the government of Syria stated that the refugees 
were not be forcibly returned to Iraq. However Syria has introduced 
entrance visa regime for Iraqis, practically closing the last remaining 
route of escape for Iraqis.133 Iraqi refugees remain in legal limbo in 
the both countries as they are denied from access to legal work and 
thus pushed into illegal and underpaid jobs. Especially in Damascus, 
Syria, thousands of desperate women without other means of 
survival are forced to work in prostitution. The refugees’ physical 
and mental health has rapidly deteriorated due to lack of sufficient 
medical care.134
Neither Jordan nor Syria have signed the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees, which creates a constant fear of 
deportation regardless of the official promises not to deport Iraqis 
by force. In both countries refugees largely rely on their savings, 
and in many cases their resources are running out. The prices of 
foodstuffs increased by thirty per cent, property prices by forty 
per cent, and rentals by 150 per cent since the arrival of first Iraqis 
131 Land, T. (2009). Europe accepts 10,000 more Iraqi refugees. The Middle East, 
February 2009. Available online at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2742/
is_397/ai_n31396362/
132 Ibid.
133 Harper, A. (2008) Iraq: Growing needs amid continuing displacement. Forced 
Migration Review 29, September 2008. Available online at: www.fmreview.org/
FMRpdfs/FMR29/51–53.pdf
134 Land, T (2009).
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fleeing the violence.135 Due to price increases in suburban areas of 
Amman and Damascus, Iraqis encounter great difficulties to rent or 
buy apartments. As Sajida and her husband Abu Faris recounted,
S: So we headed to Damascus…
A (interrupting) …and rented an apartment. The middlemen 
were already there – at the bus station waiting for Iraqi newcomers. 
“Are you looking for an apartment? What kind?” they said.
S: (interrupting) ”...how many bedrooms?” They were there with 
their pick-ups. We settled the price, but when we reached the flat the 
price had doubled. For them, the most important thing was to catch 
a potential client. They knew that the new arrivals were exhausted 
and had left all their possessions behind. (S: Sajida, born in Baghdad 
1969) (A: Abu Faris born in Bagdad, 1957)
As many families are increasingly destitute the choices narrow 
and the risks increase. Nur, whom we interviewed in Baghdad in 
the mid July in 2010, told us having been forced to leave Iraq after 
being kidnapped and raped by a group of men of the Mahdi Army. 
She was particularly worried of the shame the rape brought to her 
family. Nur was requested to turn to a family residing in Damascus 
by a woman she acquainted with in Bagdad. As she recounted,
This woman gave me her relatives’ address in Bab Touma in 
Damascus. I managed to get across the border and finally I felt that 
I was safe. I settled in this family and I really liked these people, 
especially the mother. I constantly demanded that I could work for 
my housing and food because the family was destitute and with two 
daughters and two sons. I found it strange that they left the house 
in the evenings and did not return until one in the night. They did 
not respond to my enquiries when I asked where they worked. Then 
one night while I was asleep one of the sons tried to sleep with me. I 
fought back and the mother woke up. She said that I will have to work 
with the other daughters. I didn’t know what kind of work she was 
talking about. Then she said she knows everything about my history, 
and that should I refuse to work she would inform my family about 
what had happened to me and where to find me. So, I had to go to the 
club, and strip and go with men. (Nur, born in Baghdad, 1986)
135 Lischer, S. (2008, 39) Security and Displacement in Iraq Responding to the 
Forced Migration Crisis International Security, 33 (2).
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Nur later managed to register her case in the UNHCR office 
in Damascus, a lucky strike compared to thousands queuing in 
front of the offices that were overwhelmed by the work load. Nur 
thought that as a kidnapped victim of sexual violence, fleeing from 
both militias and her own family, she had a chance to be selected 
for third country settlement program. Iraqis in Syria are largely 
aware of the fact that UNHCR prioritizes particularly vulnerable 
groups including female headed households, persecuted religious 
and political groups but as well those who had worked for the 
foreign employers, popularly associated with the occupiers. After 
registration Nur was entitled to receive a monthly cash payment and 
food allotment but after waiting period of several months she heard 
that she was not among the fortunate one per cent granted the right 
for third country settlement.136 The officials in the UNHCR office 
demanded a large bribe. Exhausted and desperate she left the family 
but soon acquainted with an Iraqi woman from Sayida Zaynab in 
Damascus, who offered to house her among her relatives if she chose 
to return back to Baghdad. Nur is at the time of writing this report 
living in Baghdad but in great fear that her family will find her. 
4.6.4.  International refugees
Despite U.S. government’s pivotal role in the dramatic developments 
in post invasion Iraq the Bush administration proved to be extremely 
unwelcoming for the displaced Iraqis.137 
136 cf. Harper, A. (2008) Iraq: Growing needs amid continuing displacement. Forced 
Migration Review 29, September 2008. Available online at: www.fmreview.org/
FMRpdfs/FMR29/51–53.pdf
137 For example families who had paid ransom for the return of their kidnapped 
relatives had been rejected under a provision of the Patriot Act, U.S. counter 
terrorism law. Paying ransom to kidnappers was interpreted by U.S. immigration 
officials as material support for terrorist groups. See: Iraq’s Invisible Refugees. The 
Nation, march 9, 2009. Available online at: http://www.thenation.com/article/iraqs-
invisible-refugees.
The U.K. rejected numerous Iraqi asylum claimants, who are under threat for 
having worked for British forces in Iraq. See: Frelick, B. (2007). Iraqis denied right 
to asylum. Iraq Special Issue. Forced Migration Review. June 2007. Available online 
at: http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/Iraq/contents.pdf 
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Between 2003 and 2006 merely 770 Iraqis were admitted by the 
U.S. . The number was to reach 7,000 the year 2007, yet in reality the 
numbers were dramatically lower – 1,608 individuals. Resettlement 
gained momentum gradually but did not meet its stated goal 12,000 
resettlements for the year 2008, largely due to insufficient funding 
and bureaucratic hindrances.138
The U.S. government’s attitude was clearly shared by EU Member 
States. The UNHCR called for a resettlement of 80,000 refugees in 
Europe between 2009 and 2012 but the EU ministers of interior and 
justice decided grant asylum for 10,000 members of most vulnerable 
groups.139 
During the first years of the crisis Sweden was the only exception 
among the EU countries. In 2006 it admitted more Iraqis than all 
other EU countries combined and during the first four years of the 
crisis some 18,000 Iraqis gained residence permits in Sweden. With 
the formation of right wing government (October 2006) winds 
begun to change and by 2008 Sweden introduced considerably more 
restrictive asylum and resettlement policies.
Some 100,000 asylum applications from Iraqis were received in 
the EU between 2003 and 2007. Sweden alone hosts a permanent 
community of some 100,000 Iraqis, yet it should be noted that the 
number includes Iraqis who settled in Sweden in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Other large communities of newcomers are in Germany (13,414), 
Greece (11,627) UK, (11,145), and the Netherlands (10,906).140 
The treatment of newly arrived Iraqis reflects the huge differences 
of refugee policies in different EU countries. The decision rates for 
first instance asylum applications of the Iraqis in 2007 varied from 
zero per cent (Slovenia, Greece) to over eighty per cent (Hungary, 
138 Lischer, S. (2008, 76). Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the Forced
Migration Crisis. International Security, 33 (2).
139 Land, T. (2009). Europe accepts 10,000 more Iraqi refugees. The Middle East, 
February 2009. Available online at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2742/
is_397/ai_n31396362/
140 Five years on Europe is still ignoring its responsibilities towards Iraqi refugees. 
ECRE January 3, 2008. Available online at: www.ecre.org/files/ECRE_Survey_
Iraq_2008.pdf 
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Cyprus and Sweden). Only eight EU Member States, including 
Finland were engaged in resettlement efforts the year 2008.141
The determination within the member states to prevent Iraqi and 
other refugees’ entry to their territory has materialized in stricter 
border controls. The new European Border Management Agency 
(FRONTEX) is designed at preventing irregular entries and thus it 
doesn’t distinguish asylum seekers from other border crossers.142
There are no signs that indicate improvement of the situation of 
displaced Iraqis. Two developments are likely to follow. First, the EU 
states receiving largest number of Iraqis will display more force and 
determination to send refugees back into Iraq. As it will be indicated 
in the following chapter this development is well on the way in the 
UK, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. 
Second, with current political impasse in Iraq massive returns 
are likely to have negative impact on the security situation within 
Iraq. As tens of thousands of Iraqis run out of savings in Jordan and 
Syria many are left with practically no other option than to return 
to Iraq. The returnees will be subjected political maneuvering, as 
both U.S. and Iraqi administration have vested interest to claim that 
return of refugees is a clear indication of improved security situation 
and the success of their political strategy. Information concerning 
returns from neighboring countries is likely to reverberate across EU 
countries and make their social and political atmosphere increasingly 
hostile to Iraqi asylum seekers. 
Prime Minister al-Maliki’s first government (2006–2010) 
displayed little sympathy for the displaced Sunni Iraqis and the 
sectarian bias remains strong not only within the governing 
institutions of the country but to a large degree in the society in 
general. Prime Minister al-Maliki is surrounded by a network of 
Shi’ite advisors and thus many refugees feel that the government 
it much more sympathetic towards displaced Shi’ites than Sunnis. 
Furthermore, several non-governmental organizations working in 
141 Ibid.
142 See: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/
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Sunni areas have informed of problems when attempting to register 
formally with the Government of Iraq.143
4.7. Return: a feasible solution?
The reluctance of displaced Iraqis to return to their homes is a 
concrete indication of vast challenges which the country is still 
facing and which need to be addressed before sustainable returns 
can take place.
While return is the most desirable solution for both the 
international community and the majority of the displaced Iraqis, 
the countries of asylum should not overlook the fact that premature 
or forced return of large numbers of Iraqis is bound to make Iraq’s 
recovery process extremely difficult. Rampant corruption and 
the inability of the leading political parties to form a legitimate 
government paralyzed the rebuilding of basic infrastructure, and led 
to increasing popular resentment towards political leaders. The U.S. 
is determined to end its military occupation by the end of 2011, 
and many fear that the Iraqi Army is unprepared to take the lead. A 
security vacuum may easily ignite another circle of violence. Forced 
return of displaced persons to reordered urban spaces can further 
destabilize the situation and launch new refugee flows. 
The returnees have often no other option than to search for 
housing among their ‘own’ social groupings, which reinforces the 
social and political divisions in the country. In Iraq as elsewhere in 
protracted crisis zones, forced population movements are followed 
by property disputes, as returnees find their houses occupied by 
newcomers. In many areas of Iraq, thousands of squatters are 
themselves displaced people who cannot return to their homes. The 
143 The Return and Resettlement of Displaced Iraqis.
Testimony Submitted by Kenneth H. Bacon President, Refugees international and 
Kristele Younes, 
Senior Advocate, Refugees International To the hearing before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations One hundred eleventh Congress – 
First Session Tuesday, March 31, 2009 Presiding: Senator Robert P. Casey. Available 
online at: http://www.refintl.org/policy/testimony/return-and-resettlement-displaced-
iraqis
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situation is equally complicated for the displaced property owners 
who are willing to return, but fear for their own safety. There are 
no signs that property disputes can be solved effectively in the near 
future.144 It should be underlined that in many urban areas of Iraq 
security is highly relative to individual’s subjective position within 
the social space. Umm Sa´ad, who arrived in Finland with her 
husband and three children in August 2009 related: 
If Finland engages in forced returns we have no place to go to. The 
boy (her son) injured his arm in a terrorist strike, and my husband 
was threatened several times. Our home region is very unsettled and 
hundreds of people have died in car bomb strikes. Where could we 
go to? (Umm Sa´ad, born in Sinjal, 1972)
Certain areas – that may at first sight appear secure and settled 
– can be extremely dangerous for people of the “undesirable” social 
groupings. Murder and intimidation still occur daily in many areas 
of the country as indicated by our interviewee Abu Faris:
If we were forced to go back my wife would certainly have had 
to leave her profession as sports coach, and we would have had to 
move to another area. I used to work at the Sabah newspaper and 
likewise, it would have been impossible for me to return to work. 
We were all threatened by militias (at work). More than a dozen 
of people working in our paper lost their lives. (Abu Faris, born in 
Bagdad, 1957)
Sustainable returns are extremely hard to accomplish without 
coordinated programs of aid for returnees, as many have sold their 
property in order to travel to countries of asylum. Only in Baghdad 
much needs to be done before the basic conditions for return are 
fulfilled, as the whole city resembles a series of interconnected 
fortresses, with each grouping guarding its frontiers. 
4.7.1. Forced returns from The EU – countries
In Western Europe, the 2000s was marked by unprecedented divisions 
among political parties regarding their attitudes towards the new 
refugees and migrants. Migration, Islam, and criticism of policies 
144 Ibid.
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that were popularly labeled as ‘multiculturalist’ became heated topics 
of both official and popular debates, and were successfully exploited 
by populist politicians. Negative and stereotypic images of Muslim 
migrants in Europe were rallied by the yellow press, numerous 
internet communities, and hate groups. Concerns focusing on 
gender relations, integration, social cohesion, demographic change, 
and security influenced immigration debates from Scandinavia to 
the Mediterranean Europe. 
This created growing public pressure to reverse a range of policies, 
such as instruction and advisory services for foreigners in schools, 
health care, and other public institutions – as part of the official 
integration strategy.145 A more interventionist integration policy, 
including compulsory language education, initiation programs 
for refugees, and growing control on family reunification, became 
common practices in different EU Member States. The adoption of 
these practices was accompanied with revaluation of citizenship and 
a shift towards increasingly restrictive immigration policy.146 
These developments were viewed with growing concern among 
the Iraqi human right organizations operating in Western Europe. 
Sa´ad, an Iraqi human rights activist in Sweden, told us the following 
in an interview conducted in September 2010:
After the developments that occurred in Iraq, specifically in April 
2003, the countries of asylum begun to reconsider how to deal with 
asylum seekers from Iraq. They saw that the main justification (i.e. 
Saddams’s brutal regime) for Iraqis’ need of international protection 
was no longer there. (Sa´ad, Iraqi human rights activist in Sweden)
Many Iraqi newcomers in the EU had been granted temporary 
refugee status, based on the perception that Iraq was too dangerous 
for the refugees to return to. However, the winds were changing 
rapidly. 
In Denmark, the National Police increased its monitoring of 
the movement of Iraqi refugees and claimed that since 2003 several 
hundreds of Iraqis had travelled back and forth between Denmark 
145 Akkerman, T. & Hagelund, A. (2007, 197). Women and children first! Anti-
immigration parties and gender in Norway and the Netherlands. Patterns of 
Prejudice, 41(2)
146 Ibid. p. 207.
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and Iraq. This was seen to prove that they no longer needed 
international protection.147
Our interviews indicated that the fall of Saddam’s regime opened 
a possibility for several refugees from earlier generations of Iraqi 
diasporans to visit their home region and family members after years 
of exile. Although this was still a dangerous possibility, many took 
the chance and visited Iraq, highly conscious of the risks that such 
a visit might involve. During their visits, the refugees could provide 
help and mental support for friends and family members suffering 
from the long years of embargo and post-invasion violence.
Already in 2006-2007, as Iraq was undergoing the most severe 
period of violence, some European countries began deporting failed 
asylum seekers and those without residence permits. Germany, 
Britain, Sweden, and Denmark were particularly determined to 
deport hundreds of Iraqis whose asylum requests had been rejected 
by authorities. From the point of view of the German government, 
Saddam Hussein’s fall had ended relevant claims to asylum. The 
revocation procedures were started already in 2006 by the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), aiming to deprive 4,400 
Iraqis of their refugee status. The practice was unique in Europe as 
it included hundreds of people that were already well- integrated 
into the German society. Some 14,000 Iraqis were listed as subject 
to deportation from the country, yet lack of air connections and 
bilateral agreement with the Government of Iraq prevented Germany 
from engaging in large scale deportations.148
In Britain, Home Office figures from 2009 showed that 632 
people were deported against their will to the Kurdish region in the 
north of Iraq between 2005 and 2008. It was estimated that the 
number would exceed 900 by 2009. According to the International 
Federation of Iraqi Refugees, Britain has organized monthly charter 
147 Ministry to investigate refugee trips to Iraq. The Copenhagen Post. June 11, 
2009. Available online at: http://www.cphpost.dk/news/politics/90-politics/45919-
ministry-to-investigate-refugee-trips-to-iraq.html
148 Iraqi Refugee Disaster: Europe continues to shirk its responsibility. Pro Asyl. July 
21, 2007. Available online at: http://www.proasyl.de/en/news/newsenglish/news/
iraqi_refugee_disaster_dt_vorlage/back/764/
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flights each carrying approximately fifty Iraqis since the beginning 
of 2009.149
In Sweden, 1,400 Iraqi refugees received letters from the country’s 
Immigration Service where they were informed that measures would 
be taken to deport them forcibly unless they consented to return 
voluntarily. As a response, the International Federation of Iraqi 
Refugees organized demonstrations in several European capitals 
including Stockholm (April 19, 2007) and Helsinki (April 20, 2007).150
Numerous EU countries displayed growing willingness to solve 
the Iraqi refugee crisis by engaging in forced returns of failed asylum 
seekers. In Denmark, Iraqis represented nearly fifty per cent of the 
total number of rejected asylum seekers under expulsion order in 
March 2009. 151
By 2009, Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, had ratified 
bilateral agreements with the Iraqi government to repatriate Iraqi citizens. 
According to the Finnish Immigration Service estimate from May 
2010, the time was ripe for the rejection and removal of asylum 
seekers from autonomous Kurdish regions in the north, southern 
Iraq, and the capital city of Baghdad. The reason, it was claimed, was 
that they no longer needed international protection due to improved 
security. In May 2009, approximately 1,500 Iraqis were waiting for 
their asylum decision and the new guidelines were to be applied only 
to new decisions. The Immigration Service estimated that the first 
returns were expected to be take place in the spring months of 2010.152
The inter-governmental repatriation agreements received plenty 
of critique from humanitarian organizations, including the UNHCR 
149 Iraqi army confronted U.K. deportation officials on Baghdad plane. Guardian, 
October 16, 2009. Available online at: www.guardian.co.uk/uk/.../unhcr-uk-
baghdad-deportations
150 Campaign Against the Deportation of Iraqi Kurdish Asylum Seekers. Echoes 
Newsletter 5, 2007. Available online at: http://www.wpiraq.net/english/2007/
Echoes5.pdf
151 Iraq reach deal to repatriate Iraqi refugees. Agence France-Presse (AFP), May 
13, 2009. Available online at: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5jeHTbmQ9pta2nmIds9_upk3-3hYA
152 Suomi palauttaa irakilaisia turvapaikanhakijoita. [Finland will return Iraqi 
asylum claimants] Yle Uutiset, May 5, 2009. Available online at: http://yle.fi/uutiset/
kotimaa/2009/05/suomi_palauttaa_irakilaisia_turvapaikanhakijoita_728142.html 
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and Refugees International.153 However, for several EU Member 
States the agreements were interpreted as guarantees that the 
returns could be implemented without violating the human rights 
of the displaced Iraqis. As for the Iraqi Government, it received the 
returnees with open arms since they conveyed an important message 
to international audiences: the Government of Iraq was on the right 
path to stabilize the country. 
We conducted a series of interviews with human rights activists 
and failed asylum seekers facing forced repatriation in Sweden in 
September-October 2010. All the interviewees we spoke to told us 
that sentiments across the political field had become more favorable 
to forced returns in Sweden. Sa´ad, an Iraqi activist residing in 
Sweden informed us:
This is the first time (in Sweden) in which the positions of the 
extreme right, the center and even left are getting closer to each 
other. Maybe some political actors took advantage of feelings of 
anger of Swedes who reject foreigners. This in fact happened when 
the extreme right won seats (in September 2010) in the Swedish 
Parliament. (Sa´ad, Iraqi human rights activist in Sweden)
The decision-making of the Swedish authorities proved to be 
highly contradictory, which only increased fears among the failed 
asylum seekers. As Sa’ad recounted,
 We have studied cases where someone arriving in Sweden week 
later than another one was granted temporary residence and the 
first one received a negative decision. I mean, only in mid-2007 a 
considerable number of Iraqis fleeing the violence arrived and they are 
facing deportation now. Some others arriving a week later obtained 
the residence and in fact both cases had similar backgrounds. These 
things we cannot correct – because we don’t make the decisions. 
(Sa´ad, Iraqi human rights activist in Sweden)
Typically, the Iraqis arriving in Sweden in 2006 and 2007 had 
received negative decisions from the Swedish Immigration office, the 
Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. Consequently, they were 
153 UNHCR dismayed at forced repatriation of Iraqis; reports increase in flight of 
Iraqi Christians. UNHCR News stories, December 17, 2010. Available online at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/4d0b45476.html 
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contacted by the Swedish Police and were asked to report themselves 
at the local police office every fourteen days. 
Salma, whom we interviewed by telephone two times in September 
2010 had arrived in Sweden together with her sister in September 
2007. Her entire family had been denounced from Iraqi citizenship 
and was deported from Iraq to Iran in 1982, among several tens 
of thousands of Iraqi citizens who were seen by their government 
as loyalists to Iran. The family’s property was confiscated and two 
brothers were executed by the Iraqi regime. In 1985, the UNHCR 
office in Iran accepted the family to a third country settlement 
program but the waiting period was prolonged due to an overloaded 
waiting list for resettlement. Finally, Salma’s father turned to 
migrant smugglers and traveled to Sweden. He gained permanent 
resident status in Sweden in mid-1990s. Salma, together with her 
sister and brother decided to return to Iraq in 2004, but they did 
not manage to reclaim Iraqi citizenship. They settled in an area in 
Baghdad which witnessed severe sectarian violence. Salma’s sister 
injured her right leg in a car bomb explosion and the sisters decided 
to return to Sweden with the financial help provided by the father 
and other relatives living in Sweden. The sisters received negative 
decisions from both Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Two 
years after their father’s death, in the beginning of September 2010, 
they were detained and repatriated to Baghdad on September 22. 
Two days prior to her deportation Salma told us:
Problem that will confront us in Baghdad, is that the Iraqi 
authorities will not recognize us as Iraqis... as we were living in 
Iran since 1982. I mean I really do not know what to do ... All of 
these things were spelled out to the Swedish authorities, but they 
always say this is not our problem. I think the responsible for all this 
is the Iraqi government which signed an agreement with Swedish 
authorities encouraging them (Swedes ) to take such harsh decisions 
. (Salma, born in Baghdad, 1967)
On October 10, 2010, we interviewed two Iraqi men, each of 
whom had received negative decisions in similar manner to Salma. 
They were hiding from the authorities in Gothenburg in fear of 
forced return. They told us: 
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I think that everybody now is talking about an agreement signed 
between the Iraqi government and the Swedish government and the 
problem is there. Silence leaves us the impression that everyone is 
satisfied with this resolution! (Ahmad, born in Baghdad, 1972)
We lost everything in our country, we paid very large sums of 
money to get here and psychologically we cannot return to Iraq 
because it reminds us of the crimes that took place in front of us. 
Today we are in such a bad state that we do not desire to talk to even 
our relatives in Baghdad. Please deliver our voice, through all means 
available. (Majid, born in Baghdad, 1974) 
What further complicates forced returns is that neither the Iraqi 
Government nor international aid organizations sufficiently monitor 
the situation faced by the forcefully returned failed asylum seekers. 
The unfortunate situation of the returnees was fully acknowledged 
by Sa´ad, a representative of the Iraqi Human Rights Organization 
in Sweden. 
Interviewer: Have you followed the situation of Iraqis who have 
been returned in Iraq?
Sa´ad: This is not one of our tasks, but as I know our main 
branch in Baghdad takes care of it.
Interviewer: As I understand their following is also a very bad. 
Sa´ad: Regrettably, this is what we have heard too. (Sa´ad, Iraqi 
human rights activist in Sweden).
In August 2009 Astrid Thors, the Finnish Minister of Migration and 
European Affairs announced that Finland was aiming to reach a 
repatriation agreement with the Government of Iraq, which would 
largely follow the content of the Swedish – Iraqi agreement. 154 The 
political deadlock in Iraq following the parliamentary elections in 
March 2010 largely explains why such an agreement had not been 
reached by the time of writing this research.
154 Thors: Puheet löysästä maahanmuuttopolitiikasta ovat puppua. [ Thors: Talk on 
loose migration policy is unfounded]. Kaleva August 19, 2009. Available online at: 
http://www.kaleva.fi/uutiset/thors-puheet-loysasta-maahanmuutto-politiikasta-
puppua/809817
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5  AFGHANISTAN: THREE   
 DECADES OF VIOLENCE
In August 2010 as we begun searching for the first Afghan 
interviewees for this study, we contacted an Afghan journalist who 
had lived in Finland for nineteen years. We expressed our interest in 
his opinions concerning developments in the country with a history 
of over three decades of nearly continuous violence. He arranged a 
meeting for us in a multicultural center in a migrant suburb in South 
Western Finland. At the time Afghanistan was facing a critical period. 
The U.S. Government had recently announced its determination to 
end the decade-long military operation carried out by NATO and 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by July 2011. All the 
key arguments that had been used to justify the western military 
engagement in Afghanistan were under severe international criticism. 
In the post 9/11 shock, Afghanistan was interpreted by the George 
W. Bush administration as the prime incubator of international 
terrorism. The toppling of the brutal Taliban regime in the Afghan 
capital Kabul, in 2001, was followed by heavy air strikes against al-
Qaeda bases. These actions, however, were far from marking the end 
of violence in the country. By the time of our meeting the western 
coalition’s military engagement in Afghanistan was approaching the 
length of the Vietnam War, and there were very few positive signs in 
the horizon. The Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership were largely intact. 
In fact, their political influence and strategic strength had increased, 
not only in Afghanistan, but also in the neighboring Pakistan. This 
fact greatly undermined Afghan Government’s and President Hamid 
Karzai’s legitimacy. The number of casualties – both international 
and Afghan – had reached alarming levels and many regions that had 
remained relatively stable since 2001 witnessed increasing violence. 
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 Our Afghan host explained:
The problem of Afghanistan is that the neighboring countries – 
specifically Pakistan and Iran– have a great role in supporting the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda with money and weapons, for the purpose 
of making Afghanistan unstable. Before 2001 Pakistan was heavily 
present in Afghanistan but after 2001 its presence became more 
secretive. It took the form of mafias and this certainly was dangerous 
to Afghans. Neither Pakistan nor Iran has interest in promoting 
stability and security in Afghanistan. Particularly Pakistan can take 
the advantage of the considerable support provided by the West 
to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda. To stabilize the situation in 
Afghanistan we need to deprive Pakistan from support. In addition, 
the erroneous policy of the government of Hamid Karzai and his 
poorly trained army must be mentioned. They have not helped 
stabilizing the situation. (Muntadar, born in Kabul, 1954)
In the course of this research, it became clear that Afghanistan’s 
fate resulted not only from the troubled relation with its neighbors. 
In 2010, ethnically and religiously heterogeneous Afghanistan was 
perhaps more than ever in its modern history lacking the founding 
principles and a shared narrative which would be needed to build 
a state. A leading scholar on Afghan society, Alejandro Monsutti, 
argued that the present crisis was further exacerbated by a new 
type of political and economic force – namely that of transnational 
networks. These networks were comprised, first of all, of illicit 
trading of heroin, as over ninety per cent of world heroin is produced 
in Afghanistan. Second, the Taliban and al-Qaeda, together with 
less influential insurgent groups, received weapons, money, fighters, 
and logistical support from an increasingly globalized body of 
advocates. Third, there were the migrant networks that circulated 
the wealth of millions of Afghans living abroad, and were largely 
responsible of financing the international movement of Afghans. 
Fourth and perhaps most important, Afghanistan had become 
a target of thousands of international relief aid and development 
programs. Monsutti was one of the rare voices pointing out 
that in weak states the control over resources and circulation 
of commodities is likely to fall into the hands of person centered 
networks. In such a situation, redistribution – whether the question 
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is about drugs, fighters, weapons, or international aid – increases 
political influence of particular elites.155 Monsutti seemed to capture 
the core of the problem, as by 2010 Afghanistan had transformed 
into a conflict zone hosting a plethora of groupings fighting for 
their share. These included the Western-supported political elite 
revolving around President Karzai, transnationally financed and 
recruited Muslim radicals, localized armed groupings largely 
financed by narco-trafficking, new development elites seeking to 
take advantage of western aid programs, and finally, thousands of 
western administrative and military personnel whose main task was 
to restore order in the country. 
5.1. Country out of a historical   
 co-incident
Although the historical roots of Afghanistan as a political entity 
reach back to mid-18th century, its present day borders were drawn 
out of co-incidence. In 1813–1907, during the period known as the 
Great Game, the entire Central Asia witnessed strategic rivalry and 
conflict between British Empire and Tsarist Russia. In 1878, the 
British army occupied most of the area of present day Afghanistan in 
order to form a buffer zone, and to block the Russians from gaining 
access to the ports of the Indian Ocean. The arrangement hardly 
paid respect to the territorial boundaries of Afghan tribal groupings. 
The largest ethnic groups – the Pashtun and the Tajik –resided in 
areas which extend far beyond modern Afghanistan’s international 
borders. The case was no different with minor ethnic groups, such 
as Uzbeks, Aimaks, Balochs, and Turkmen. The only exception in 
this respect was the Hazaras of north central Afghanistan, for their 
traditional areas were bounded by the new international border. 
Creating sustainable political and economic stability in 
Afghanistan proved to be difficult, as both the British and Russian 
empires allocated resources to their favoured social groupings to 
155 Monsutti, A. (2009). Local Power and Transnational Resources: An 
Anthropological Perspective on Rural Rehabilitation in Afghanistan. UCLA Asia 
Institute Central Asia Initiative Working Paper No. 2
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promote their interests. The central state was established in 1919 
under the Pashtun leadership of King Amanullah Khan. The central 
government was challenged by occasional tribal upheavals, and in 
1929 the capital Kabul fell to rebel forces. The unrest came to an end 
as Amanullah’s cousin prince Nadir Shah defeated the rebels and was 
declared king. After Nadir Shah’s assassination in 1933, Afghanistan 
was governed until 1973 by his son Mohammed Zahir Shah.156
Under Mohammad Zahir Shah’s reign, the modernization 
process reached even the most remote areas of the country, leading 
to the establishment of administrative, educational, and security 
structures. This period of modern history of Afghanistan (until the 
1970s) was characterized by relative political stability,
However, throughout the latter half of the 19th century, the 
legitimacy of the central government was increasingly challenged by 
two very different political forces. On the one hand, there were those 
rallying for the establishment of a distant and benevolent state, and 
on the other hand, those who wanted a centralized and ideological 
state. The former were typically traditional men of religious learning, 
while the second group was comprised of Communists and modern 
Islamists. Ethnicity was by no means a central organizing principle 
of political opposition, yet radical political visions tended to be 
expressed particularly among the Pashtun groupings.157
The declaration of independence of Pakistan as a sovereign 
Muslim state in 1948 brought to the fore the resentment of the 
Pashtun tribes. Nearly two thirds of the Pashtun population became 
Pakistani citizens, while less than a third remained Afghans.158 As a 
response to the mounting social tensions, the Afghan government 
made a considerable shift in its foreign policy and resorted to Soviet 
156 Roy, O. (2002) Afghanistan: Internal Politics and Socio-Economic Dynamics and 
Groupings. Writenet Paper No. 14. Available online at: www.unhcr.org/refworld/
pdfid/3e9ae5535.pdf 
Afghanistan: Country profile. Library of Congress – Federal Research Division 
Country Profile, August 2008. Available online at: lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/
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157 See: Roy, O. (2002).
158 Rashid, A. (2010). A Deal With the Taliban. New York Review of Books, February 
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Union for support. The constitution of 1964 sought a compromise 
with the secular and religious opposition forces by liberalizing the 
political culture of the monarchy. However, the democratization 
process initiated by the new constitution was largely halted because 
of worsening economic conditions, which soon led to increasing 
popular unrest.159
Ultimately, Afghanistan’s experiment with democratic governance 
came to an end in 1973, as Daoud Khan, a member the royal family, 
orchestrated a coup that led to his nomination for the first president 
of Afghanistan. Daoud Khan’s attempts to reform the economic 
sector proved unsuccessful, and his rule was short lived.
In April 1978 Afghanistan witnessed a violent uprising, this time 
organized by a Marxist movement called ‘Peoples Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan’. The party leader Nur Mohammad Taraki was declared 
President. The party immediately began to persecute its rivals, which 
ranged from traditional elites and educated professionals to the 
major figures of religious institutions. In harmony with the spirit of 
Marxist revolutions elsewhere, the party pushed for a rapid reform 
in the position of women in the fields of labor and political life. In 
December 1978, it signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. 
The revolution and the radical implementation of socialism stirred up 
reactions in the U.S. administration that were typical of the Cold War 
era. The White House, already alarmed by the Islamic revolution of 
Iran and the takeover of U.S. embassy in Tehran, sought to counter 
the loss of its influence in the world’s richest oil producing region. 
Americans believed that Afghanistan offered a possibility for the Soviet 
Union to fill the political void in the entire Central Asia. In effect, 
the Carter administration begun to offer both financial and material 
support for the Mujahidin, that is, loosely aligned groups of Islamist 
militants opposing the pro-Soviet government of Afghanistan.160
The U.S. strategy prompted a firm response from the Soviets. The 
power struggle in the Afghan Communist circles intensified and the 
government began to execute its opponents. President Taraki was killed 
159 Afghanistan: Country profile. Library of Congress – Federal Research Division 
Country Profile: August 2008. Available online at: lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/
Afghanistan.pdf 
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in September 1979 by his rivals within the party. Fearing for chaos in 
Afghanistan, 100,000 Soviet troops invaded the country in December 
1979. Suddenly, the majority of the Afghans were thrust into resistance. 
Bombings had destructed the crops and herds of rural populations and 
pushed all capable men to participate in the Mujahidin factions.161
With the Reagan administration and the CIA’s support, the 
Mujahidin engaged in full scale guerilla war against the Soviet 
troops. It has been estimated that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia 
provided up to forty billion U.S. $ worth of arms and cash for the 
Islamists.162 The first and the increasingly international training 
camps of the Mujahidin were established along the Pakistani North 
West Frontier in an area hosting more than three million Afghan 
refugees. A massive amount of light weaponry, delivered by the CIA, 
flowed to the insurgents through the Pakistani port of Karachi. A 
large proportion of this weaponry was sold to local markets before 
reaching its official recipients. In Afghanistan, the trucks conveying 
arms were loaded with heroin for the return trip, thus providing an 
additional source of steady income for the insurgents.163
In this context, the call for holy war against the occupier came 
from transnational religious networks, and subsequently Afghanistan 
became a focal point of militant Islamists worldwide. In the mid-
1980s, a heterogeneous group of young Muslim militants with 
different ideological and doctrinal backgrounds, united merely by 
common goal, had arrived by thousands from all over the Muslim 
world. The material and financial support provided by the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia reached its destination predominantly via the Inter 
Service Intelligence (ISI) of the General Zia ul-Haq’s Islamist regime 
in Pakistan.164 Other main source of support for the main factions 
161 Ibid., p. 138
162 See: How the CIA created Osama bin Laden. The Green Left, September 19, 
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of Mujahidin was the Pakistani Islamist group, the pro-government 
Jamaat-e-Islami organization.165
The ten years of continuous violence that followed the Soviet 
invasion took a devastating toll on the Afghan people. Between 
600,000 and two million Afghans, most of them civilians, lost their 
lives. Up to six million sought refuge in the neighboring states, 
particularly in Pakistan and Iran, and some tens of thousands made 
their way to the U.S. and Western Europe.166 
By the end of the 1980s it became clear that, despite their 
overwhelming war craft, the Soviets were unable to repress the 
Mujahidin military resistance. The first concessions were made in 
1988, as the Soviet Union agreed to create a neutral Afghan state. 
The high number of Soviet casualties (up to 50,000) and mounting 
international pressure led to the Soviets’ complete withdrawal in 
1989 – an event seen as an ideological cold war victory in the U.S. 167
5.2. The emergence of the Taliban
In Afghanistan as elsewhere in the Muslim world, Islamic political 
movements emerged in reaction to modernity. From Morocco to 
Indonesia, the Muslim world witnessed highly uniform and often 
concurrent developments, as the administrative elites aspired to 
modernize the society. At the same time the overwhelming majority 
of the people were excluded from the process of discussing the 
practical consequences of modernity on their lives.168
In Afghanistan, the first movements that promoted Islam as an 
all-encompassing social, moral, and political program appeared in 
the political arena in the 1920s. By and large, modern Islamism 
165 Kepel, G. (2002, 137–142).
166 See: Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century. 
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sought to maximize its political potential at a time that witnessed 
increasing polarization between proponents of modern liberalist 
ideologies and traditional systems of values. The pioneers of Afghan 
Islamism represented the educated new generation that had largely 
distanced its roots from traditional world views. Like elsewhere, 
they can thus be viewed as results of modernization. Similarly to 
Islamist movements in the Arab world, the Afghan Islamists were 
largely aware of the modern social ills and utilized them for the 
purpose of ideological recruitment.169
By the 1960s Afghan universities had become contested sites for 
ideological rivalries between Soviet model socialists and Islamists. 
The latter were largely inspired by their ideological forefathers of 
the Muslim Brothers movement in Egypt. Shortly after the 1973 
coup, the confrontation between Islamists and the government 
led by Muhammad Daoud escalated. While the regime displayed 
considerable tolerance towards socialists, many Islamist leaders 
were driven to exile, mainly in Pakistan. The Soviet invasion of 1979 
was soon turned into direct call for resistance among the exiled 
Islamists. In the aftermath of the Soviet occupation and the collapse 
of the Soviet-backed government in April 1992, the various Afghan 
and international Mujahidin factions failed to reach unity. The 
ideological, political, and security vacuum provided a fertile ground 
for radical responses – most notably by a conservative and austere 
movement known as the Taliban. The Taliban (the Students) was 
comprised of students from Pakistan’s boarding schools for Islamic 
religious learning, the madrassas. After managing to gain generous 
support from Pakistan, the Taliban began a military campaign, 
attempting to seize control of the Mujahidin factions and to unite 
Afghanistan. A large proportion of Taliban’s constituents had a 
refugee background. Uprooted from their social backgrounds and 
without a state of their own, the Afghan children and young men 
of various ethnic origins were particularly receptive to the idea of 
universal Islamic identity and religious rigor, communicated by the 
curriculum of madrassas.170 
169 Marsden, P. (2002). Whither The Taliban? Asian Affairs, vol. XXXIX, no. III.
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5.3.  Globalized radicalism
A network of modern madrassas, were established in Afghanistan 
in late 19th century the by the conservative Deobandi movement, 
founded in 1867 in Deoband India. The Deobandi movement 
represents a typical neo-fundamentalist movement disseminating the 
idea of “purified” Islam in the tradition of the founder generation 
of the religion (as-salaf).171 Like neo-fundamentalist Islamists 
elsewhere, Deobandis sharply reject all practices and ideologies that 
are understood as ”foreign” to Islam. All matters − whether practical 
or spiritual − that cannot be traced back to the examples of the 
pious forefathers are perceived as forbidden innovations. Despite 
these basic tenets that are commonly shared, neo-fundamentalists 
have highly differing political agendas, ranging from ultra-political 
to non-political. The same applies to their preferred strategies for 
forwarding the message, which range from peaceful charity work 
to warfare and terrorist strikes against civilians. The overarching 
objective for all neo-fundamentalists is the unification of the global 
community of Muslims, the Umma, by a collective return to the ideal 
set of beliefs and practices of the first community of Muslims.172
To fully understand the process by which the Taliban movement 
aligned with the idea of globalized radicalism, it is essential to shift 
attention to the role played by Saudi Arabia in the development of 
Islamism in Afghanistan. 
The status of the Saudi Monarchy as the spiritual center of the 
Muslim world had been directly challenged on November 20, 1979, 
as the Grand Mosque in Mecca was seized by a group of radical 
insurgents. Following the crackdown of the attack and execution of 
the surviving aggressors, the Saudi state imposed stricter enforcement 
of Islamic code within the Kingdom. In order to communicate its 
position as a defender of Islam worldwide, the Monarchy expressed 
its complete moral support for the Afghan Mujahidin. From the 
point of view of the Saudi Arabian government it was beneficial 
171 Gugler, T. (2009) Jihad Da´wa and Hijra: Islamic Missionary Movements 
in Europe. Zentrum Modern Orient. Available online at: http://www.zmo.de/
mitarbeiter/gugler/jihad,%20dawa%20and%20hijra.pdf 
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that numerous young men, whom it perceived as potential security 
threats, left the country to join the Afghan battlefronts. 
The flow of material and financial aid from the Persian Gulf 
States to Pakistan and Afghanistan naturally required intermediaries. 
In the 1980s the key persons facilitating the reception of aid and 
manpower from the Arab world were Abdallah Azzam, a Palestinian 
academic and a former professor of Islamic Shari’a at the University 
of Jordan, and a wealthy Saudi, Osama bin Laden, who had joined 
the Mujahidin already in 1979. Both men settled in the Pakistani 
city of Peshawar, commissioned by Saudi Arabia and the Kuwaiti 
Red Crescent to co-ordinate assistance in support of the Afghan 
resistance. In 1984 Azzam founded a bureau for receiving and 
supervising jihadists on the way to the battle fronts in Afghanistan. 
Among the thousands of arrivals was also Egyptian Ayman al-
Zawahiri, who settled in Afghanistan in 1986 and after a decade 
became known as the second man of the international al-Qaeda 
organization.173 
Although the role of Arabs in the actual military operations 
remained marginal throughout the Soviet occupation, their 
importance as modifiers of the radical Islamist ideology cannot be 
refuted. The war in Afghanistan put thousands of new arrivals in 
contact with radicals much more extreme than their sponsors from 
the oil rich Gulf States, and with much higher and utopian goals 
than the Taliban, who conceived jihad merely as war against foreign 
occupier. In the latter part of 1980s, Peshawar turned into a meeting 
point for radicals from Morocco to Indonesia, persecuted by the 
regimes of their home countries.
In the mid-1980s, Azzam began to outline in his many 
writings what would become the founding principles of al-Qaeda 
organization, namely that jihad it is a religious obligation for all 
Muslims and it should be waged worldwide to defend the global 
community of Muslims. The radical neo-fundamentalist thought 
was largely welcomed, not only by the eight to twenty five thousand 
Arab fighters, but also among the Pashtun population in Afghanistan. 
As the Soviet withdrawal seemed inevitable, the relations between 
the mentor Azzam and the disciple bin Laden deteriorated due 
173 Kepel, G. (2002, 149). Jihad the Trail of Political Islam. Belknap, London.
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to disagreements over the tactics of jihad. Azzam was finally 
assassinated in late 1989, which left bin Laden as one of the few 
surviving senior Mujahidin.174 Simultaneously with increasing 
internal fractures among the Mujahidin, the U.S. aid flowing to 
jihadists was sharply reduced, yet the future of Afghanistan did not 
seem any brighter. The Soviet army had begun to withdraw its forces 
already in early 1989, with the result that the U.S. lost a great deal of 
its strategic and rebuilding interest towards Afghanistan. Numerous 
Arab states expressed their concern over general instability in the 
country. Gradually, the possibility that Kabul could be taken over by 
extremist Islamists received more international concern. 
In 1994, the Taliban movement caught international attention 
due to its rapid military advancement. At the time, Afghanistan was 
fractured into literally hundreds of warzones with several dozens 
of warring factions. Three names in particular were present in the 
international media: warlords Ahmad Shah Massoud, an ethnic 
Tajik, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun, and Abdul Rashid Dostum, 
an Uzbek. 
It was particularly the Taliban that proved to be capable of 
bringing security to areas where the civilian population had suffered 
tremendously under the Soviet occupation and the subsequent inter-
factional battles of different Mujahidin groups. Pakistan had a great 
interest in supporting the formation of a conservative Islamist regime 
in Afghanistan. Since the 1980s, Pakistan had supported jihadists 
for its own purposes in and outside of Afghanistan. The rationale 
was to further its goals regarding Kashmir, a region that Pakistan 
perceived as illegitimately occupied by India.175
For Pakistan the Taliban seemed to be the most likely force 
to gain control of the entire Afghanistan. With abolishment of 
bribery on roadblocks, the Taliban managed to win both the moral 
and financial support of professional groups such as traders and 
174 Gunaratna, R. (2002, 26–31). Inside al-Qaeda. Columbia University Press, New 
York.
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truckers. Particularly receptive for Taliban were the areas dominated 
by the Pashtun population of Southern Afghanistan. The movement 
found support especially in the city of Kandahar, a native home of 
the Taliban’s spiritual leader and self-proclaimed Commander of the 
Faithful of the movement, Mullah Muhammad Omar. In 1996 the 
Taliban finally gained control of most of the country, and established 
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Only three countries, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates recognized the entity. By 
the request of Omar, bin Laden arrived in Kandahar in 1997.176 He 
had left Afghanistan in 1989 for his native Saudi- Arabia. However, 
his radical criticism of the monarchy’s decision to allow the U.S. 
soldiers use Saudi Arabia as a base in the 1990–1991 Second Gulf 
War forced bin Laden to flee to Pakistan and later to Sudan, where 
he relocated al-Qaeda’s infrastructure.177
As a result of more than fifteen years of war, Afghanistan’s 
economy remained in ruins, and most government services had 
ceased to function. For several of our interviewees the Taliban meant 
a new form of oppression. Muntadar who experienced the Taliban 
occupation of Kabul told us:
They (the Taliban) brought along mercenaries from all 
nationalities, Arabs, Pakistanis, and Chechnyans especially. They 
were ready to make us pay for slightest failure to conduct according 
to their rules. This does not mean we were better off before the 
Taliban. Our city had been governed by the Mujahidin and they were 
harsh as well. The situation did not change for better in the city when 
the Taliban forces entered – no, the situation became even worse. 
The organization spread its influence by exploiting the emotions of 
religious people. They raised the Quran and talked about Islam. Bin 
Laden’s economic wealth allowed distribution of goods to people to 
win them over to the organization. They had doctors and plenty of 
medications. They were able to take over large (rural) regions and 
after gaining control of these areas they moved to cities where they 
faced increasing resistance. (Muntadar, born in Kabul, 1954)
176 Gunaratna, R. (2002, 56). Inside al-Qaeda. Columbia University Press, New 
York.
177 Ibid. pp. 38–39.
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5.4.  The formation of the Taliban   
 – al-Qaeda alliance
The increasingly globalized notion of jihad – rallied by Azzam and 
later by bin Laden and his trustee Ayman al-Zawahiri – was to a great 
deal shared by the international Mujahidin, and gradually absorbed 
by the Taliban. Already in the mid-1990s there were mounting 
concerns among western intelligence that the international Muslim 
fighters had become more organized. Al-Qaeda was known to run 
several training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, largely backed by 
the Taliban. The first considerable international targets of al-Qaeda 
were the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The two terrorist 
strikes carried out in Nairobi and Dar as Salam in 1998 turned the 
attention of the Clinton administration towards Afghanistan. The 
U.S. initiated air strikes on al-Qaeda’s training camps in August 
1998 pushed the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance towards an increasingly 
pan-Islamic strategy. Conscious of Taliban’s close relations with al-
Qaeda, U.S. leaders began to demand the handing over of Osama bin 
Laden to U.S. forces. As a result, the Taliban increased its support 
for al-Qaeda and increasing numbers of Muslim volunteers from all 
continents arrived in order to wage jihad – this time against the U.S. 
military.178
In the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist strikes in New York and 
Washington DC, President George W. Bush announced a Crusade 
against the international al-Qaeda. Like Bosnia, Chechnya and 
Palestine before, the conflict in Afghanistan was increasingly 
Islamized; it became a global drama of particular symbolic value 
for Muslims worldwide. The military invasion was translated as 
aggression against the world of Islam. At the same time, the alliance 
between the Taliban and al-Qaeda begun to construct its public 
image in terms of defending Muslims from the aggression of the 
Christian West.179
178 Marsden, P. (2002). Whither The Taliban? Asian Affairs, vol. XXXIX, no. III.
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5.5.  The (temporary) downfall 
The U.S.-led international alliance – consisting of U.S. army, 
British special forces, CIA Special Activities Division, and the so 
called Northern Alliance, that is, Afghan combatants and military 
commanders opposing the Taliban regime − made extremely rapid 
progress in fighting the Taliban. The capital Kabul fell in November 
2001, pushing the Taliban fighters, including al-Qaeda leadership, 
to the mountainous borderland between the Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.180 
The reordering of Afghanistan’s governing institutions 
was likewise made with breathtaking speed. After the Taliban 
government had ceased to exist, a new government under President 
Hamid Karzai was formed in December 2001. In order to support 
the government in its efforts to rebuild the country, International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by the UN Security 
Council. The number of ISAF troops increased from less than 
10,000 to roughly 43,000 by 2008, and further to 64,500 by July 
2009. The largest contributors of military personnel of the forty-two 
participant countries in ISAF were U.S., Britain, Germany, Canada, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and France. The first presidential elections 
were carried out on December 7, 2004. Hamid Karzai became the 
first democratically elected President of Afghanistan and a new 
constitution, written by an assembly of regional leaders, was ratified 
in early 2004.181
As in Iraq, the overwhelming military victory of the international 
coalition marked the beginning of a new kind of violence in 
Afghanistan. The western military operation seemed to prove the 
historical truth that winning battles does not necessarily equate 
with winning wars – especially when it comes to fighting terrorists. 
Afghanistan’s fate resembled that of Chechnya under Russian 
invasion, and Lebanon and Occupied Palestinian territories under 
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the Israeli aggression.182 It seemed that resolving the conflict with the 
Taliban required addressing the increasing radicalization, and the 
abolishment of the Taliban’s support structures in Pakistan. Since 
2005 the war on the Taliban has clearly been a battle on both sides of 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border. Between 2001 and 2008, the U.S. 
offered ten billion dollars of aid to Pakistan, however, rather than 
initiating development programs in the Taliban’s recruitment basis 
in north-western parts of the country, the Government of Pakistan 
directed nearly 90% of the aid to its military.183 
Popular resentment against the occupation was largely caused 
by two factors. First, the international military force relied heavily 
on airpower and unmanned aerial drone bombings, which produced 
large numbers of civilian casualties.184 Second, the radical Islamists 
penetrated the state institutions, including army, police force, 
schools, hospitals, and ministries, and launched attacks against the 
state from within its institutional structures. 
Several Shi’ites whom we interviewed were of the opinion 
that the threat of the Taliban had forced the government to make 
several concessions towards conservative Sunni views. This resulted 
in further deterioration in the position of religious minorities. 
Mohannad from the city of Herat in Western Afghanistan told us:
There is grave injustice towards the Shi’ite minority. 
The laws always make us second class people. Things have 
remained as they are from the time of the rule of the Taliban, 
and the Taliban still control this very moment the region. 
 It is true that the government is engaged in war with the Taliban, 
but in most cases it turns a blind eye to what is happening to the 
Shi’ite community. Some nine years ago our city Herat was attacked 
by the Taliban and parties that were hostile to the Shi’ite community. 
It happened in the Shi’ite holy month of Muharram. (Mohammad, 
born in Heart, 1965)
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Nearly all of our interviewees had faced situations of direct 
aggression – killings of family members, gunfire, kidnappings, 
and forced recruitment by the Taliban and factions aligned to it. 
Consider the experiences of Ahmad and Muhsin, young men whom 
we interviewed for this study: 
My elder brother was taken from our house (village near city of 
Ghazni) by force because he refused to join the Taliban’s ranks. It was 
like the kidnapping. We did not receive any information from him in 
three months. Then we were informed that Taliban killed him. For this 
reason we had to leave Afghanistan. (Ahmad, born in Ghazni, 1992).
In my hometown Lashkar Gah the atmosphere was very tense, 
nobody trusted strangers, because people did not know whether 
they were from the Taliban or not. Many were indeed members, 
but secretively. On occasions you just found out that people were 
actually active in factions. There are plenty of jihadists in my area 
and we have witnessed several suicide attacks against the Americans. 
We had plenty of problems in the family. The Taliban took my father 
and then (in 2002) they begun to threaten my family. (Muhsin, born 
in Lashkar Gah, 1994). 
 Nearly two thirds of our interviewees had been forced to move 
– often several times – to Pakistan or Iran because of the security 
situation. Everyone’s immediate family members were dispersed to 
several countries. Some family members remained in Afghanistan, 
and others had sought refuge in Europe, Pakistan, and Iran. Muhsin 
related us:
The Taliban killed my father and I had to take care of our large 
family. My brothers had to leave to Pakistan for fear of the Taliban. 
For these circumstances I wasn’t able to study full-time or even 
participate in normal life. (Muhsin, born in Lashkar Gah, 1994).
5.6.  Recent developments
Towards the end of the first decade of the new millennium the future 
prospects for Afghanistan seemed increasingly unsettling. Despite the 
steady increase in foreign military strength – in October 2010 there 
were 152,000 NATO troops of which little less than 100,000 of 
U.S. personnel − many areas that had remained relatively calm since 
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2001 had become much more unstable. This applied particularly 
to the north of the country. The Taliban had become a significant 
regional player with safe havens, sources of supply, medical 
treatment, and centers of leadership on both sides of the Afghan-
Pakistan border. The insurgency remained particularly strong in the 
southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, areas long regarded 
as ‘hotbeds’ of the Taliban. Kandahar’s strategic importance for 
the future of the whole country is aptly illustrated by the recent 
deployment of 30,000 additional U.S. troops, mostly to Kandahar 
province in order to clear the area from the Taliban.185
 In many areas the situation begun to resemble an open warfare 
between the Taliban, regional warlords, and the international forces, 
with a rising number of insurgent attacks and casualties on all sides. 
In 2009 there were in average 1,200 monthly attacks by the Taliban 
or other insurgent groups, indicating a sixty-five per cent increase 
from the year before. The number of Afghan civilian deaths, reaching 
2412 in 2009, indicated a fourteen per cent increase from 2008.186 
Similarly, the number of NATO and ISAF casualties reached an all-
time high in 2010, with 599 deaths in the period between January and 
October 2010.187 The unstable security situation increases popular 
resentment towards the Karzai government, which enjoys only limited 
legitimacy, particularly among the twelve million Afghan Pashtuns. 
In thirty-three of Afghanistan’s thirty-four governorates, the Taliban 
runs its own shadow governors, and engages in the killing and 
intimidation of the government functionaries, aid agencies, women’s 
groups, and the UN. By 2009 practically seventy per cent of the 
country was under Taliban’s control.188 The Taliban has managed 
to place night guards even in remote rural areas, making it very 
185 Suicide bomber kills Afghan deputy governor. AFP, September 27, 2010. Available 
online at: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iixpkgULAPbH0d
7y2Uep2NkkObA?docId=CNG.65d5de24b23a7e6931907c79435f70bd.81 
186 Ahmad Rashid (2010). A Deal with the Taliban. The New York Review of 
Books, February 25, 2010. Available online at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/2010/feb/25/a-deal-with-the-taliban/
187 cf. www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?232826
188 Dalrymple, W. (2009). Pakistan in Peril. New York Review of Books. February 
12, 2009. Available online at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/
feb/12/pakistan-in-peril/ 
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difficult for the coalition to reach its enemy. A senior officer from 
ISAF claimed in July 2010 that, in twenty-five to fifty per cent of 
raids, the coalition soldiers found that the insurgents had escaped as 
they reached the targeted area.189
It is increasingly unrealistic to assume that the western military 
coalition will reach significant breakthroughs regarding the security 
situation in a matter of months, or even the few upcoming years. In the 
current political standoff, it seems likely that the U.S. administration will 
eventually open negotiations with the Taliban, but it wants to weaken 
the enemy before taking serious initiatives in this direction. On the other 
hand, the Taliban leadership perceives that in order to distance itself 
from al-Qaeda and engage in serious peace negotiations, foreign troops 
must leave Afghanistan. At the same time, the neighboring Pakistan’s 
military fears that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan will thrust 
Afghanistan in civil war. In December 2009 the U.S. President Barack 
Obama announced that a drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan would 
begin in July 2011. In response to heavy criticism both nationally and 
internationally, the Obama administration rephrased its objectives in 
November 2010 by stating that July 2011 will mark a phased reduction 
of troops with the aim of ending the combat mission by 2014.190 The 
NATO partners view the situation in a variety of ways. In principle 
there exists a fragile agreement on the timeline of 2014, yet Canada 
has named a date (in 2008) for complete withdrawal in 2011. The 
Dutch completed their withdrawal in August 2010, and Britain’s Prime 
Minister David Cameron mentioned 2015 as the “lights out date”. 191
Many Taliban commanders are expected to change sides 
depending on the reconciliation strategy of President Karzai. In order 
to reach a sustainable solution, Karzai’s policy needs to satisfy the 
189 Coll, S. (2010). Stop Blaming the Afghans. The New republic. July 26, 
2010. Available online at: http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/76448/
afghanistan-unity-karzai-najibullah-taliban-cohesion 
190 A New U.S. ‘Transition’ Strategy For Afghanistan. NPR news, November 
15, 2010. Available online at: http://www.npr.org/2010/11/15/131330600/for-
afghanistan-a-new-u-s-transition-strategy
191 Afghanistan: Exit vs. Engagement. International Crisis Group, Update Briefing 
115, November 28, 2010. Available online at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/
Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/B115%20Afghanistan%20--%20Exit%20vs%20
Engagement.ashx
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non-Pashtun populations of the north, such as the Hazaras, Uzbeks, 
and Tajiks, who together make up more than half of the country’s 
population. The current situation can be interpreted in various 
ways – undoubtedly thousands of the Taliban leaders think that it is 
better to wait for the Americans’ withdrawal before engaging in full 
military efforts to seize Kabul.192
5.6.1.  Security institutions
Within the Government of Afghanistan and its western supporters, 
security is to a large degree understood in terms of armed dominance, 
the number of soldiers, and the geographic coverage of areas under 
control. Success, on the other hand, is predominantly measured 
in the numbers of killed or captured insurgents – not in terms of 
increased sustainable stability.193 
The Afghan security institutions face tremendous challenges 
as they are expected to take the lead at the handover of power 
by U.S. forces. Both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the 
Afghan National Police (ANP) are not only politicized institutions 
but also fragmented, “ethnicized”194, and completely dependent of 
the financial goodwill of the U.S. government. The ANP is entirely 
financed and supervised by the U.S. and its NATO allies. In a 2010 
report by the International Crisis Group, it was criticized of being 
“corrupt, brutal, and predatory”, and resorting to “bribery, illegal 
tax collection, drug dealing, and even murder.”195 The police officers 
192 Coll, S. (2010). Stop Blaming the Afghans. The New republic. July 26, 
2010. Available online at: http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/76448/
afghanistan-unity-karzai-najibullah-taliban-cohesion 
193 Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan. Human Rights 
Watch, Reports, July 2006. Available only at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/
afghanistan0706/index.htm
194 Afghan Army Struggles With Ethnic Divisions. CBS News July 27, 2010. Available 
online at: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/27/world/main6717786.shtml 
195 Afghanistan: Exit vs. Engagement. International Crisis Group, Update Briefing 
115, November 28, 2010. Available online at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/
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have for several years been targeted by the Taliban. The year 2009 
alone witnessed 646 killings of police officers.196 
There is a striking inconsistency between the information provided 
by leading global newspapers and the International Crisis Group, and 
the Finnish Migration Service,  regarding the present state of Afghan 
security institutions. The latter informs in its 2009 report ‘Fact Finding 
Mission to Afghanistan’ that “the training of civilians as police was 
started by the Germans in 2006 and it has progressed well”, and 
that there are “no nationality-based problems among the police”. 
Furthermore, the report claims that there are “no reports of anyone 
having been persecuted because of their service with the police”.197 Such 
selective analysis of the situation in Afghanistan clearly indicates the 
deep politicization of the Afghanistan crisis in the West, undoubtedly 
resulting in violations of the human rights of Afghan asylum seekers.
Several journalists have pointed out that many police officers 
who serve the government in the daytime join the insurgency when 
the night falls.198 A recent survey, which was carried out by the 
International Council on Security and Development with the help of 
Afghan interviewers, indicated that fifty-six per cent of the Afghans, 
interviewed in the Taliban strongholds of Helmand and Kandahar 
provinces, believed that the Afghan police are helping the Taliban.199 
Despite the salary increases attrition rates within the ANP are 
alarming, reaching twenty-one per cent in 2008 and twenty-five 
196 Taliban attacks on Afghan police intensify. New York Times, August 22, 2010. 
Available online at: http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-08-22/news/22230032_1_afghan-
police-police-officers-afghan-national-army-soldiers
197 Fact Finding Mission to Afghanistan by the Finnish Immigration Service. February 
11, 2010. Available online at: www.migri.fi/download.asp?...Afghanistan+Fact-
Finding+Mission+2009
198 Afghan Police Unit Defects to Taliban, Leaving Burning Station Behind. The 
New York Times, November 1, 2010. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/11/02/world/asia/02afghan.html
199 Afghanistan Transition: Missing Variables. International Council on Security and 
Development October 2010. Available online at: http://www.icosgroup.net/modules/
reports/afghanistan_transition_missing_variables
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per cent in 2010.200 The police forces are poorly trained and largely 
illiterate. Many police officers also have serious drug problems.201 
One of our interviewees claimed that in his home region the drug 
problem was endemic. 
The use of drugs is something as natural as drinking water. 
Everyone uses drugs, even peasants. In the cities anyone can buy 
drugs – it’s a trade among trade for Afghans. Neither the Police nor 
the Americans interfere in the consumption of drugs. (Muhsin, born 
in Lashkar Gah, 1994).
While the Afghan National Army (ANA) has been portrayed by 
the U.S. as a success story, financially it is entirely dependent on U.S. 
aid, and far from prepared to face the mounting security threats 
within the country. The U.S. is investing heavily on enlarging the 
ANA’s manpower, while ethnic frictions, political factionalism, and 
eighteen percent drop-out rate and corruption make the building 
of institutional loyalty extremely difficult.202 In the south of the 
country, near all Afghan soldiers are ‘foreigners’, do not master 
the local languages, and are dependent on interpreters hired for 
the Americans.203 Especially in the Pashtun stronghold Helmand 
province, it has proved difficult to recruit Pashtuns for both the 
200 Reforming Afghanistan’s. Police. Crisis Group Asia Report No138, August 30, 
2007. Available online at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south asia/
afghanistan/b85_policing_in_afghanistan___still_searching_for_a_strategy.ashx 
Reluctant Pashtuns hamper Afghan recruitment drive. Reuters, March 3, 2010. 
Available online at: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62247W20100303
201 Drug abuse hampers Afghan police. BBC News, February 18, 2009. Available 
online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7895612.stm
202 Afghanistan: Exit vs. Engagement. International Crisis Group.
Asia Briefing N°115 28 Nov 2010 . Available online at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/B115-afghanistan-
exit-vs-engagement.aspx Reluctant Pashtuns hamper Afghan recruitment drive. 
Reuters, March 3, 2010. Available online at: http://www.reuters.com/article/
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army and police. The Pashtun represent only two to three per cent 
of the total number of ANA recruits.204
The U.S. aims to recruit 141,000 men for ANA before the 
transition date in July 2011. The number is more than the current 
size of the Afghan army. The Taliban will undoubtedly take the 
opportunity to enlist insurgents into the ranks of the ANA.205 The 
situation is further complicated by the fact that the American public 
opinion is increasingly critical towards military engagement in 
Afghanistan, as the building of Afghanistan’s security institutions 
has cost billions of dollars for American taxpayers. 
5.6.2.  Rebuilding
The institutional structures responsible for Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction and security currently lay in the hands of Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). They are joint civilian-military 
organizations and typically consist of sixty to two- hundred and 
fifty persons. A large majority of PRT functionaries are without 
development and diplomatic backgrounds.206 This arrangement has 
not managed to win the trust of local populations and it has received 
plenty of critique, from the point of view of both military and 
development specialists. For example, the PRTs have been criticized 
for lacking a clear overall strategy of auto-evaluation.207
Aid workers, particular those linked to western organizations, 
are often targeted by the Taliban and other insurgent groups, 
and kidnappings and intimidations are frequently reported. 
204 Reluctant Pashtuns hamper Afghan recruitment drive. Reuters, March 3, 2010. 
Available online at: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62247W20100303
205 Ex-UN Official Says Taliban Infiltrating Afghan Forces, BBC News, 4 October 
2010. Available online at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11464175 
206 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment. 
USAID, June 2006. Available online at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf
207 See: Open Eyes to Humanitarian Needs. Refugees International, July 20, 2009. 
Available Online at: http://www.refintl.org/policy/field-report/afghanistan-open-
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Some insurgent groups are also known to target particularly aid 
organizations that are working to improve the lives of women.208
The perceptions of local populations should be taken into account 
when considering the larger picture of security in Afghanistan: the 
most pivotal question in this regard should be whether the basic 
rights of citizens can be enjoyed or not.
With a growing number of western casualties and increasing costs 
of war, popular attitudes have become considerably more critical 
towards the rationality of the western engagement in Afghanistan. 
In addition to the U.S., this applies particularly to the UK, Germany, 
Canada, and Italy. In the 2010 fiscal year, which began October 1, 
2009, the U.S. budgeted more than $900 billion for military and 
diplomatic operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas where 
the country is engaged in the war on terrorism. For the first time 
since occupation of Iraq, the budget for Afghanistan – $65 billion – 
was larger than for Iraq – $61 billion.209 
While the criticism increases, the Obama administration claims 
that, without the presence foreign troops, the Taliban will take 
control of several cities, thus increasing the risk that al-Qaeda would 
re-establish its organizational structures in Afghanistan.210 
5.6.3.  Security climate 
In addition to the Taliban, the main sources of the present insecurity 
in Afghanistan are the armed factions that maintain close contacts 
with the Taliban, and the thousands of regional warlords and 
regional militia commanders who are largely financed by narco-
trafficking. Indeed, narco-trafficking is equivalent to more than 
208 Afghan Police Unit Defects to Taliban, Leaving Burning Station Behind. 
New York Times, November 1, 2010. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/11/02/world/asia/02afghan.html?_r=1
209 Cost of Afghan war explodes with new strategy. USA Today, February 12, 2009. 
Available online at: http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-12-02-war-
costs_N.htm 
210 We must crush the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in a ‘long war’ in Afghanistan. Los 
Angeles Times, July 1, 2010. Available online at: http://articles.latimes.com/2010/
jul/01/opinion/la-oe-bolton-afghanistan-20100701 
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thirty per cent of Afghanistan’s licit economy.211 Both the Taliban 
and regional insurgent groupings largely share a common objective 
to weaken the grip of the central government on the society at large. 
A key part of the strategy is to prevent reconstruction projects, and 
usurp the billions of dollars that flow into the country in the form of 
development aid. As in the case of Iraq, ordinary civilians are often 
poorly informed who is behind the acts of violence. The situation is 
particularly disconcerting in the rural areas in the south and south 
east of the country, which are largely unreachable for the U.S. and 
ISAF forces. 212
In our research we interviewed fifteen Afghans who were denied 
asylum in Finland. All interviewees told us that the Finnish Migration 
Service had stated – in its asylum decisions – that their home areas 
are secure and safe for return. Most of them had received their first 
negative decisions in 2008 and 2009. At the time of interview, they 
were waiting for the decision of the appeals court, and one case 
was being processed at the Supreme Court. The fifteen interviewees 
with negative decisions come from Herat, Lashkar Gah, Ghazni, and 
Kabul. While the city of Herat, in the Western Afghanistan has for 
several years remained relatively secure, recent developments point 
to the fragility of security in all regions of the country. Violence 
sharply increased in 2010, as the Taliban-led insurgency extended 
its attacks from its traditional strongholds in the south and east to 
the previously stable north and west. 213
In many parts of the province of Helmand—where the province 
capital Lashkar Gah is situated—the situation resembles open 
warfare between the U.S. troops and the Taliban. The Taliban is 
heavily present in the Lashkar Gah and carries out frequent terrorist 
211 Afghanistan: Drug Industry and Counter-Narcotics Policy. Structure, functioning, 
Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy. Wolrd Bank, UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime. November 28, 2006. Available online at: http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/448813-1164651372704/
UNDC.pdf
212 Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch, 
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213 Roadside bomb kills four police in west Afghanistan. Reuters, October 26, 2010. 
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strikes, targeting both civilians and government buildings.214 In 
December 2010, the U.S. completed a ten-month offensive in the 
neighboring city of Marjah, which is a major poppy production area 
of the province, and located thirty kilometers south west of Lashkar 
Gah. At the time of writing this report, the battle over control of the 
city of Sangin, seventy kilometers north of Lashkar Gah, was still 
under way. 
As for the situation in Ghazni, the province has for a long time 
been extremely unstable due to its strategic location on the major 
road to Kandahar, the heart of Taliban country. Qayim Sajadi, a 
member of Afghan Parliament from the province, recently stated 
that “The security situation is very bad in Ghazni; in many parts of 
the province, the government has no control.” In fact most of Ghazni 
was deemed too dangerous to conduct voting in September 2010 
parliamentary elections.215
Many of our interviewees had lived more than five years in 
the neighboring countries of Afghanistan. A number of people we 
heard for this study stated that over the recent years the situation of 
thousands of Afghans had become unbearable particularly in Iran. 
President Ahmadinejad’s administration in Iran has expelled over 
720,000 Afghans in the past two years, according to the Afghan 
Ministry of Refugees and Returnees Affairs (MoRRA).216 
214 UPDATE Taliban deputy commander for Lashkar Gah district captured. All 
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5.6.4.  Women and gender 
The NATO/ISAF invasion of Afghanistan was not only a military 
operation against international terrorism. Like before the occupation 
of Iraq, the question of women’s rights was placed high on the 
political agenda. Despite plenty of good will and openly expressed 
commitment to promoting women’s cause, Afghanistan still faces 
tremendous challenges in women’s health, education, employment, 
as well as legal and political rights. Again, as in the case of Iraq, 
the position of women deteriorated after a rapid period of 
modernization. As Taliban seized control in 1996, nearly half of the 
country’s civil servants and some seventy per cent of schoolteachers 
were women.217 According to 2006 figures twenty two per cent of 
government employees were women. 218 
At present, more than 15,000 women die annually from 
pregnancy-related causes and nearly ninety-eight per cent are without 
formal documents proving their citizenship and identities. More than 
half of the girls under eighteen years of age are married. Particularly 
among the poorest segment, the family’s survival depends on bride 
prices, forcing thousands to marry against their will.219 
The post-invasion Afghanistan also resembles Iraq in another 
important respect: like the Government of Baghdad, the Afghan 
Government relies to a great extent on conservative Islamists to 
maintain political control, which in turn reflects negatively on the 
public role of women. To take one example, in March 2009 the 
parliament passed a conservative personal status law pertaining to 
Afghanistan’s Shi’ite population, which in many respects restricts 
women’s basic civil liberties. Wives are obliged not to leave their 
homes without husband’s consent unless having “reasonable legal 
reasons”. Furthermore, the law restricts child custody rights only 
to fathers and grandfathers, and frees the husband from obligation 
217 Afghanistan: Afghan women fact sheet . Afghan Communicator. Available online at: 
h t tp : / /www.womenforafghanwomen.org / images / In tWomensDay04/
AfghanWomenFact%20Sheet.pdf 
218 See http://www.unifem.org/afghanistan/prog/MOWA/civilservice.html
219 Ibid.
118
to provide maintenance for a wife unless she performs her marital, 
including sexual, duties.220
One impact of the decades of militarization on the Afghan society 
is that the number of abductions of girls, as well as forced marriages 
to men of armed factions, has increased. This fact was reflected in 
numerous interviews that we carried out in 2010. Hamid related us: 
 Ghazni is currently very dangerous and a large proportion of 
young adolescents has left the area. Yes, young people in this region 
left the city with the entry of the Taliban forces. People, especially 
women feared for their lives as a result of laws imposed by the 
Taliban. (Hamid, born in Ghazni, 1979)
Kidnappings also involve young men who are sometimes recruited 
by force. Ahmad, young man from Ghazni fled Afghanistan shortly 
after the kidnapping of his elder brother. He recounted:
My elder brother was taken from the house by force, because he 
refused to join. It was like the kidnapping. We did not receive any 
information from him, in three months, and then we were told that 
Taliban killed him. For this reason we had to leave Afghanistan. 
(Ahmad, born in Ghazni, 1992).
Stories about abduction and fear of violence among families 
who refuse to marry off their daughters to combatants emerged in 
numerous interview situations. Armand expressed his reasons to flee 
from his native city Herat: 
My uncle was detained by the Taliban – because of being Shi’ite. 
He has five daughters and was forced to sign a pledge to marry off 
his daughters to the Taliban. To save his home and his daughters he 
had to act quickly. He decided to marry his daughter Ahu to me, so 
that there was no excuse to the Taliban forces to take his daughter. 
I married her in order to save her. (Armand, born in Herat, 1986).
Several interviewees with children told us that the threats and 
attacks on the education system formed a central part of the violence 
against civilian population perpetrated by the Taliban and other 
armed factions. As the Taliban perceives schools and particularly 
the education of girls and women as corrupt foreign import, these 
220 Hamid Karzai signs law ‘legalising rape in marriage’. The Telegraph March 
31, 2009. Available online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
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incidents were often targeted at female students. This type of violence, 
which had been carried out by the Mujahidin factions already in 
early 1990s, was increasingly used to send symbolic messages to 
central authorities and their foreign allies. Furthermore, between 
2005 and 2006 seventeen teachers and officials of education were 
assassinated and more than two hundred attacks on teachers, 
students, or educational institutions were carried out. The situation 
improved immediately after the U.S. invasion in 2001, as students 
begun to return to schools. By 2005 5.2 million children, both 
girls and boys, attended public schools, yet the situation differs 
tremendously between different parts of country.221
5.6.5.  Trafficking in persons
The decades of conflict, impoverishment, lack of security, and violence 
make Afghan people particularly vulnerable to international human 
trafficking. In addition, the geographical environment is favorable to 
trafficking, as the terrain around Afghanistan’s international borders is 
difficult to control. In many areas, local networks engaged in narcotics 
trade offer a ready-made “infrastructure” and strategic know-how 
contributing to emergence of transnational networks. Efforts to 
counter trafficking must always occur on several levels from legislation 
to policy making and information dissemination. Currently, few 
organizations in Afghanistan work directly with trafficking. The field 
is still empirically under-researched. It is often difficult to recognize 
victims of trafficking as people often fall prey to false promises made 
by people they already know. Another difficulty arises from the fact 
that, while Afghans generally recognize that forced trafficking occurs, 
they tend to confuse it with smuggling and kidnapping.222
221 Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan. Human Rights 
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publisher,HRW,,AFG,45c23e2d2,0.html 
222 Trafficking in Persons in Afghanistan. International Organization for Migration, 
Field Survey Report 2008. Available online at: www.iom.int/.../afghanistan/iom_
report_trafficking_afghanistan.pdf
120
5.7.  Return
There was a massive return of Afghan refugees after the collapse 
of the Taliban regime in Kabul. It involved nearly five million 
Afghans, particularly from Iran and Pakistan and was considered 
by the UNCHR as the largest of its return programs in nearly thirty 
years. A large number of the returnees were well aware that political 
conditions for return were unstable, and many were obliged to return 
against their own interests.223 At the time, numerous western states 
displayed willingness to engage in massive repatriation programs, 
including both voluntary and forced returns. The British Home 
Secretary said that the Afghans in the U.K. should return in order 
to participate in the country’s reconstruction. In the Netherlands, 
the authorities announced their willingness to return nearly 30,000 
Afghans to their home country.224 However, with the deteriorating 
security situation, the return has slowed down considerably. In 2009, 
it reached the lowest number – 251,500 – since 1990.225 
The Afghan returnees face very similar problems as discussed in 
the case of Iraq. Wide-spread corruption, instability, and violence, 
together with insufficient housing conditions and land and tenure 
disputes, make life for thousands extremely difficult. At the same 
time, the future for the ones still remaining in the neighboring 
countries is an open question. In Pakistan and Iran, refugees have 
been accused of many social ills and increasing social tensions.
Countries hosting large numbers of Afghan refugees need to 
acknowledge that forced returns will make people vulnerable 
to various risks in Afghanistan, and many will embark on a new 
journey as soon as possible. As apparent in their migratory strategies 
since the Soviet occupation, of the Afghans have learned to survive 
through movement, and that movement is based on rational cost-
223 Repatriation to Afghanistan: durable solution or responsibility shifting? Forced 
Migration Review. April 9, 2009. Available online at: www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/
FMR33/20–22.pdf
224 Afghan refugees in Europe. Forced Migration Review 13, June 2002. Available 
online at: http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR13/fmr13full.pdf
225 UN: Wars Slow Refugee Returns to Record Low, The Associated Press, 15 June 2010. 
Available online at: http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=10914821
121
benefit considerations. This means that forceful repatriations are 
very unlikely to offer durable solutions unless the security, economic, 
and housing conditions in the home regions are guaranteed. 
The international community must acknowledge the need for 
the returnees to be given a role in the rebuilding and devel opment 
programs in Afghanistan. This applies particularly to Eastern and 
Central Afghanistan, where most of the returns take place. It has 
been repeatedly noted that the development programs in the country 
have focused on large-scale infrastructural projects at the cost of 
humanitarian objectives. Due to repeated and extended displacement, 
integration back to home communities will be a difficult process. 
This is the case particularly among rural population, many of whom 
have adapted to urban life styles in exile. 226
Nearly eighty-eight per cent of Afghanistan’s land resources 
are un-arable while agricultural land is largely state-owned. The 
increase of population among the refugee groups has created further 
challenges for returns as land disputes and landlessness remain 
grave problems in rural areas. In 2005 president Karzai issued a 
controversial decree on land allocation for the returning Afghans. 
A large proportion of the plots offered for the landless were of little 
value and many had to move to bigger cities for survival. 227
The failures to address the humanitarian needs of returnees 
result mainly from the structural limitations of the UN and other 
development bodies engaged in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 
Large areas of Afghanistan are practically inaccessible for 
humanitarian work228, and even government employees, unless 
armed, cannot travel in nearly one third of country’s administrative 
districts. In all but one of Afghanistan’s provinces there are districts 
226 Repatriation to Afghanistan: durable solution or responsibility shifting? Forced 
Migration Review. April 9, 2009. Available online at: www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/
FMR33/20-22.pdf 
227 Afghanistan: Invest in People. Refugees International, July 10 2008. Available 
online at: http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/in-depth-report/afghanistan-
invest-people 
228 See: Indicators of Worsening Security in Afghanistan. The New York Times, September 
12, 2010. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/09/12/world/
asia/20100912-afghan-indicators.html?ref=asia
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too dangerous for outside visitors.229 Simultaneously, humanitarian 
projects have suffered from budget cuts. As for international coalition 
forces, they tend to direct their aid merely to their own area without 
paying due respect to the humanitarian needs elsewhere.
In April 2010, the Finnish Immigration Service (Migri) issued 
a press release on up-dated guidelines for Afghanistan. This was a 
response to the increasingly complicated security situation in the 
country, and the difficulties encountered in the evaluation of that 
situation in areas which were inaccessible. The new guidelines 
adopt the need for subsidiary protection as the key criterion in the 
assessment of the international protection of Afghani asylum seekers. 
However, Migri’s view of the overall security situation in Afghanistan 
stands in contrast with the UN Assessment of Travel Safety within 
Afghanistan. 230 According to Migri, only four provinces, namely 
those of Kandahar, Helmand, Khost and Kunar, are understood 
as zones of armed conflict, while the UN considers nearly eighty 
percent of Aghanistan’s land area too dangerous for travel. 
 According to Migri’s interpretation, the worsening security 
situation in the central and northern provinces of Afghnaistan does 
not fulfill the definition of armed conflict. Migri does not regard 
the areas under the Taliban control as unsafe for the civilians, even 
though it notes that “foreigners have no access to such areas”.  The 
basis of Migri’s security assessment remains unclear, as the UNHCR 
and other international aid organizations are no longer able to 
provide security updates. 
The Migri report mentions that in order to update its security 
assessments a number contacts were established during its fact 
finding mission. These contacts included Finnish nationals, as well 
as international and local organizations working in Afghanistan. 
The report mentions that, due to security reasons, no road trips were 
made to areas where the majority of asylum seekers in Finland come 
229 Security in Afghanistan Is Deteriorating, Aid Groups Say. The New York Times, 
September 11, 2010. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/
world/asia/12afghan.html?_r=1
230 See: Indicators of Worsening Security in Afghanistan. The New York 
Times, September 12, 2010. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2010/09/12/world/asia/20100912-afghan-indicators.html?ref=asia
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from. The information on which the report is based was gained 
through interviews made in Kabul’s Serena Hotel, in embassies, 
and in offices of different international organizations. The only 
Afghans interviewed were a wealthy returnee couple who owned 
of a construction company with a history of cooperation with 
western assistance projects. According to the report, the mission 
had established an effective network of local level contacts for 
further data collection. According to Migri, Finland was (in April 
2010) preparing a tripartite agreement with the Government of 
Afghanistan for the repatriation of Afghans.
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6  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Given the enthusiasm with which EU Member States presently 
promote large-scale returns to Iraq and Afghanistan, it is surprising 
that so little research has been conducted on the reintegration of 
returnees. In the Nordic context, we were able to trace only one study 
that touched upon the theme, carried out by Maria Bak Riiskjør in 
2008. Her study focused on the perceptions of thirty-five Iraqis who 
had participated in a voluntary repatriation program but chose not 
to remain in Iraq and returned back to Denmark.231 
The main reasons for failed reintegration dissected by Riiskjør 
could be classified with reference to three underlying factors. First, 
the Iraqi interviewees in Denmark perceived that the Iraqi society had 
undergone significant and often entirely unanticipated changes, such 
as ethnic and sectarian cleansings with corresponding reorganization 
of the political and social arena. Increasing religious conservatism 
that came as the by-product of political power struggle had affected 
gender roles and shared norms of propriety in ways that made many 
feel like strangers – even unwanted ones– in their own country. As 
seen in the course of this study, reintegration process was particularly 
difficult – if not entirely impossible – for highly educated women, 
who had held public sector positions— as journalists, academics, 
teachers, nurses, doctors, and administrative officials— prior to their 
231 Bak Riiskjør, M. (2008) Circular repatriation: the unsuccessful return and 
reintegration of Iraqis with refugee status in Denmark. New Issues in Refugee 
research. UNHCR Research Paper No. 165. Available online at: www.unhcr.
org/48eb34c72.html
Danish Act on Repatriation, ratified in January 2000 provides the legal and 
practical facilities for voluntary repatriation. It furthermore offers an opportunity 
for the voluntary returnees to change their minds and return to Denmark within 12 
months of their repatriation. By the year 2008 306 Iraqis had participated in the 
voluntary return program of whom 73 chose not to remain in Iraq and to returned 
to Denmark. Ibid.
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refuge. Riiskjør’s study indicates that the unstable security situation 
and lack of services threatened the returnees’ physical safety. Number 
of our Iraqi informants also highlighted that foreign returnees are 
stereotypically considered to be relatively wealthy, and they may be 
targeted by criminal groups engaged in trafficking and kidnappings 
for ransom. 
Recent reports on both Afghanistan and Iraq indicate 
that returnees are particularly affected by poor economic and 
humanitarian conditions and unsettled property disputes. Massive 
returns from Europe and elsewhere will undoubtedly burden the 
societies in a manner that can lead to renewed large-scale violence 
and exile. It should be underlined that the security situation in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan is extremely fragile, not least because the 
international military engagement will come to a gradual end in the 
near future. The rebuilding of the Iraqi and Afghan military and 
security institutions has received plenty of international critique and 
the governments of both countries lack popular legitimacy.232
According to Riiskjør, a second factor hindering reintegration is 
that, while adapting to new circumstances in exile, refugees undergo 
changes in behavior, habits, and perceptions. Often the refugee 
households are divided regarding their opinions on repatriation. The 
return is particularly painful for children who have undergone a 
large part of their socialization process in exile, and acquired social 
and linguistic skills in the foreign setting. The Afghan interviewees 
in particular, considered themselves uprooted from their country of 
origin due to extended exile – in Iran or Pakistan – prior to their 
asylum travel to the west. They felt that they were lacking the 
necessary social capital to construct their lives anew in Afghanistan. 
As Iraq and Afghanistan – the primary battle fronts of the U.S. led 
War on Terror – will witness gradual withdrawal of Western military 
forces, the EU member states display increasing determination to 
promote both voluntary and involuntary repatriation of asylum 
seekers. While durable return is the most desirable solution for the 
majority of Iraqis and Afghans abroad, the EU Members States also 
232 cf. Five Years on Europe is Still Ignoring Its Responsibilities Towards Iraqi 
Refugees, UNHCR, March 3, 2008, Available online at: http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/47e1315c2.html 
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need to take into account the social and political consequences of 
large scale population movements. Returning people to crisis zones 
within programs of ‘voluntary’ return – will not serve the long term 
interests of either the countries of origin or the countries of exile. 
The people who do not ‘fit in’ will engage in revised strategies of 
movement to ensure survival and find shelter.
Participation in voluntary return programs must not be offered 
as the last option before resorting to hard-line measures. As Tiina 
Kanninen aptly points out in the first part of our project reports, 
voluntary return “should not mean the intensification of measures of 
surveillance, punishment, or other kinds of threats of dehumanizing 
deportation233”. Voluntariness turns into a mere semantic game 
when a person is placed in a position of choosing between return 
and sanctions, such as forced return and re–entry prohibition. 
As Kanninen argues, “Only positive incentives – not detention, 
withdrawal of financial support, or other pressure – can contribute to 
the aim of sustainable returns234.” Furthermore, such arrangements 
will not treat in any relevant ways the underlying reasons behind 
international movement of Iraqi and Afghan asylum seekers. 
In the worst case, large-scale returns, whether forced or 
‘voluntary’, will generate new forms of mobility from the conflict 
zones towards Western Europe. Thus they might only serve to 
reshape the migration and trafficking markets. There is plenty of 
empirical evidence that increasing numbers of people embrace forms 
mobility that can no longer be understood in terms of conventional 
categories such as “migrant” transmigrant, clandestine migrant, 
asylum seeker, and refugee. These marginal mobile people display 
a deeply ambivalent relation with national contexts. They perceive 
themselves as unwanted global nomads, for whom mobility is a 
method of survival. Their self-image is often defined by cultural up-
rootedness and alienation. Many individuals whom we heard for this 
study had lived for years in a constant state of ‘in-betweennes’ and 
legal limbo, drifting between their country of origin, neighboring 
233 Kanninen T. (2010, 114). Gender, Vulnerability and the Obligation to Return: 
An Overview of Return Assistance to ’Rejected’ Asylum Seekers in the Nordic 
Countries. Occasional Paper No. 98. Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere.
234 Ibid.
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countries, and Western European asylum countries. Many end 
up leaving their asylum claims in several EU countries and under 
different identities. It is highly probable that the increasing readiness 
of EU member states to promote both forced and ‘voluntary’ returns 
will increase the number of people engaged in marginal mobility.
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